Economics of air pollution: policy, mortality concentration-response, and increasing marginal benefits of abatement by Goodkind, Andrew Lloyd
Economics of Air Pollution: Policy, Mortality
Concentration-Response, and Increasing Marginal
Benefits of Abatement
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY
Andrew Lloyd Goodkind
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
Jay S. Coggins
December, 2014
c© Andrew Lloyd Goodkind 2014
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Acknowledgements
I wish offer my greatest appreciation and thanks to those that have shaped my thinking
and supported my education. My adviser, Jay Coggins, for inspiring me to study
environmental economics and for providing me unwavering encouragement. To the
members of my dissertation committee, Julian Marshall, Stephen Polasky and Frances
Homans, my education has been greatly enhanced by learning from each of you in
classes, as an assistant, and as an adviser to me. My deepest thanks to Chris Tessum,
for patiently explaining the details of air dispersion models and selflessly sharing his
models and data that were integral to the completion of my dissertation. I want to
credit the members of Jay Coggins’ environmental economics special project group, for
the fruitful discussions of increasing marginal benefits that helped develop my research
topics.
I am forever grateful to my parents, and my wife Amanda for supporting my deci-
sions, providing needed encouragement, and making everything I do possible.
i
Dedication
To Amanda, my loving wife and best friend.
ii
Abstract
This dissertation examines the economics of air pollution in three essays. The first
two essays consider the implications of the possibility of increasing marginal benefits to
pollution abatement. The third essay integrates a new model of air dispersion with an
economic model to estimate the marginal damage caused by criteria pollutants in the
United States.
In the first essay, the optimal abatement policy is derived for a scenario with increas-
ing marginal benefits of abatement and uncertainty in the marginal cost of abatement.
Pollution taxes are preferred over quantity restrictions when marginal benefits are in-
creasing in abatement.
The second essay uses simulations of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) dispersion and
compares optimal source-specific pollution control policies with pollution concentration
standards and uniform pollution taxes. Optimal policies for PM2.5 regulation yield
substantial advantages over uniform policies that do not discriminate based on the
location of emissions. The simulations also consider the shape of the concentration-
response (C-R) relationship between PM2.5 pollution and mortality. With a log-log
C-R, where marginal benefits of PM2.5 abatement are increasing, society should prefer
fewer emissions and lower PM2.5 concentrations than if the C-R is log-linear, where
marginal benefits of abatement are decreasing.
The third essay estimates the marginal damages of criteria pollutant emissions for
hundreds of the most heavily polluting sources in the U.S. Marginal damages vary
substantially depending on the location of the emission source. The calculation of
marginal damages is highly dependent on the choice of air dispersion modeling, the C-R
relationship, and the value assigned to mortality caused by environmental risks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
2This dissertation discusses issues of air pollution and environmental risk. Air pollu-
tion that impacts human health is a topic critical to policy makers, businesses and
economists. The environmental risks from air pollution, especially fine particulates
(particles with diameter less than 2.5 microns, PM2.5), are large and affect almost all
people.
Epidemiologists have identified fine particulate air pollution as a key environmental
risk (Pope et al. 1995; Dockery et al. 1993; Pope, Ezzati and Dockery 2009b). Exposure
to all outdoor air pollutants, globally and in the U.S., has been linked with several
detrimental health impacts leading to morbidity and mortality including: respiratory
infections; lung, trachea and bronchus cancers; ischaemic heart disease; cerebrovascular
disease; and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Lim et al. 2012). Globally, 3.4
million deaths are attributed to outdoor air pollution annually, 95% of which are from
exposure to fine particulates. In the U.S., risks from fine particulate air pollution is the
8th leading cause of mortality, just ahead of alcohol use, responsible for over 100,000
deaths annually, leading to 1.6 million years of life lost (IHME 2014).
With many lives at stake, controlling air pollution is a pressing issue for government
regulators and lawmakers. Making comprehensive decisions to limit the external costs
of air pollution is difficult for a number of reasons: there are many sources of air
pollution, and the connection between emissions and the people impacted is highly
complex. With businesses bearing only a fraction of the environmental costs associated
with their emissions, air pollution represents an externality that affects an enormous
number of people given dispersion of air pollutants and the difficultly avoiding pollution
in the air we breathe. Economists play a prominent role in advising policy makers how
to appropriately handle the externalities from emissions of pollutants that originate
from many sources. Businesses that emit air pollution represent important and central
industries in the economy. Given the magnitude of the externalties associated with
PM2.5 air pollution, it may be optimal to require businesses to incur large costs to limit
their contributions to pollution, even if it results in dramatic changes to the economy.
U.S. government agencies assign large values to health risk reductions of existing
and proposed regulations. The Office of Management and Budget estimates benefits of
$19 to $167 billion per year from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations
of fine particulates, against costs of $7 billion (OMB 2013). In EPA regulatory impact
3analyses of ozone (EPA 2008), mercury and air toxics (EPA 2011), and carbon (EPA
2014b), the health benefits of reduced mortality risks attributable to fine particulates
are included to justify the regulations.
Although these regulations save many lives, an efficient policy of fine particulate air
pollution could reap benefits to society between $50 and $220 billion annually, from addi-
tional pollution reductions and cost-effective abatement strategies (Muller and Mendel-
sohn 2009). Across all outdoor air pollutants with identified monetary damages from
increased morbidity and mortality, decreased visibility, and impacts to timber produc-
tion, agriculture and recreational activies, the lion’s share of damages are attributable
to mortality from chronic exposure to fine particulates. This results from the large
mortality risks associated with fine particulate air pollution and the large value placed
on avoiding risks to human life.
The impacts of fine particulate air pollution have been identified as an issue of utmost
importance by epidemiologists, regulators, and economists, but additional analysis is
necessary. This dissertation examines some of the important issues that affect our
understanding of the damages from fine particulate air pollution and how they should
be regulated.
There exists a disconnect between economic theory of efficient regulation of exter-
nalities and most regulations of air pollution. Economics advises pricing emissions of
air pollutants at the value of the marginal external damages caused by the emissions.
Yet regulators often implement command and control policies requiring emission reduc-
tions to meet pollution concentration limits at locations of concern, generally without
providing financial incentives for polluters to make cost effective pollution abatement
decisions. In the U.S., the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) set pol-
lution concentration limits that cannot be exceeded in any location.
The reliance on concentration limits for criteria pollutants, in particular PM2.5,
suggests that regulators assume that there are no damages below a particular concen-
tration level. In other words, there is a threshhold concentration level, below which
human health risks are not impacted by further concentration reductions. For expo-
sure to PM2.5, results from the two most prominent studies into the link with human
mortality, the American Cancer Society (ACS) study (Pope et al. 2005; Pope et al.
2002; Krewski et al. 2009) and the Harvard Six City (H6C) study (Dockery et al. 1993;
4Laden et al. 2006; Lepeule et al. 2012), indicate that no safe threshhold exists, or
that the threshhold is below the concentration levels experienced by most people. If
no safe threshhold exists, then there are opportunities to improve public health by fo-
cusing attention on reducing risks to people exposed across the entire range of PM2.5
concentrations.
The issue of no safe threshhold of PM2.5 exposure is related to the concentration-
response (C-R) relationship between PM2.5 concentrations and the risk of mortality.
In the most recent analysis of the ACS study, Krewski et al. (2009), estimate two
possible functional forms of the C-R: log-linear, a commonly assumed relationship with
a constant relative-risk of mortality between any fixed difference in concentration; and
log-log, an alternative relationship where the risk of mortality decreases at a faster rate
from reductions at low compared to high concentrations. With log-log, the marginal
benefits of abating fine particulate pollution are increasing in concentration reductions,
suggesting that not only is there no safe threshhold, but the first unit of exposure is the
most damaging. The implications of the difference between the log-linear and log-log
C-R relationships, for policy and damages from pollution, are explored in the following
chapters.
With log-log, a central tenet of environmental economics, that the marginal benefits
of abatement are decreasing, is violated. Chapter 2 evaluates the theory of optimal
pollution control given increasing marginal benefits of abatement. Here price and quan-
tity instruments are compared under marginal abatement cost uncertainty, a framework
first developed by Weitzman (1974). The optimal price and quantity policies are de-
rived depending on the relative slopes of the marginal benefits of abatement and the
marginal abatement costs. The key finding is that, with increasing marginal benefits,
a quantity policy is never preferred. Unlike Weitzman (1974), who assumed downward
sloping marginal benefits of abatement, the optimal price and quantity policies may
yield solutions either at the corners (zero abatement or complete abatement) or in the
interior. Another surprising finding is that the optimal price policy is not necessarily
at the intersection of the marginal benefit and the expected marginal abatement cost
functions. In addition, the optimal price policy is a function of the level of uncertainty
in marginal costs. As the level of uncertainty increases, the advantage of the price policy
over the quantity policy increases.
5A simulation model is developed in Chapter 3 that analyzes pollution control poli-
cies for PM2.5. Dispersion of air pollution from hundreds of sources of PM2.5 emissions
are simulated using a Gaussian plume model, and the resulting pollution concentrations
are calculated in receptors for a region of the U.S. Midwest. The model calculates mor-
tality risks at each receptor with the log-linear and the log-log C-R from Krewski et al.
(2009). Three air pollution policies are examined: efficient emission abatement, where
the marginal costs of abatement are equated with the marginal benefits of abatement
at each source; a uniform pollution limit that cannot be exceeding in any receptor; and
a uniform emissions tax.
Important differences are found in the outcomes across the three policies and the
two C-R relationships. With a log-log C-R, each policy calls for lower emissions and
lower PM2.5 concentrations than with a log-linear C-R. If the true C-R is log-log lower
emissions and concentrations are preferred to take advantage of the larger mortality risk
reductions possible in the cleaner locations.
For both C-R relationships, the efficient abatement policy achieves substantially
greater welfare for society than the uniform pollution standard. This result highlights
the importance of regulating emissions that impact more than just those that face
the greatest risks. Finally, substantial advantages exist with the efficient policy com-
pared with the uniform emissions tax. While the unform tax achieves a cost-effective
outcome, the efficient policy differentiates between the damages of emissions at each
location. The spatial heterogeneity of marginal benefits of abatement indicates the im-
portance of applying source-specific regulations. One possibile approach to implement
an approximation of the efficient abatement policy, with low information requirements
of abatement costs by regulators, is a set of discriminating emissions taxes, different for
each source equal to the marginal damage of emissions.
In Chapter 4 the marginal damages of emissions of certain criteria pollutants are esti-
mated using a newly developed air dispersion model for the U.S. The impact of emissions
of PM2.5, SOX , NOX and NH3 (pollutants that contribute to the total fine particulate
concentration), are modeled from hundreds of the largest elevated and ground-level
sources of emissions across the U.S. The estimates of the marginal damages of an ad-
ditional ton of emissions show orders of magnitude differences depending on source
6location and pollutant. In addition, damages in receptors far from the source of emis-
sion can be substantial, highlighting the interconnected nature of the many sources of
emissions that contribute to the PM2.5 concentrations in a receptor.
Marginal damages were calculated for each source with the both the Krewski et al.
(2009) log-linear and log-log C-R relationships. In 2005, the baseline year modeled, fine
particulate concentrations were substantially higher than today, and marginal damages
with a log-linear and log-log C-R were very similar. However, when the calculations were
made with lower 2013 PM2.5 concentrations, the marginal damages with a log-log C-R
were much larger than with a log-linear C-R. At lower fine particulate concentrations,
the value of additional emission reductions are larger if the true C-R is log-log.
The results found in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 indicate that using a log-log C-R (or
increasing marginal benefits of abatement) can substantially change the analysis of
PM2.5 air pollution impacts and regulation. Identifying the true shape of the C-R
between exposure to fine particulates and mortality thus has significant implications for
society.
Regardless of the shape of the C-R, fine particulate air pollution is a significant risk
to human health that requires attention from epidemiologists and economists. Despite
the substantial improvements in air quality in the United States over the last several
decades, additional reductions may be required.
Chapter 2
Prices vs. Quantities With
Increasing Marginal Benefits∗
∗Chapter 2 originally as unpublished manuscript with authors:
Andrew L. Goodkind, Jay S. Coggins, Timothy A. Delbridge, Milda Irhamni, Justin
Andrew Johnson, Suhyun Jung, Julian D. Marshall, Bijie Ren, Martha H. Rogers and
Joshua S. Apte.
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82.1 Introduction
Environmental policy is often built upon quantity restrictions. In the U.S., at least, these
usually take the form of direct quantity standards, with a few noteworthy allowance-
trading schemes and emissions taxes mixed in. In this paper we offer new reasons to
favor taxes. We find that, for the model under study, quantity restrictions are never
preferred and the relative advantage to taxes can be large. In our theoretical model,
taxes are preferred because of the flexibility they grant to the polluting industry. The
greater the level of uncertainty regarding control costs, the greater the advantage to
taxes. Recycling of tax revenue, which we ignore, would tilt the comparison still more
decisively in favor of taxes.
In the standard economic model of environmental policy, one assumes that marginal
benefits are decreasing or, in the limit, constant in abatement.1 One assumes too that
marginal costs are increasing in abatement.2 In this setting, the obvious optimum is
found where marginal benefits and marginal costs meet. Familiar textbook treatments
of the problem adhere to the standard view. Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 59), to take
one prominent example, justify their assumption of downward-sloping marginal benefits
this way: “In accord with the usual observations, [MB] has a negative slope, indicating
that the greater the degree of purity of air or water that has already been achieved, the
less the marginal benefit of a further ‘unit’ of purification.”
This understanding of the curvature of abatement benefits is no longer obviously
correct. A benefit function for air pollution abatement is, after all, a reduced form
in which is embedded a good deal of nontrivial science. The mapping runs first from
abatement to a change in ambient pollution concentration, next from a change in con-
centration to a change in health outcomes, and finally from a change in health outcomes
to monetary benefits.3 If (i) the first and third mappings are approximately linear; (ii)
1The limiting case of linear benefits, constant marginal benefits, is employed by Muller and Mendel-
sohn (2009).
2But see Andreoni and Levinson (2001), who argue that the production function for abatement of
fine particulates exhibits increasing returns to scale, and thus that marginal costs are decreasing in
abatement.
3This emphasis on health outcomes reflect that fact that the lion’s share of benefits associated with
air-quality rules flows from improvements in human health. Of that, the lion’s share flows from avoided
mortality. If the curvature of mortality benefits goes against type, it is unlikely that other components
such as benefits to avoided hospitalization and morbidity will reverse it.
9the mapping from concentration to health outcomes (a concentration-response function
that relates mortality or another negative health outcome to pollution levels) takes the
classical logistic form; and (iii) the range of concentration relevant to air policy falls
in the convex part of the curve; then one does indeed find support for the “usual ob-
servations.” The first unit of abatement is most valuable, the last unit least valuable:
marginal benefits are decreasing in abatement.
To be fair to Baumol and Oates, their view reflected the conventional scientific wis-
dom of the time. Dockery et al. (1993) and Pope et al. (1995), showed for the first
time that there is no safe minimum level of concentration of fine particulates (PM2.5).
Concentration-response (C-R), both papers said, is not logistic but linear. Health dam-
age goes all the way down to the lowest observed concentration. Recent evidence sug-
gests that linearity itself is now questioned. The C-R, some prominent studies suggest,
is strictly concave. Not only is the first unit of concentration not safe, it is the most
harmful.
Unexpected benefits curvature can arise from any component of the mapping from
abatement to benefits. Nonlinearity due to atmospheric chemistry in the first mapping is
a distinct possibility. A curious example, featured in Repetto (1987) and in Muller and
Mendelsohn (2012), is that of ozone. Titration of ozone by excess nitrogen oxides means
that, in conditions where NOX is plentiful, abatement of NOX can lead to increased
concentration of harmful ozone. Here we have negative and increasing marginal abate-
ment benefits for the first units of abatement, at least for a portion of the downwind
landscape.4
If, contrary to the ozone case, the rest of the problem is approximately linear, the
curvature of benefits is dual to that of the underlying C-R. Here, if the C-R curve is
strictly concave in concentration, then the first unit of concentration is the most harmful,
the last unit of abatement the most valuable. In such a case benefits are strictly convex
and marginal benefits therefore slope upward in abatement.
This possibility, an unusual observation, forms the intellectual basis for the present
4Strange curvature and increasing marginal benefits arise in other situations as well, at least over a
range of the given policy choice. Examples due to externalities of an intervention include incidence rates
for vaccination (Boulier, Datta, and Goldfarb 2007) and for bed nets to prevent malaria (Hawley et al.
2003). In Anderson, Laxminarayan, and Salant’s (2012) dynamic model of the optimal expenditure of
a treatment budget for an infectious disease in multiple villages, unexpected curvature and surprising
corner solutions result.
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paper. Why might it be interesting? For PM2.5, according to a growing chorus of
environmental-health experts the curvature of the C-R for this deadly pollutant might
be strictly concave.5 Examples include Ostro (2004), Pope et al. (2009a, 2011), and
Smith and Peel (2010). These studies rely in part on data representing very high
concentrations, for active smokers, that lie outside the range of ambient concentrations
observed in U.S. cities.
More compelling evidence, because it relies exclusively upon ambient levels of PM2.5
that are directly relevant to U.S. clean-air policy, is found in Crouse et al. (2012) and
Krewski et al. (2009). The Crouse et al. study, in which PM2.5 concentrations range
from 1.9 to 19.2µg/m3, fits natural-spline and logarithmic C-R functions, for four causes
of mortality, to a large cohort of Canadian residents. For three of the four categories
they cannot reject a linear relationship, but for the fourth (ischemic heart disease) they
reject linearity in favor of strict concavity. There, the first unit of concentration is the
most harmful, the last unit of abatement the most valuable.6
Krewski et al. (2009) is especially important because of the role their results play in
the U.S. Environmental Agency’s recent (2012b) Regulatory Impact Analysis supporting
a new proposed national standard for PM2.5 concentration. Krewski et al. contains an
extended analysis of the influential American Cancer Society longitudinal study (Pope et
al. 1995) of the effects of air pollution on human health. In the extended analysis, where
PM2.5 concentrations range as low as 5 µg/m
3, Krewski et al. estimated a log-linear and
a log-log C-R relating PM2.5 to five causes of death (all causes, cardiopulmonary disease,
ischemic heart disease, lung cancer, and all other causes). Their point estimate of 1.06
for the constant hazard ratio (HR) assocated with all causes of death (see Table 11 of
Krewski et al. 2009, p. 28) serves as an essential parameter in the EPA’s (2012b, p. 5-27)
PM2.5 benefits assessment.
7
5Strict concavity is neither unusual nor, apparently, controversial in the case of environmental health
related to toxins found in workplaces, a threat that lies outside the purview of the U.S. EPA. See, for
example, Steenland et al. (2011) and especially Stayner et al. (2003).
6In the Crouse et al. cohort of 2.1 million subjects, ischemic heart disease claimed 43,400 lives between
1991 and 2001. The corresponding number for all non-accidental causes is 192,300.
7In the U.S. EPA PM2.5 RIA, the 1.06 linear HR estimate from Krewski et al. (2009) helps determine
the lower end of the range of EPA’s benefits estimate. The corresponding number from Laden et al.
(2006) is 1.16, which helps determine the higher end of the range of EPA’s benefits estimate. Average
concentrations in the six cities, all in the eastern U.S., are higher than in the much larger ACS cohort.
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The three right-most columns in Krewski et al.’s Table 11 report the results of esti-
mating a log-log function for each cause of death. These results reflect a strictly concave
fitted relationship: the first units of concentration are the most harmful.8 Though they
do not report the results of a statistical test to determine which function gives the better
fit, Krewski et al. (2009, p. 27) observe that the log-log form “was a slightly better pre-
dictor of the variation in survival.”9 The EPA chose to use the results of the log-linear
rather than the log-log model.
Let us state carefully what we endeavor to claim: that a strictly concave C-R, and
attendant increasing marginal benefits, might sometimes be true, for some important
pollutants and some health endpoints. The scientific results are mixed, and so a stronger
claim on our part would be unwarranted. Our point, though, is that this science is
unsettled and relatively new. The experts disagree.10 The evidence conflicts.
Our paper is rooted in the following question: What if marginal benefits of abate-
ment are increasing. What then is the proper policy response, and which if any of our
most familiar recommendations need to be reconsidered?
We examine the effect of increasing marginal benefits on the comparison of tax and
quantity instruments in environmental policy (Weitzman 1974). Our focus is not on
technology or dynamics or on how different permit-market arrangements affect policy
choice.11 Rather, in the presence of increasing marginal benefits we study how corner
8It is perhaps worth noting the terminology adopted by Krewski et al. in describing their results.
The column headings in their Table 11 are given as “Linear” and “Log.” These labels refer to the way
in which the PM2.5 variable enters the right side of their regression models. It is either untransformed
(the linear model) or log-transformed (the log model). In both cases, however, the dependent variable
is the log of the hazard ratio. (See the unnumbered equations on their p. 27.) Here we adopt the
language “log-linear” and “log-log” to refer to the two alternatives. Over the range of ambient PM2.5
concentrations, their log-linear results yield a C-R that is very nearly linear and their log-log results
yield a C-R that is markedly concave.
9Noting the importance of the choice of functional form, they write (2009, p. 28), “The choice of
functional relationship between PM exposure and mortality can make a considerable difference in the
predicted risk at lower concentrations. For example, the HR for lung cancer adjusted for the ecologic
covariates based on the [log-linear] formulation is 1.142 (95% CI, 1.057–1.234), whereas the HR based
on the [log-log] formulation is 1.236 (95% CI, 1.114–1.372), a 66% increase in risk.” The corresponding
increase for all causes, from 1.078 to 1.128, is 64%.
10For an interesting glimpse into the way the scientists talk to each other about curvature, see Schwartz
(2011).
11Karp and Zhang (2012) present a nice overview of the large literature related to the question. They
study the problem when a regulator behaves strategically. See also Jaffe et al. (2003). Various aspects
of the problem of instrument choice are take up by, among others, Moledina et al. (2003), Fisher et al.
(2003), and Tarui and Polasky (2005). The connection between technology adoption and instrument is
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solutions affect the usual Weitzman-style results.
Given an initial level of air quality, we assume that the marginal benefits of abate-
ment and the marginal costs of abatement are both increasing in abatement. We allow
for the possibility that reducing emissions to zero may be technologically infeasible, per-
haps due to background natural sources. In this case, “complete” abatement means a
reduction to the minimum feasible level. Expected marginal costs are assumed to meet
marginal benefits where abatement is positive but not complete. Then we analyze two
sets of cases: those in which marginal benefits are less steep than marginal costs (we
call this case “crossing from above”); and those in which marginal benefits are steeper
than marginal costs (“crossing from below”).
A model of optimal abatement policy, largely familiar excepting the slope of marginal
benefits, is outlined in the following section. There we explain two additional assump-
tions, which are adopted throughout: (i) linearity of marginal costs and benefits; and
(ii) a uniform distribution on uncertainty. The first is common in the literature since
the work of Adar and Griffin (1976). The second is less common, but our wish to
characterize the optimal tax requires the selection of a specific functional form for the
denisity on the stochastic term. (A normal distribution offers advantages, but it defeats
attempts at analytical solutions.) We believe that our results survive in a more general
setup, but we defer a detailed analysis of that situation to future work.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 contain a preliminary analysis of first the optimal quantity
policy and then the optimal price policy. If marginal benefits are steeper than marginal
costs, we show that the optimal quantity policy is either zero or maximum possible
abatement. The optimal price policy is more complicated because for a given tax it is
possible that for some realizations of the stochastic term the industry will choose either
zero abatement or maximum possible abatement. The corners that come into play add
a significant degree of complexity to the tax-setting regulator’s optimization problem.
Section 2.5 addresses the problem for the situation of marginal benefits crossing
from above. In this case the optimal price is always preferred. This finding is not at
odds with Weitzman, but we find that if the level of uncertainty becomes sufficiently
large, the optimal emissions tax is no longer at the intersection of marginal benefits and
explored by Montero 2002, Milliman and Prince (1989), Biglaiser et al. (1995), Gersbach and Glazer
(1999), and Requate and Unold (2003).
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expected marginal costs.
Section 2.6 contains the heart of the paper. There marginal benefits cross marginal
costs from below. The all-or-nothing nature of the quantity policy means that the
welfare stakes are especially high, in that the regulator might choose a policy of zero
abatement when the optimal policy was maximum possible abatement. If the level
of uncertainty is low, the price and quantity policies are equivalent. If the level of
uncertainty is sufficiently high, the price policy becomes strictly preferred. At the
threshold, the optimal tax can jump discretely from extreme (either high or low) to an
intermediate level.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. If the regulator had perfect informa-
tion about costs, the appropriate policy, either zero abatement or maximum possible
abatement, could be selected with confidence. This is essentially the outcome achieved
by either policy if uncertainty is low. If the level of uncertainty is high, though, the
quantity policy is likely to produce the incorrect level of abatement. The wrong choice,
in either direction, can be quite costly. An intermediate tax, however, allows the regu-
lator to exploit the fact that the industry will choose low abatement (if the realization
of uncertainty is high) precisely when zero abatement was optimal and will choose high
abatement (if the realization of uncertainty is low) precisely when maximum possible
abatement was optimal. The tax policy confers an advantage via the flexibility granted
to the industry, whose interests are, in a crucial sense, aligned with those of the regula-
tor.
2.2 The basic model
Consider the problem facing a regulator who contemplates limiting emissions of a single
pollutant from a single polluting industry. Current total emissions are eT > 0. Due
to technological constraints the minimum achievable level of emissions is emin > 0.
The corresponding maximum level of abatement is denoted e0 < eT and abatement is
a ∈ [0, e0]. (Abatement levels greater than e0 are ignored throughout, and abatement
at e0 is referred to as complete abatement.) The nonstochastic benefit to abatement is
described by the quadratic function B : [0, eT ] → R+ given by B(a) = αa + (β/2)a2,
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with α ≥ 0, β > 0, and B(0) = 0. Marginal benefits are written
MB(a) = α+ βa
and are known by the regulator with certainty.
The industry’s cost of abatement is quadratic on [0, e0], but because further abate-
ment is infeasible (and so infinitely costly) we ignore a > e0 and write C : [0, e0]×R→ R.
The cost function depends upon abatement and upon a random variable u, and is ad-
ditively separable in its two arguments: C(a, u) = ηa+ (δ/2)a2 + ua, with η ≥ 0, δ > 0
and C(0, u) = 0 for any u. Marginal costs are written
MC(a, u) = η + δa+ u.
Let the vector of structural parameters be denoted θ = (α, β, η, δ, e0).
Uncertainty enters only through the distribution on the intercept of marginal costs.
Let the support for the intercept be on the finite interval [η − ν, η + ν], with ν > 0.
The density function for u within this interval is assumed to be uniform, with density
f(u) = 1/2ν and with E(u) = 0. We assume that the regulator knows the density
function f(u). Social welfare is quadratic in abatement, and is given by
SW(a, u) = B(a)− C(a, u)
We shall assume throughout that marginal benefits and expected marginal costs
intersect exactly once, in the interior of [0, e0]. We then distinguish between situations
in which marginal benefits cross marginal costs from above and from below. These are
formalized as follows.
Assumption 1. (Crossing-from-above condition.) There exists aˆ ∈ (0, e0) such
that MB(a) > E
(
MC(a, u)
)
for all a ∈ [0, aˆ) and MB(a) < E(MC(a, u)) for all a ∈
(aˆ, e0].
Assumption 2. (Crossing-from-below condition.) There exists aˆ ∈ (0, e0) such
that MB(a) < E
(
MC(a, u)
)
for all a ∈ [0, aˆ) and MB(a) > E(MC(a, u)) for all a ∈
(aˆ, e0].
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Figure 2.1: Depiction of upward-sloping marginal benefits. A: crossing from above. B: Crossing
from below.
Assumption 1, which implies that α > η and β < δ, is depicted in Figure 2.1A, where
MC(a, 0) represents marginal cost with degenerate u. A quantity-setting regulator in
this situation would maximize expected social welfare by setting abatement at aˆ. A
price-setting regulator would maximize expected social welfare by setting an emissions
tax at or near tˆ.
Assumption 2, which implies that α < η and β > δ, is depicted in Figure 2.1B.
There, the optimal abatement level depends upon whether area X is less than or greater
than area Z. In either case, abatement at aˆ, the crossing point, results in negative
social welfare, the minimum to the regulator’s optimization problem. This will be true
of the intersection any time the curves satisfy Assumption 2. We will see that under
Assumption 2, with uncertainty the optimal emissions tax is ill-behaved in the face of
uncertain costs.
2.3 The optimal quantity policy
Suppose that the random term in MC(a, u) is degenerate at u = 0. Under Assumption 1,
the problem without uncertainty is straightforward. The optimal quantity policy is set
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where MB(a) = MC(a, 0). Under Assumption 2, the optimal quantity policy is either
maximum possible abatement or no abatement. In either case, there exists a critical
value η∗ such that the social welfare associated with maximum possible abatement is
zero. This value is given by
η∗ =
e0
2
(β − δ) + α. (2.1)
The optimal quanity policy is defined by the relative value of the intercept of the ex-
pected marginal cost curve and η∗
q∗(η) =

e0 if η < η∗
{0, e0} if η = η∗
0 if η > η∗.
(2.2)
With uncertainty in marginal cost, whether she chooses to pursue a price policy or
a quantity policy, our regulator is assumed to maximize expected social welfare. The
optimal quantity policy is based entirely upon the intersection of marginal benefits and
expected marginal costs. The quantity-setting regulator’s optimal decision rule q∗(ν; θ)
maximizes expected social welfare:
q∗(ν; θ) = argmax
q∈[0,e0]
Eu
[∫ q
0
(
MB(a)−MC(a, u)
)
da
]
. (2.3)
This constraint set for q is compact in R and the objective function is continuous in q.
By the Weierstrass Theorem it achieves a maximum. If marginal benefits cross from
above (Assumption 1 holds), the optimal quantity policy is at aˆ, where the two curves
meet. If marginal benefits cross from below (Assumption 2 holds), the optimal quantity
policy is once again given by equation (2.2) and is either zero or e0.
2.4 The optimal price policy
If there is no uncertainty, the price policy, an emissions tax of t, mimics the quantity
policy. If marginal benefits cross from above, it is set where MB = E[MC(a, u)]. If
marginal benefits cross from below, it is set either where t ≥ MC(e0) (if η < η∗) or
where t ≤ MC(0) (if η > η∗). Because any tax at or less than MC(0) is equivalent,
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and any tax at or greater than MC(e0) is equivalent, we limit attention to those inner
thresholds.12 For the knife-edge case with η = η∗, the regulator is indifferent between
the upper and lower taxes. The optimal tax policy with no uncertainty is
t∗(η) =

MC(e0) if η < η∗{
MC(0),MC(e0)
}
if η = η∗
MC(0) if η > η∗.
(2.4)
If there is uncertainty in costs, the price policy depends upon more than expected
marginal cost, for the industry’s chosen level of abatement depends upon the realization
of u. The abatement response creates a price corner that is quite different from the all-
or-nothing quantity corner that arises, even without uncertainty, when Assumption 2 is
satisfied.
Clearly, if t ≤ MC(0,−ν) the outcome will be zero abatement. Define tmin =
MC(0,−ν) and note that any t ≤ tmin serves as a zero-abatement policy. We ignore
t < tmin as redundant. If t ≥ MC(e0, ν) the outcome will be maximum possible abate-
ment. Define tmax = MC(e
0, ν) and note that any t ≥ tmax serves as a full-abatement
policy. We ignore t > tmax as redundant. The interesting cases lie between these
two extremes. There, the industry will attempt to respond to t by choosing a˜ so that
t = MC(a˜, u). Given that marginal cost, being continuous and strictly monotone in-
creasing, is invertible, on the interval u ∈
[
t − E[MC(e0, u)], t − E[MC(0, u)]] the
function describing the abatement level at which realized marginal cost equals t is given
by
a˜(t, u) =
t− η − u
δ
. (2.5)
12Here we hew to the literature in assuming implicitly that there is no deadweight loss associated with
taxation. The tax revenue of t∗e0 in the zero-abatement situation is simply a transfer from polluters
to the regulator. Under Assumption 2, the question of deadweight taxation losses can be mooted by
imposing a tax of zero whenever η > η∗. At the other extreme, of course, if abatement is at e0 there
are no emissions and so no tax is paid at all.
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For the industry, the optimal abatement level given t is therefore
a∗(t, u) =

e0 if u ≤ t− E[MC(e0, u)]
a˜(t, u) if t− E[MC(e0, u)] < u < t− E[MC(0, u)]
0 if u ≥ t− E[MC(0, u)].
(2.6)
The interval of interesting taxes may be partitioned usefully, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.2. Consider first Figure 2.2A, where uncertainty is relatively low. For taxes below
tmax but above MC(e
0,−ν) (this threshold is denoted t4 = t3 in the figure), the indus-
try’s abatement response will be either e0 with positive probability (for low realizations
of u) or interior (for high realizations). Denote by T3 the interval of tax levels at which
this corner can arise. One price corner, where abatement turns from the maximum pos-
sible to interior, resides in T3. For taxes above tmin but below MC(0, ν) (this threshold
is denoted t4 = t2 in the figure), with positive probability the industry’s abatement re-
sponse will be zero (for high realizations of u) or it will be interior (for low realizations).
Denote by T2 the interval of tax levels at which this corner can arise. Another price
corner, where abatement turns from zero to interior, resides in T2. Between T2 and T3
is a band of tax levels at which abatement is sure to be interior. Denote this interval
T4.
Now consider a situation in which uncertainty has risen. In Figure 2.2B, this is
depicted as an increase in ν. If, as here, the increase is large enough that MC(0, ν) ≥
MC(e0,−ν), then the inner endpoints of T2 and T3 switch places, though tax levels in
the two intervals encounter the same corners as before. When it is nonempty, as in Fig-
ure 2.2B, the region between T2 and T3, now denoted T1, is fundamentally different from
the T4 region in Figure 2.2A. At any t ∈ T1, according to the response function in (2.6)
there is positive probability of a = 0 (for high realizations of u), of interior abatement
a ∈ (0, e0) (for intermediate realizations of u), and of a = e0 (for low realizations of
u). In fact, whenever T1 6= ∅ there is no tax at which abatement is guaranteed to be
interior.13
The price corners are usefully depicted in Figure 2.3, which shows the industry’s
13Avoiding the price corner, Weitzman (1974) considers only tax levels in T4, where abatement is sure
to be interior.
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Figure 2.2: Tax ranges for four cases. A: uncertainty is low, T4 is nonempty. B: uncertainty is
high, T1 is nonempty.
response to different tax levels. (The dashed lines represent possible realizations of
marginal costs.) In Figure 2.3A, which corresponds to Figure 2.2A, three different
taxes are illustrated. At t′ ∈ T2, abatement will be zero for high and interior for low
realizations of u. At t′′′ ∈ T3, abatement will be at e0 or interior. At t′′ ∈ T4, abatement
must be interior. In Figure 2.3B, which corresponds to Figure 2.2B, we see that at
t′′ ∈ T1 all three responses are possible: zero, interior, or maximum possible abatement
for high, intermediate, or low realizations of u.
More formally, take a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν), and define T = [tmin, tmax].
Partition T as described above, where the suprema and infima of the Tj are given by
t1 = MC(e
0,−ν) t1 = MC(0, ν) (2.7a)
t2 = tmin t2 = min
{
MC(e0,−ν),MC(0, ν)} (2.7b)
t3 = max
{
MC(e0,−ν),MC(0, ν)} t3 = tmax (2.7c)
t4 = MC(0, ν) t4 = MC(e
0,−ν). (2.7d)
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Figure 2.3: Abatement responses. A: T4 is nonempty. Abatement is zero or interior at t
′;
interior at t′′; complete or interior at t′′′. B: T1 is nonempty. Abatement is zero, interior or
complete at t′′.
The elements of the partition are
T1 =
[t1, t1] if t1 ≤ t1∅ otherwise T2 =
[t2, t2] if T1 = ∅[t2, t2) if T1 6= ∅
T3 =
[t3, t3] if T1 = ∅(t3, t3] if T1 6= ∅ T4 =
(t4, t4) if t4 < t4∅ otherwise.
(2.8)
Because of the way they are defined, T1 = ∅ precisely when T4 6= ∅. This is true
if MC(0, ν) < MC(e0,−ν). Conversely, T4 = ∅ precisely when T1 6= ∅. This is true if
MC(0, ν) ≥ MC(e0,−ν). To see that equations (2.8) constitute a partition, note that
Tj ∩ Tj′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′ and also that ∪jTj = T . The two-part definitions for T2 and
T3 ensure that the partitions do not intersect, as uncertainty increases, at the point at
which T1 appears as a singleton set with t = MC(0, ν) = MC(e
0,−ν).
Social welfare can be expressed, using (2.6), as a three-part function of t and u,
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according to whether abatement is at e0, interior, or zero:
SW(t, u) =

B(e0)− C(e0, u) if u ≤ t− E[MC(e0, u)]
B
(
a˜(t, u)
)− C(a˜(t, u), u) if t− E[MC(e0, u)] < u < t− E[MC(0, u)]
B(0)− C(0, u) if u ≥ t− E[MC(0, u)].
(2.9)
The tax-setting regulator’s optimization problem may be obtained as follows. Inte-
grate (2.9) over the support of u, separating the three subintervals in [−ν, ν]. One or
two of these intervals may be empty for some values of t. The first integral in (2.10)
is over all realizations of u that yield maximum possible abatement and the second is
over realizations for which abatement is interior. The third integral, over realizations
for which abatement is zero, yields zero expected welfare and so can be discarded. The
optimal tax, which maximizes expected social welfare, is the solution correspondence
t∗(ν; θ) = argmax
t∈[tmin,tmax]
∫ max{−ν,min{ν,t−E[MC(e0,u)]}}
−ν
[
B(e0)− C(e0, u)]f(u) du
+
∫ min{ν,max{−ν,t−E[MC(0,u)]}}
max
{
−ν,min
{
ν,t−E[MC(e0,u)]
}} [B(a˜(t, u))− C(a˜(t, u), u)]f(u)du
+
∫ ν
min
{
ν,max
{
−ν,t−E[MC(0,u)]
}}[0]f(u)du (2.10)
where f(u) = 1/2ν. The min{·, ·} and max{·, ·} operators in the limits of integration
ensure that each integral is evaluated over the correct interval. The outer max{·, ·}
function on the upper limit of the first integral, for example, determines whether the
infimum of T3 is given by MC(e
0,−ν) (when T4 6= ∅) or by MC(0, ν) (when T1 6= ∅).
The inner min{·, ·} function then determines whether the limit is determined by the
upper boundary ν of u or by the value of u at which abatement moves into the interior.
This is a price corner.
The constraint set for t in (2.10) is compact in R and the objective function is con-
tinuous in t. By the Weierstrass Theorem it achieves a maximum. But the task of
selecting the optimal tax is not trivial. This is because of the non-differentiable func-
tions, containing the choice variable t, that define the limits of integration. Were those
functions differentiable, first-order necessary conditions for (2.10) could be obtained via
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Leibniz’s rule. Because they are not, the only available strategy for deriving the opti-
mal tax is to define separate functions for expected social welfare on the Tj . For t ∈ T1
there are possible tax levels in all three of the components of integral (2.10). For t ∈ T2
there is no realization of u at which abatement will be e0. There, only the second and
third integrals in (2.10) are relevant. For t ∈ T3 there is no realization of u at which
abatement will equal zero. The first two components of (2.10) are relevant. For t ∈ T4
it must be true that a ∈ (0, e0), so only the second component of (2.10) is relevant.
Define the following four functions describing expected social welfare on the corre-
sponding Tj :
Γ1 : T1 → R, with Γ1(t) =
∫ t−E[MC(e0,u)]
−ν
[
B(e0)− C(e0, u)]f(u)du
+
∫ t−E[MC(0,u)]
t−E[MC(e0,u)]
[
B
(
a˜(t, u)
)− C(a˜(t, u), u)]f(u)du (2.11)
Γ2 : T2 → R, with Γ2(t) =
∫ t−E[MC(0,u)]
−ν
[
B
(
a˜(t, u)
)− C(a˜(t, u), u)]f(u)du (2.12)
Γ3 : T3 → R, with Γ3(t) =
∫ t−E[MC(e0,u)]
−ν
[
B(e0)− C(e0, u)]f(u)du
+
∫ ν
t−E[MC(e0,u)]
[
B
(
a˜(t, u)
)− C(a˜(t, u), u)]f(u)du (2.13)
Γ4 : T4 → R, with Γ4(t) =
∫ ν
−ν
[
B
(
a˜(t, u)
)− C(a˜(t, u), u)]f(u)du. (2.14)
The functions Γ1 and Γ4 in (2.11) and (2.14) are quadratic in t; Γ2 and Γ3 in (2.12)
and (2.13) are cubic in t. All four are therefore continuously differentiable in t. Piecing
them together yields the function describing expected social welfare on all of T . This
function is also continuously differentiable, though there may be multiple local maxima
and minima:
E[SW(t, u)] =

Γ1(t) if t ∈ T1
Γ2(t) if t ∈ T2
Γ3(t) if t ∈ T3
Γ4(t) if t ∈ T4.
It is useful to isolate two classes of situations: those in which T4 = ∅ and those in
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which T1 = ∅. In either case, the relationships between equations (2.11)–(2.14) at the
boundaries of the Tj ensure that the price-setting regulator’s problem is well behaved:
the E[SW(t, u)] function is twice differentiable.
Our goal is to identify the values of t at which expected social welfare might be
maximized. This requires finding all values at which the derivatives of (2.11)–(2.14) are
equal to zero. Differentiating all four expressions with respect to t, setting the results
equal to zero, and solving for t in each case produces six candidate zeros and leads to
the following collection of candidate optima:
tˆ1 = α+
βe0
2
(2.15)
tˆ2a = η − ν and tˆ2b = β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ (2.16)
tˆ3a = η + δe
0 + ν and tˆ3b =
β(η + ν)− βδe0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ (2.17)
tˆ4 =
βη − αδ
β − δ . (2.18)
Note that neither tˆ1 nor tˆ4 depends upon ν, and tˆ4 is the tax that equates marginal
benefits and expected marginal costs. In all cases, we have tmin ≡ tˆ2a and tmax ≡
tˆ3a. Depending on the parameter vector, some of the conditions in (2.15)–(2.18) might
describe either a local maximum or a local minimum. Separating them, essential in order
to identify the optimal policy overall, involves analyzing a set of second-order sufficient
conditions. That analysis, lengthy and somewhat tedious, is available in Appendix B.
2.5 Prices vs. quantities: Crossing from above (β < δ)
Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied, so that marginal benefits cross marginal costs
from above. That is, β < δ. In this case the following threshold values of ν are relevant.
[See Appendix B.] They are important in determining (2.23), the function describing
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the optimal tax:
ν1A = E[MC(e
0, u)]−MB(e0)− e
0β
2
(2.19)
ν1B = MB(0)− E[MC(0, u)] + e
0β
2
(2.20)
ν4A =
δ[E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0)]
β − δ (2.21)
ν4B =
δ[MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]]
β − δ . (2.22)
As ν increases beyond the relevant thresholds, progressively more probability is pushed
away from the neighborhood of the intersection of MB(a) and E[MC(a, u)] and, eventu-
ally, piles up at a = 0 and at a = e0. There, the price policy is unambiguously preferred
to the quantity policy, which is locked immovably at q∗ = aˆ. More probability at the
corners means that the advantage to the price policy is greater.
The optimal tax rule under Assumption 1 is given by
t∗[β<δ](ν; θ) =

tˆ1 if [ η ≥ η∗ and ν ≥ ν1A ] or [ η ≤ η∗ and ν ≥ ν1B ]
tˆ2b if [ η > η
∗ and ν ∈ [ν4A, ν1A) ]
tˆ3b if [ η < η
∗ and ν ∈ [ν4B, ν1B) ]
tˆ4 if [ η ≥ η∗ and ν < ν4A ] or [ η ≤ η∗ and ν < ν4B ].
(2.23)
Recall that at the threshold η∗, found in equation (2.1), expected social welfare at
maximum possible abatement is zero. If η < η∗, expected social welfare at maximum
possible abatement is positive; if η > η∗ it is negative. The elements that make up
equation (2.23) may be divided along these lines.
The optimal price is tˆ4 when the level of uncertainty ν is sufficiently small, with the
threshold depending upon whether η is greater than or less than η∗. This price is at the
intersection of marginal benefits and expected marginal costs. When ν is sufficiently
large the optimal price, tˆ1, diverges away from this intersection, with the threshold
again depending upon whether η is greater than or less than η∗. The optimal price is
intermediate, either tˆ2b or tˆ3b, when ν is also intermediate.
Two primary results arise in this setting. The first, Proposition 1, is that a price
25
policy strictly dominates a quantity policy, and the advantage grows with ν, when
Assumption 1 holds. (Proofs of this and the remaining propositions appear in Appendix
A.) Under the optimal price policy, the level of emissions selected by the polluting
industry moves toward the optimum. Under the optimal quantity policy this adjustment
is impossible. Expected social welfare under the quantity policy is unchanged as ν
increases, but expected social welfare under the price policy grows as ν increases.
Proposition 1. For any permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) at which β < δ, the expected
social welfare resulting from the optimal price policy is not less than that associated
with the optimal quantity policy: E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] ≥ E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)]. If ν > 0,
E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)]− E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)] is strictly positive and strictly increasing in ν.
A central tenet of the literature comparing price and quantity policies is that the
price policy should be set at t˜, where marginal benefits equal expected marginal costs.
As the level of uncertainty increases, for the linear-uniform case examined here this is
not always true. This is due to the fact that, for high levels of uncertainty, a price at
the intersection cannot capture the welfare gains associated with realizations far from
expected marginal costs. The following result establishes conditions under which the
received wisdom is overturned.
Proposition 2. Consider a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) at which β < δ.
(i.) Suppose η > η∗. If ν > ν4A then t∗ > t˜.
(ii.) Suppose η < η∗. If ν > ν4B then t∗ < t˜.
Example 1. A numerical example might help to illuminate these results and the com-
plex nature of the regulator’s optimal tax-setting rule. For the linear-uniform situation
under consideration, suppose that the parameter values are
α = 80, β = 1, η = 60, δ = 2, e0 = 50.
Figure 2.4 shows the four Γj(t) curves that combine to form the regulator’s ob-
jective function E[SW(t, u)], which is the bold curve. It is constant outside of the
interval [tmin, tmax]. This figure illuminates several important features of the optimal-
price problem. One is that Γ2(t) and Γ3(t) are indeed cubic and Γ1(t) and Γ4(t) are
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Figure 2.4: Outcome from all possible taxes, and the four Γj functions with ν = 20, T1 = ∅,
α = 80, β = 1, η = 60 > η?, and δ = 2.
indeed quadratic functions. Another is that the three feasible SW curves join as claimed,
and are also differentiable where they join at t4 = 80 and t4 = 140. Thus, the global
E[SW(t, u)] function is differentiable. Note that, with T1 = ∅, Γ1(t) is not a part of
the E[SW(t, u)] function. In this example, ν = 20 < ν4A, the optimal price is tˆ4 at the
intersection of marginal benefits and marginal costs. For higher values of ν, T4 becomes
empty and the T1 interval comes into play.
Figure 2.5 shows how things change as ν, the level of uncertainty, increases. There,
the five curves represent expected social welfare, as a function of the tax, for ν ranging
from 10 to 60. For any ν > 0, the optimal price policy yields higher expected social
welfare than does the optimal quantity policy. As uncertainty grows with ν, the expected
social welfare associated with the optimal tax also grows and, at ν = 60, is almost thrice
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Figure 2.5: E[SW(t, u)] and t? as uncertainty increases with α = 80, β = 1, η = 60 > η?, and
δ = 2.
that at ν = 10. Higher uncertainty, it turns out, is better.14 Meanwhile, the expected
social welfare of the optimal quantity policy remains at 200.
The vertical and piecewise-linear object labelled t∗(ν) in Figure 2.5 shows how the
optimal tax changes continuously as ν grows. For ν ≤ 40 we find that t∗ = tˆ4 = 100,
the price at which MB(a) and E[MC(a, u)] intersect. For ν ≥ 55, t∗ = tˆ1 is constant at
105. Between ν = 40 and ν = 55, the optimal tax, tˆ2b, rises linearly in ν.
15 (See also
14Greater uncertainty can be an advantage in Weitzman (1974, p. 485) too: “The ceteris paribus effect
of increasing σ2 is to magnify the expected loss from employing the planning instrument with compar-
ative disadvantage.” In his model the expected social welfare under a quantity policy is unchanged in
the face of increasing σ2. Therefore, expected social welfare under a price policy must increase with σ2.
One might reasonably observe that increased uncertainty is unlikely to make society better off. The fact
that it does so here, as in Weitzman, is a result of the assumptions that the polluting industry knows
its cost function with certainty and the regulator knows the distribution of uncertainty exactly. If the
industry were itself uncertain about its costs, as is more likely to be the case in practice, the effect of
greater uncertainty may be quite different.
15In this example we have η > η∗. If η < η∗, for sufficiently high values of ν, Proposition 2 shows
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Figure 2.9, where the relationship between t∗ and ν is even more clear.)
2.6 Prices vs. quantities: Crossing from below
The situation examined in the previous section is not different in essence from the
Weitzman framework with marginal benefits sloping downward but less steeply sloped
than marginal costs. Even though our marginal benefits slope upward, Weitzman’s basic
insight is preserved: when marginal benefits are more nearly horizontal than marginal
costs, a price policy is strictly preferred.
In this section, which concerns cases in which Assumption 2 is satisfied (that is,
α < η and β > δ), we enter unexplored terrain. Because the optimal quantity policy
is now discrete, all or nothing, the comparison to a price policy becomes both more
complicated and more important. Complicated because a new kind of corner solution
and a new discontinuity appear, and important because the stakes involved in choosing
the right policy become greater. Choosing maximum possible abatement when zero
abatement is optimal, or vice versa, can lead to very large welfare losses. And choosing
anything in the middle, which can occur when an intermediate tax is selected, risks the
greatest losses of all. We will see that this risk is sometimes worth taking.
It turns out that another surprise awaits us. The problem, and especially the be-
havior of the optimal tax policy, depend crucially on the difference between the slope of
marginal costs and the slope of marginal benefits. Our results are for the linear-uniform
case to which we have restricted attention, but it appears that a similar result will go
through for a more general setup. Here, the behavior depends upon whether β is less
than or greater than twice δ. Much of the section is divided along these lines. The
reader should bear in mind that, in the entire section, equations (2.6) through (2.18)
are still in force.
Before turning to an examination of the two cases, we pause to establish an initial
result that applies whenever marginal benefits cross from below, whether β < 2δ or
β ≥ 2δ. Proposition 3 shows that a quantity policy can never outperform the optimal
price policy when marginal benefits cross from below.16
that the optimal tax moves below the intersection of MB and E[MC].
16Note that we have not restricted realized marginal costs to remain positive, which they do not
whenever η < ν. In that case any negative tax, including importantly tmin = η− ν < 0, can be thought
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Proposition 3. For any permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) at which β > δ, the expected
social welfare resulting from the optimal price policy is not less than that associated with
the optimal quantity policy: E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] ≥ E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)].
2.6.1 Similar slopes: δ < β < 2δ
We turn first to the case in which marginal benefits cross from below, but the slope is
less than twice that of marginal costs: β ∈ (δ, 2δ). Throughout, whenever Assumption 2
is satisfied and so β > δ, from equation (2.18) we know that tˆ4 is a local minimum when
T4 is feasible. We can ignore tˆ4 in our search for the optimal tax.
The optimal tax rule, analogous to equation (2.23) is given by
t∗[β∈(δ,2δ)](ν; θ) =

tmin if
[
η ≥ η∗ and ν ≤ E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0)]
tˆ2b if
[
η ≥ η∗ and ν ∈ (E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0), ν1A)]
tˆ1 if
[
η ≥ η∗ and ν ≥ ν1A
]
or
[
η ≤ η∗ and ν ≥ ν1B
]
tˆ3b if
[
η ≤ η∗ and ν ∈ (MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)], ν1B)]
tˆmax if
[
η ≤ η∗ and ν ≤ MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]].
(2.24)
All five of the possibilities from equations (2.15)–(2.17) are now relevant. If uncertainty
is low, the tax should be set at tmin or at tmax. These extreme tax levels mimic the opti-
mal quantity policy by guaranteeing zero or maximum possible abatement respectively.
As uncertainty increases, the optimal tax moves away from the extremes and into
the interior of its feasible range. And when ν exceeds the relevant threshold (either ν1A
or ν1B depending on whether η is less than or greater than η
∗), the optimal tax becomes
tˆ1 and remains there for further increases in ν.
The next two results, for η > η∗ (Proposition 4) and for η < η∗ (Proposition 5),
provide parametric conditions under which the optimal tax is interior to T = [tmin, tmax].
They also establish that when this is true, the price policy is strictly preferred and is
strictly increasing in ν.17 In both of these propositions, notice that when the tax policy
of as a subsidy.
17The special case in which η = η∗, and so the planner is indifferent between zero and maximum
possible abatement, is neglected here. This is not because it is uninteresting but because it leads to an
additional layer of conditionality on the optimal tax that only clutters our notation further.
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is preferred, the advantage increases as ν increases.
Proposition 4. Consider a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) with β ∈ (δ, 2δ) and
suppose that η > η∗, which means that q∗(ν; θ) = 0.
(i.) If ν ≤ E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0), then t∗(ν; θ) = tmin.
(ii.) If ν > E[MC(0, u)] − MB(0), then t∗(ν; θ) ∈ (tmin, tmax) and, for ν sufficiently
large, t∗(ν; θ) = tˆ1. The decision rule t∗(ν; θ) is a continuous function of ν.
(iii.) If ν > E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0), then E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)]−E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)] is strictly
positive and strictly increasing in ν.
Proposition 5. Consider a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) with β ∈ (δ, 2δ) and
suppose that η < η∗, which means that q∗(ν; θ) = e0.
(i.) If ν ≤ MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)], then t∗(ν; θ) = tmax.
(ii.) If ν > MB(e0) − E[MC(e0, u)], then t∗(ν; θ) < tmax and, for ν sufficiently large,
t∗ = tˆ1. The decision rule t∗(ν) is a continuous function of ν.
(iii.) If ν > MB(e0) − E[MC(e0, u)], then E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] − E[SW(q∗(ν, θ), u)] is
strictly positive and strictly increasing in ν.
Example 2. Once again we explain the unwieldy tax-setting rule through an example.
Consider the following vector of parameter values:
α = 60, β = 2, η = 70, δ = 1.5, e0 = 50.
The example is illustrated in Figure 2.6. In this case η∗ = 72.5, which means that we
have η < η∗ and so the optimal quantity policy is q∗ = e0, at which E[SW(q∗, u)] = 125.
It also means that the first two terms in (2.24), those for tmin and tˆ2b, can be ignored.
For any ν ≤ 15, we can be sure that t∗ = tmax, which increases linearly in ν from 145 for
ν = 0 to 160 for ν = 15. Above that value, t∗ equals tˆ3b and so moves into the interior
of the interval [tmin, tmax], declining until ν = 40. There, t
∗ = 110, where it remains for
further increases in ν.
In Figure 2.6, the four curves represent expected social welfare as a function of t
for ν = 10, 20, 30, and 40. The many local maxima and minima are readily apparent.
Look at the curve for ν = 10, and note the way in which expected social welfare for an
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Figure 2.6: E[SW(t, u)] and t? as uncertainty increases with α = 60, β = 2, η = 70 < η?, and
δ = 1.5.
intermediate price is much lower than for the optimal quantity. Indeed, it goes negative
there. To see why, note that at the optimal price any relization of u near zero means
that the industry will choose an intermediate abatement level. This is the worst possible
outcome: each unit of abatement costs more than the benefit it confers.
The relative gains to a price policy occur for extreme realizations, where q∗ = 0 or
q∗ = e0 can be very wrong, and in the example this cannot happen when uncertainty
is low. Thus, for small ν the optimal tax mimics the optimal quantity of maximum
possible abatement and so E[SW(q∗, u)] = E[SW(t∗, u)]. In this example with ν = 10
the optimal price policy is tˆmax. On the ν = 20 curve, though, the optimal tax is
t∗ = tˆ3b = 150 and has already begun its gradual descent toward 110, where t∗ = tˆ1.
For any ν > 15 expected social welfare is higher for the tax than for the quantity policy,
and expected social welfare associated with t∗ increases monotonically. The optimal
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tax is piecewise linear, and changes continuously, in ν. The relationship appears as the
bold curve in Figure 2.6; the curvature is generated by the E[SW(t, u)] function. (The
piecewise linearity of t∗(ν) is apparent in Figure 2.9.)
2.6.2 Dissimilar slopes: β ≥ 2δ
Finally, consider the most unusual case, in which β ≥ 2δ. When marginal benefits are
at least twice as steep as marginal costs, both tˆ2b and tˆ3b are local minima and so along
with tˆ4 play no role. The optimal tax is now driven discontinuously from an extreme of
tmin or tmax, which matches the optimal quantity, to an intermediate value at tˆ1. Define
ν∗min = η − η∗ +
e0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) (2.25)
as the value of ν that equates Γ2(tˆ2a) and Γ1(tˆ1). Similarly, define
ν∗max = η
∗ − η + e
0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) (2.26)
as the value of ν that equates Γ3(tˆ3a) and Γ1(tˆ1). These are threshold levels of un-
certainty above which, for η > η∗ and η < η∗ respectively, the regulator is indifferent
between an extreme tax and the intermediate tax tˆ1. The optimal tax rule is
t∗[β≥2δ](ν; θ) =

tmin if [ η ≥ η∗ and ν ≤ ν∗min ]
tˆ1 if [ η ≥ η∗ and ν ≥ ν∗min ] or [η ≤ η∗ and ν ≥ ν∗max ]
tˆmax if [ η ≤ η∗ and ν ≤ ν∗max ].
(2.27)
We will see that, for some parameter values, this rule is multi-valued and so is a corre-
spondence rather than a function.
We have already shown, in Proposition 3, that the quantity policy can never outper-
form the price policy strictly when β ≥ 2δ. The two results of this section, for η > η∗
(Proposition 6) and for η < η∗ (Proposition 7), provide parametric conditions under
which the optimal tax is interior to T = [tmin, tmax]. They also establish that when
this is true, the price policy is strictly preferred and expected social welfare under the
optimal tax increases in ν. At the threshold, both the optimal tax and the expected
level of abatement are discontinuous in ν.
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Proposition 6. Consider a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) with β ≥ 2δ and suppose
that η > η∗, which means that q∗(ν; θ) = 0.
(i.) If ν < ν∗min, then t
∗(ν; θ) = tmin.
(ii.) If ν = ν∗min, then t
∗ is multi-valued with t∗(ν; θ) ∈ {tmin, tˆ1}. The correspondence
t∗(ν; θ) is not continuous in ν.
(iii.) At the threshold value ν∗min, the expected level of abatement changes discontinuously
from 0 to Eu[a
∗(t∗(ν, θ), u)] > 0.
(iv.) If ν > ν∗min, then E[SW(t
∗(ν, θ), u)] − E[SW(q∗(ν, θ), u)] is strictly positive and
strictly increasing in ν.
Proposition 7. Consider a permissible parameter vector (θ, ν) with β ≥ 2δ and suppose
that η < η∗, which means that q∗(ν; θ) = e0.
(i.) If ν < ν∗max, then t∗(ν; θ) = tmax.
(ii.) If ν = ν∗max, then t∗ is multi-valued with t∗(ν; θ) ∈ {tˆ1, tmax}. The correspondence
t∗(ν; θ) is not continuous in ν.
(iii.) At the threshold value ν∗max, the expected level of abatement changes discontinu-
ously from e0 to Eu[a
∗(t∗(ν, θ), u)] < e0.
(iv.) If ν > ν∗max, then E[SW(t∗(ν, θ), u)] − E[SW(q∗(ν, θ), u)] is strictly positive and
strictly increasing in ν.
Example 3. A final example shows how the optimal tax rule behaves when marginal
benefits are at least twice as steep as marginal costs. Consider the following vector of
parameter values:
α = 0, β = 2, η = 35, δ = 0.5, e0 = 50.
The example is illustrated in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. In Figure 2.7, where ν = 19, we see
that T1 ranges from 41 to 54. Also, η < η
∗ = 37.5, so that the optimal quantity policy
is q∗(ν; θ) = e0, where expected social welfare is 125. With ν = 19, the optimal tax is
at tmax, where abatement is sure to be at e
0. Figure 2.7 is akin to Figure 2.4, except
that here T4 = ∅. For ν = 19 the price tˆ1 is a local, but not a global, maximum.
In Figure 2.8 we see how things change as ν increases from 16 to 19, to 21.594, and
then to 26. The threshold value of ν∗max = 21.594 is relevant for this case with η < η∗.
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Figure 2.7: Outcomes from all possible taxes, and the four Γj functions with ν = 19, T4 = ∅,
α = 0, β = 2, η = 35 < η?, and δ = 0.5.
At ν∗max the regulator is indifferent between choosing tmax or tˆ1, here equal to 50. Thus,
t∗(ν; θ), represented by the two bolded segments, is multi-valued at ν∗max. The optimal
price policy, and the resulting expected level of abatement, are discontinuous at ν∗max,
but the level of expected social welfare is not. Figure 2.9 depicts the optimal price as a
function of ν. There one can see the discontinuity and the multi-valuedness of t∗(ν;β)
at ν∗max. At ν = 26 the optimal price is unique at tˆ1 and the expected social welfare is
higher.
2.7 Conclusions
When marginal benefits do not adhere to the basic rules of economic analysis, environ-
mental policy becomes both more complicated and more interesting. When marginal
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Figure 2.8: E[SW(t, u)] and t? as uncertainty increases with α = 0, β = 2, η = 35 < η?, and
δ = 0.5.
benefits slope upward, there is never an advantage to a quantity policy. Understand-
ing the degree of uncertainty in marginal costs takes on a new and increased level of
importance.
We contend that these findings are not merely mathematical curiosities. The scien-
tific literature suggesting a strictly concave C-R is real, it is important, and it is familiar
to scientists who study the relationship between pollution and public health. Economics
has some catching up to do. And, for fine particulate matter especially, the stakes are
high. Each year tens of thousands of Americans die prematurely due to exposure to
ambient concentrations of particulates. Using standard estimates of the value of a sta-
tistical life, the value of foregone social welfare due to PM2.5 alone reaches into the tens
of billions of dollars annually (U.S. EPA 2012b). By any measure, getting this right is
important.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal tax policy as a function of ν. Figure 2.5 is crossing from above, Figure 2.6
from below with β < 2δ, and Figure 2.8 from below with β > 2δ.
But one does not need to accept the recent scientific findings in order to see that
anomalous situations, in which our analysis may be relevant, can be concocted using
only ingredients from the mainline economics literature. Muller and Mendelsohn (2009)
employ a linear damage function for fine particulates and thus assume that marginal
benefits are constant. Their β is zero. Add to that Andreoni and Levinson (2001),
who argue that the marginal cost of particulate abatement slopes downward. Their δ
is negative. The combination yields marginal benefits crossing from below and, indeed,
β > 2δ.
Whether the findings of the paper prove to be important is, ultimately, an empirical
question. But our insight that the level of uncertainty is more important than has been
realized before seems likely to matter in the end. Without question, climate policy faces
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us with huge uncertainties.
Chapter 3
A Spatial Model of Air Pollution:
the Impact of the
Concentration-Response
Function∗
∗Chapter 3 published as:
Goodkind, Andrew L., Jay S. Coggins and Julian D. Marshall. 2014. A spatial model
of air pollution: The impact of the concentration-response function. Journal of the
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 1 (4), 451–479.
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3.1 Introduction
The standard approach to analyzing clean-air policy assumes that the benefit associated
with a unit of abatement declines as the air becomes cleaner.1 That is, the greatest
marginal improvements in human health are to be achieved in the dirtiest places. This
assumption is based in a particular understanding of the relationship between pollution
and human health: that the marginal harm to health grows ever more severe as the level
of pollution rises. The traditional view is appealing from an ethical perspective because
it means we should clean the dirtiest places first, thereby protecting those most who
are most at risk. In line with this understanding, regulation of harmful pollutants has
generally been based on uniform standards such as, in the U.S., the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The NAAQS set limits on pollution concentration
that are not to be exceeded in any location.
In this paper we ask, what if the basic understanding regarding the link between
pollution exposure and health outcomes is wrong? This question, we argue, is both
interesting and relevant to environmental policy. Recent estimates of the concentration-
response (C-R) relationship between fine particulates (particulate matter with a diam-
eter less than 2.5 microns, PM2.5) and several causes of adult mortality suggest that
the C-R function for PM2.5 might be strictly concave in concentration. If true, this
C-R function would mean that the first unit of abatement yields the smallest improve-
ment in health risk, while the last unit, taking us to a pristine environment, yields the
greatest improvement. Crouse et al. (2012), for example, find that the C-R relationship
for PM2.5 on ischemic heart disease is strictly concave (“supralinear”) over ambient
concentrations. Supralinear C-R functions across a wide range of PM2.5 concentrations
(including oberservations from exposure to ambient air, second-hand smoke and active
smokers) were also found in Ostro (2004), and Pope et al. (2009a, 2011).
An interesting question, which economists are hardly equipped to answer, is which
physiological pathways could lead to supralinearity. This matter is not well understood
in the relevant health literature, but there are some tentative suggestions. Ambrose and
Barua (2004, p. 1735) posit that the “underlying biochemical and cellular processes may
become saturated with small doses of toxic components from cigarette smoke causing a
1Or, as in Muller and Mendelsohn (2009), that marginal benefits are constant.
40
nonlinear dose-response on cardiovascular function.” Whatever the physiological expla-
nation, supralinear C-R functions are common in studies of mortality from exposure to
workplace toxins (Stayner et al. 2003). Among several explanations of the attenuation
of the relative risk at higher concentrations, Stayner et al. suggest the possibility of
a saturation of enzyme systems, where relative-risks increase faster before saturation
is reached, and less thereafter. Birnbaum (2012) discusses the “low-dose hypothesis”
which indicates that the impacts to human health from exposure to low doses of chem-
icals may be fundamentally different than what would be expected from the impact at
higher doses.
Krewski et al. (2009), in their follow-up to the influential study by Pope et al. (1995),
estimate the health risks associated with PM2.5 exposure. They present the results of
estimates based on two functional forms (see Figure 3.1). The first form is a log-linear
C-R relationship (they call this relationship the “linear” version), which is convex and
so leads to the usual form: a marginal benefit function that decreases in abatement. The
second form is a log-log relationship (they call this relationship the “log” version), which
is concave, or supralinear, and so leads to a marginal benefit function that increases in
abatement. Regarding which of the two functions is to be preferred statistically, Krewski
et al. (2009, p. 27) say only that “[T]he logarithmic function was a slightly better
predictor of the variation in survival among MSAs than the linear function because the
MSA random-effect variance is somewhat smaller (than that for the linear function) for
each cause-of-death category except all other causes.”
The Krewski et al. study highlights the uncertainty regarding the shape of the C-R
function between PM2.5 and adult mortality. The difference between the two forms
of the C-R function has significant implications for air pollution policy of possibly the
most consequential environmental issue impacting human health. Despite the enormous
benefits from existing regulations, ambient concentrations of fine particulates remain a
major cause of premature mortality in the U.S. The Office of Management and Budget
estimates that the benefits of EPA regulations on fine particulate concentrations range
from $19 billion to $167 billion per year (OMB 2013). The benefits are large because
reduced exposure to fine particulates has saved many lives, yet at existing concentrations
substantial risks remain. Fann (2012) estimates 130,000 annual cases of premature
mortality attributable to fine particulate concentrations. In contrast, the comparative
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Figure 3.1: Risk of mortality from PM2.5 concentration relative to risk at 10 µg m
−3 for Krewski
et al. (2009) log-linear and log-log concentration-response functions.
costs for cleanup are quite modest: by OMB’s estimates, benefits are 2.6 to 22.9 times
larger than costs (OMB 2013). Krewski et al. is central to the analysis of the impacts
of exposure to fine particulates. The estimates in Krewski et al. are the latest from
an American Cancer Society study, one of two major longitudinal analyses on the link
between PM2.5 and premature mortality. In the recent regulatory impact analysis by
the U.S. EPA (2012b, page 5-32) recommending a lower standard for fine particulate
concentrations, the key parameter was the Krewski et al. log-linear estimate.
The importance of the log-log C-R function is it calls into question the risks of mor-
tality faced by individuals exposed to low levels of pollution, suggesting that mortality
risks may be substantially lower at very low concentrations than at moderate or high
concentrations. Why should one care about the risks borne by people exposed to the
lowest concentrations, given that most experience higher exposures and correspondingly
greater risks? Under the Clean Air Act, the primary goal of pollution control is to pro-
tect human health, and the general trend has been towards less pollution and lower
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risks.2 In order to arrive at desirable policy outcomes, we must understand the risks at
the lowest pollution level being considered. If the log-log C-R function is correct, then
the benefits associated with achieving very low pollution levels are even higher than we
have thought.3
A log-log C-R relationship suggests that regulators should focus not only on reduc-
ing risks for people at high concentrations, but also on reducing risks for people at low
concentrations. Uniform pollution standards like the NAAQS, by their nature, have
the effect of aiming abatement resources at those places where concentrations are the
highest. As we show here, the uniform standard approach is not necessarily the most
appealing from a social-welfare perspective if marginal benefits are increasing in abate-
ment. An alternative policy, one that seeks to maximize the aggregate net benefits of
abatement, might yield a very different outcome. A policy of maximizing social welfare,
as opposed to limiting risks in the dirtiest locations, raises concerns over environmen-
tal justice as it may tend to exacerbate the disparity between the pollution faced by
individuals leading to greater inequality in environmental risk.
We compare the implications for mortality risk of the two functional forms estimated
by Krewski et al. (2009), and the socially preferred policies to regulate air pollution in
both cases. We devise a simple model that captures the spatial aspects of air pollution
over a region with many sources of pollution and many receptors. An efficient abatement
policy is examined that controls pollution at each individual source and maximizes the
social welfare of the individuals and industries in the region. The efficient policy is
compared to a uniform standard, under which a cap is placed upon concentrations
across the region, and a uniform tax, where a fee is levied on each unit of pollution
emitted. The three policies are compared for both C-R functional forms based on
total social welfare, the average concentration of pollution in receptors, and the level of
environmental inequality across receptors.
We find that society should prefer significantly lower emissions, and correspondingly
2For instance, emissions of sulfur dioxide (one of the main contributors to fine particulate concen-
trations) in the U.S. has dropped from 23 million tons in 1990 to 5.5 million tons in 2012 (EPA 2013c).
This drop has contributed to the 33% decrease in the U.S. national average concentration of PM2.5 from
13.8 µg m−3 in 2000 to 9.3 µg m−3 in 2012 (EPA 2013b).
3In an analysis of the effects of lead exposure on children’s IQ, Rothenberg and Rothenberg (2005),
find that a model using the log of lead exposure is a significantly better fit of the data than a model
with a linear lead relationship. The estimated benefits in the U.S. from the drop in lead concentrations
to very low levels is 2.2 times greater with the log model than with linear.
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lower ambient concentrations, of air pollution if the log-log C-R function is correct
than if the log-linear C-R function is correct. Our findings underscore the importance
of identifying the true shape of the C-R function between fine particulates and adult
mortality.
With a log-log C-R function, we find that the efficient abatement policy performs
substantially better than the uniform standard in maximizing social welfare and lim-
iting the exposure to pollution. The efficient policy is also preferred to a uniform tax
policy across the region, suggesting that there is substantial heterogeneity in marginal
damages across sources. Surprisingly, the environmental inequality concerns with the
efficient policy are slightly less than with the uniform standard. Pollution concentration
reductions in the cleanest receptors provides benefits to all surrounding locations due to
the widespread dispersion of the pollutant. In obtaining the greatest risk reductions in
the cleanest locations, significant pollution concentration reductions are achieved across
the map.
3.2 A multiple-receptor, multiple-source model
This paper presents a model that compares the outcomes from air pollution regulation
policies using either a log-linear or log-log C-R relationship between fine particulate
concentrations and adult mortality. The model simulates the dispersion of emissions
from many sources (denoted by subscript j) located across a rectangular geographic
region, and calculates the resulting change in pollution concentrations in all receptors
(denoted by subscript i) in this region.
The region is separated into N identically sized grid squares. Each square can be
both a source and receptor of pollution (i, j = 1, . . . , N). In each grid square there
is a population, Popi, and an aggregate mass emission rate, ej , of PM2.5, a primary
conserved air pollutant. The model simulates emission and dispersion of primary PM2.5,
and the resulting concentration in each receptor.4
Pollution from each source is emitted at the center of the grid square and dispersed
across the region as nonreactive emissions according to a Gaussian-Plume dispersion
4We consider only the impact of primary PM2.5 on total PM2.5 concentrations. Several other pollu-
tants contribute to total PM2.5 concentrations but these are excluded for simplicity.
44
model. The wind is uniform across the region and travels in many directions weighted by
a representative wind rose. The pollution is assumed to be emitted from a point source
with the same effective height for each grid square. The Gaussian-Plume dispersion
model describes the change in average annual ground level concentration (in µg m−3)
at any other grid square resulting from the emission of an additional unit of pollution
(tons/year) from a given grid square. Dispersion is calculated for all N grid squares
to derive a source-receptor (S-R) matrix that describes the change in concentration at
every grid square from the emission of a pollutant from every grid square. Let piji be
the S-R coefficient from source grid square j to receptor grid square i, and let ΠN×N
denote the S-R matrix for all grid squares.
The concentration of PM2.5 is calculated for each grid square based on the emission
rates from all squares, e (an N×1 vector), the S-R matrix, and a background concentra-
tion level, C˜, that accounts for emissions upwind of the modeling domain. Background
concentrations, which are constant across the region, are added to the pollution emitted
inside the region. In the initial situation, prior to pollution regulation, the concentration
in receptor square i is Ci(e
0) = C˜ +
∑N
j=1 pijie
0
j . After an abatement policy is adopted
that induces abatement of a tons, the level of emissions are e = e0−a, and the resulting
concentration in receptor square i is Ci(e) = C˜ +
∑N
j=1 pijiej = C˜ +
∑N
j=1 piji(e
0
j − aj).
3.2.1 Krewski et al. concentration-response relationships
Concentration-response functions identify the relative risk of disease given exposure to
concentrations of a stressor compared to some baseline. Suppose that the C-R rela-
tionship between exposure to fine particulates and adult mortality follows either the
log-linear or the log-log functional form reported in Krewski et al. (2009), which are
only two of many possible forms the relationship between PM2.5 concentrations and risk
of mortality can take. By focusing attention on the two forms in Krewski et al. we do
not suggest that alternate forms are impossible. Rather we attempt to call attention
to the divergent policy implications from these two functional forms, highlighting the
importance of identifying the true shape of the C-R function.
We apply the log-linear and log-log C-R functions across the entire range of ambient
PM2.5 concentrations considered in this model. Because the data are sparse, Krewski et
al. is silent on the shape of the relationship at even lower concentrations. It is possible
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that the function becomes convex in that region. There appears to be little doubt,
though, that the function bends downward at very high concentrations (Smith and Peel
2010; Pope et al. 2009a).
Krewski et al. report the results of estimating two forms of a hazard function,
denoted by λ(·), using a random-effects Cox proportional-hazard model. These hazard
functions map a given level of concentration, and several covariates, onto the risk of
developing a negative health outcome. Taking the ratio of a hazard function evaluated
at two different concentration levels results in a hazard ratio (HR). The HR is reported
in Table 11 of Krewski et al. For a certain location, or receptor, the HRs identify the
relative risk of mortality between a relatively high concentration of pollution and a low
concentration. The HR allows us to evaluate, for each receptor, the impact of a change
in air pollution concentrations.
To understand the difference between the log-linear and log-log HRs it is necessary
to examine the hazard functions (or log-hazard functions, as demonstrated in (3.1) and
(3.2) below) that were estimated by Krewski et al. The log-linear specification, which
we will often refer to as the “lin” form, is given by
ln
(
λlin(X,PM2.5)
)
= ln
(
λˆ
)
+ Xβlin + PM2.5γ
lin. (3.1)
The log-log specification, which we will often refer to as the “log” form, is given by
ln
(
λlog(X,PM2.5)
)
= ln
(
λˆ
)
+ Xβlog + ln(PM2.5)γ
log. (3.2)
In (3.1) and (3.2), λˆ is the baseline risk of disease; X is a matrix of covariates that
affect the risk of disease, with β the estimated effect of these variables; and PM2.5 is
the concentration of PM2.5, with γ the estimated effect of PM2.5 concentration. Our
interest centers on γ. Notice that the log-linear specification (3.1) regresses the natural
log of the risk, or hazard, on the “linear” concentration of fine particulates, whereas
the log-log form (3.2) regresses the natural log of the risk on the natural log of the
concentration.
The HR is defined as the ratio of the hazard function evaluated at two values of
PM2.5 concentration, PM
′′
2.5 and PM
′
2.5. This equation is calculated by taking the ratio
of the antilog of the log-hazard function at two PM2.5 concentrations. The log-linear
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and log-log hazard ratios are given by
HRlin =
λlin
(
X,PM′′2.5
)
λlin
(
X,PM′2.5
) = λˆ · exp{Xβlin + PM′′2.5γlin}
λˆ · exp{Xβlin + PM′2.5γlin} = exp
{
γlin
(
PM′′2.5 − PM′2.5
)}
and
(3.3)
HRlog =
λlog
(
X,PM′′2.5
)
λlog
(
X,PM′2.5
) = λˆ · exp{Xβlog}(PM′′2.5)γlog
λˆ · exp{Xβlog}(PM′2.5)γlog =
(
PM′′2.5
PM′2.5
)γlog
. (3.4)
With the HR, taking the ratio of the hazard function at two concentration levels causes
all the variables in X to cancel out, leaving an expression comparing the risks of disease
that depends only on the pollution concentration. Solving for γ in (3.3) and (3.4) yields
γlin =
ln
(
HRlin
)
PM′′2.5 − PM′2.5
and
γlog =
ln
(
HRlog
)
ln
(
PM′′2.5
)− ln(PM′2.5) .
The hazard ratios reported in Table 11 of Krewski et al. are based on a 10 µg m−3
difference in fine particulate concentration. Notice that for the log-linear form any 10
µg m−3 change will lead to the same value of the HR regardless of the baseline level of
the concentration. With the log-log form, the value of the HR will change depending
on the levels of the concentration. HR’s reported in Table 11 of Krewski et al. are
HRlin = 1.060 for any 10µg m−3 change
HRlog =
1.095 for a 10µg m−3 change from 5µg m−3 to 15µg m−31.059 for a 10µg m−3 change from 10µg m−3 to 20µg m−3.
The estimated values of γ, then, are
γlin =
ln(1.060)
10
= 0.005827 and (3.5)
γlog =
ln(1.059)
ln(20)− ln(10) = 0.082703. (3.6)
Using these values of γ, we can construct a HR for any PM2.5 concentration compared to
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an initial baseline concentration. We will define the baseline concentration in receptor i
as the concentration at the initial level of emissions, PM′′2.5 = Ci(e0). The concentration
in receptor i for some other level of emissions, e, is defined as PM′2.5 = Ci(e). The HRs
in receptor i become5
HRlini
(
Ci(e)
)
= exp
{
γlin
(
Ci(e
0)− Ci(e)
)}
and (3.7)
HRlogi
(
Ci(e)
)
=
(
Ci(e
0)
Ci(e)
)γlog
. (3.8)
3.2.2 Benefits of abatement
To calculate the benefits of pollution abatement in receptor i we first go back to the
original definition of the HR in (3.3) and (3.4), the ratio of hazard functions, λi(·):
HRi
(
Ci(e)
)
=
λ0i
λi
(
Ci(e)
) (3.9)
In (3.9) λ0i = λi
(
Ci(e
0)
)
is defined as the risk of disease given the initial concentration
before regulation, and λi
(
Ci(e)
)
is defined as the risk given a lower concentration in
receptor i after a reduction in emissions. Rearranging (3.9), the risk of mortality in
receptor i for any level of emissions is λi
(
Ci(e)
)
= λ0i /HRi
(
Ci(e)
)
.
Assume that premature mortality is the only identified risk from the air pollution.
We can estimate the expected number of deaths in receptor i as the receptor’s population
times the risk of mortality, Deathsi
(
Ci(e)
)
= Popi · λ0i /HRi
(
Ci(e)
)
. The change in
deaths in receptor i after a reduction in emissions from e0 to e is ∆Deathsi
(
Ci(e)
)
=
Popi · λ0i
[
1− 1/HRi
(
Ci(e)
)]
. Next we define the vector of emissions in all sources after
regulation in terms of the vector of abatement from all sources, e = e0 − a. This way
we can write the change in expected deaths and the concentration level after regulation
as a function of a vector of abatement.6
Define V as the value society places on each human life. Therefore, the benefits in
receptor i of a vector of abatement in all sources, are the changes in expected deaths,
5Note that the initial concentration is not an argument of the HR function because it is fixed under
all abatement policies.
6We write Ci(e) = Ci(e
0 − a) to indicate that the concentration in a receptor is a function of the
level of abatement.
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times the value of a life saved.
Bi
(
Ci(e
0 − a)) = V ·∆Deathsi(Ci(e0 − a))
= V · Popi · λ0i
[
1− 1
HRi
(
Ci(e0 − a)
)] . (3.10)
These benefits are the difference in monetized health damages without and with reg-
ulation, defined as a function of the hazard ratio. This implies that the benefits for
receptor i from the two C-R functions in (3.7) and (3.8) are
Blini
(
Ci(e
0 − a)) = V · Popi · λ0i [1− exp{−γlin (Ci(e0)− Ci(e0 − a))}] and
Blogi
(
Ci(e
0 − a)) = V · Popi · λ0i
[
1−
(
Ci(e
0 − a)
Ci(e0)
)γlog]
.
The total benefits for all receptors in the region, resulting from abatement, a, from all
sources, are the sum of the benefits across receptors.
Blin(a) =
N∑
i=1
Blini
(
Ci(e
0 − a)) and
Blog(a) =
N∑
i=1
Blogi
(
Ci(e
0 − a)).
The total benefits are the value of risk reductions in all receptors resulting from a vector
of abatement, a, at every source of pollution. Next we investigate how the benefits in
all receptors change from an incremental change in abatement at any single source.
3.2.3 Interrelated marginal benefits across sources
With the total benefits in all receptors we can examine the marginal benefits of ad-
ditional abatement from source j. We start with the marginal benefits in receptor i
associated with a change in concentration in i (surpressing the argument of Ci):
MBi(Ci) =
∂Bi(Ci)
∂Ci
=
VPopiλ0i
[HRi(Ci)]2
∂HRi(Ci)
∂Ci
.
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The marginal benefits in receptor i attributable to a change in abatement at source j is
just MBi(Ci) times piji, the incremental impact on concentrations in i from emissions at
j. Summing across all receptors we obtain the combined marginal benefits of additional
abatement from source j:
MBj(a) =
N∑
i=1
MBi
(
Ci(e
0 − a))piji.
The marginal benefits of abatement from source j are the sum of the change in benefits
in all downwind receptors from an incremental increase in abatement at that source.
For the log-linear and log-log C-R functions the expressions for the marginal benefits of
abatement from source j are given by
MBlinj (a) = Vγlin
N∑
i=1
Popiλ
0
ipiji
HRlini
(
Ci(e0 − a)
) and
MBlogj (a) = Vγlog
N∑
i=1
Popiλ
0
ipiji
Ci(e0 − a) ·HRlogi
(
Ci(e0 − a)
) .
The marginal benefits of abatement, or equivalently the marginal damages of emis-
sions, are different for most or possibly all sources, as demonstrated in Muller and
Mendelsohn (2009), and NRC (2010). Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) report median
marginal damages across U.S. counties of $1,170 (2000 U.S. Dollars) per ton of primary
PM2.5, with a range of $41,000 between the 1
st and 99.9th percentiles. In a report by
the National Research Council (NRC 2010) median marginal damages across coal power
plants are estimated at $7,100 (2007 U.S. Dollars) per ton of primary PM2.5, with a
range of $23,400 between the 5th and 95th percentiles.7
The heterogeneity of marginal benefits of abatement across sources is heavily influ-
enced by the size of the population near the source.8 The marginal benefits with the
log-log C-R function (but not with the log-linear C-R function) will also be substantially
influenced by the PM2.5 concentration of the receptor grid squares near the source. A
7Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) and the NRC report (2010) use the log-linear C-R function from
Pope et al. (2002). Krewski et al. (2009) is an update of Pope et al. (2002).
8Marginal benefits of abatement are closely linked with the relationship between emissions and
human intake, known as the intake fraction [see Bennett et al. 2002]. Larger populations near sources
are associated with a greater intake fraction.
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source emitting pollution near receptors with low pollution concentrations will have
higher marginal benefits of abatement than a source near high concentration receptors
(given equal receptor populations) because of the concavity of the log-log C-R function.
However, the lowest concentration receptors are also likely to have the lowest population
density. If the log-log C-R function is correct, these two effects, higher population in
dirtier places and greater risk reductions in cleaner places, pull in opposite directions.
The overall effect might be to reduce the variance of the distribution of marginal benefits
of abatement with log-log compared to log-linear.
The marginal benefits in source j are a function of the level of abatement from all
sources of the pollution. The interconnected nature of the marginal benefit functions
across sources turns out to be quite important. How do the marginal benefits of abate-
ment from source j change when source k increases its abatement? The relevant effects
are
∂MBlinj (a)
∂ak
= −V(γlin)2
N∑
i=1
Popiλ
0
ipijipiki
HRlini
(
Ci(e0 − a)
) and (3.11)
∂MBlogj (a)
∂ak
= −Vγlog(γlog − 1)
N∑
i=1
Popiλ
0
ipijipiki[
Ci(e0 − a)
]2
HRlogi
(
Ci(e0 − a)
) . (3.12)
for the log-linear and log-log C-R, respectively. Using the specific parameter values for
γ found in (3.5) and (3.6) we can determine the sign of equations (3.11) and (3.12).
Notice that the parameters are all positive, and most importantly for equation (3.12),
γlog < 1. This means that, although equation (3.11) is negative, the
(
γlog − 1) term
guarantees that equation (3.12) is positive. When k = j it is clear that the marginal
benefit function for source j is decreasing in abatement aj for log-linear, but increasing
in aj for log-log.
When j 6= k with the log-linear C-R equation, the marginal benefits of abatement
from source j are decreasing with abatement from source k. Therefore, abatement from
different sources can be considered substitutes: additional abatement from one source
decreases the marginal benefits of abatement from other sources. With the log-log C-
R function, on the other hand, the marginal benefits of abatement from source j are
increasing with abatement from source k. Thus, abatement levels across sources are
complements.
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Two questions arise from this differential feature of the two specifications. First,
which of the two effects (substitute for log-linear or complement for log-log) is larger?
And second, are either of these effects significantly different from zero? To answer the
first question, consider the ratio of these two expressions:
Λ =
∂MBlogj (a)
∂ak
∂MBlinj (a)
∂ak
=
γlog
(
γlog − 1)
(γlin)
2

N∑
i=1
Popi · λ0ipijipikiCi(e0)−γ
log
Ci(e
0 − a)γlog−2
N∑
i=1
Popi · λ0ipijipiki · exp
{
−γlin (Ci(e0)− Ci(e0 − a))}
 .
For the moment, assume that the concentration level is the same in each receptor i:
Ci(e
0) = C(e0) and Ci(e
0−a) = C(e0−a). (This assumption is not appropriate for the
rest of our model, but it does help shed light on the characteristics of Λ.) This allows
us to cancel out all the Pop, pi and λ0 terms, leaving
Λ =
γlog
(
γlog − 1)
(γlin)
2
C(e0)−γlogC(e0 − a)γlog−2
exp {−γlin (C(e0)− C(e0 − a))} .
Plugging in the parameter values found in (3.5) and (3.6) and using concentration levels
commonly found in the U.S., the absolute value of Λ can range from 10 to 60, with the
largest values at low concentrations. This finding suggests that the complement effect in
the log-log function is far more important than the substitution effect in the log-linear
function, and at lower concentrations the difference is even more pronounced. A large
complement effect suggests that for multiple sources that are interrelated (such that
their pollution impacts common receptors), emission reductions from one source would
increase the marginal benefits of abatement from the other sources. The incremental
gains, in terms of reductions in risk, at the impacted receptors from additional abate-
ment are larger after one source has reduced emissions. This outcome is embodied by
the concave shape of the log-log C-R function in Figure 3.1, where the steepest part of
the curve is found at the lowest concentration levels. Achieving low concentrations in
receptors allows for the largest reductions in risk of mortality, per unit of concentration
reduction.
The second question is whether the complement effect is large in absolute value,
rather than just in relation to the substitution effect. This question is an empirical
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matter, but results given below indicate that the complement effect contributes to a
preference for lower emissions and lower concentrations with the log-log C-R function
than with log-linear.
3.2.4 Costs of abatement
The primary focus of this paper is the impact of the functional form of the C-R function
on the benefits of pollution abatement. However, to provide an interesting analysis of
pollution abatement policies it is necessary to specify the costs of abatement. The cost
of abatement at each source is assumed to be independent of the other sources. The
form of the marginal cost function (below) was chosen to have a relatively flat slope for
the first units of abatement and a steeper slope as abatement increases, indicating that
abatement becomes exceedingly expensive as a source attempts to completely eliminate
their pollution. The marginal cost functional is strictly convex in aj and is defined as
MCj(aj) = φ1j − φ2j · ln
(
1− aj
e0j
)
,
with φ1j ≥ 0 and φ2j > 0. As seen in Figure 3.2 the marginal costs rise to infinity as
abatement approaches the maximum (limaj→e0j MCj(aj) =∞).
In the simulations, described in Section 3, marginal costs are heterogeneous across
sources. This outcome is accomplished by randomly assigning values for parameters φ1j
and φ2j for each source. The simulation assumes an initial situation with no pollution
regulation, and then various policies to regulate pollution are introduced. The param-
eter values are calibrated to make the simulation economically interesting. That is, we
ensure that marginal costs are small enough to induce abatement, and large enough
to discourage nearly complete abatement. Although the cost parameters are randomly
assigned to sources in the initial situation, after abatement policies have been imple-
mented the largest marginal costs are found, on average, at sources that had the greatest
amount of abatement.
The corresponding abatement cost function with fixed costs F is
Costj(aj) = (φ1j + φ2j) aj + φ2j
(
e0j − aj
)
ln
(
1− aj
e0j
)
+ F.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of marginal cost of abatement curve from zero abatement to complete
abatement (e0).
The total cost of a vector of abatement levels is the sum of the costs for individual
sources:
Cost(a) =
N∑
j=1
Costj(aj).
3.2.5 Abatement policies
With the benefits and costs of pollution abatement established for each receptor and
source in the region, we examine three approaches to abatement. The first approach
(called “efficient abatement”) selects abatement levels at each source to maximize the
difference between the benefits and costs of abatement. The second approach is a
uniform pollution concentration standard across the region, designed to emulate the
NAAQS, achieved through a command-and-control approach. The third approach is a
uniform tax on emissions. The uniform tax yields a cost-effective outcome, but ignores
the spatial heterogeneity of marginal damages of emissions among sources. The dif-
ference in the outcomes between efficient abatement and the uniform tax identifies the
importance of implementing source-specific regulation. All three approaches (policies)
are considered with the log-linear and log-log C-R functions.
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Efficient abatement can be represented for the log-linear C-R function, as
max
a
{
Blin(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj ≥ 0, aj ≤ e0j for j = 1, . . . , N (3.13)
and, for the log-log C-R function, as
max
a
{
Blog(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj ≥ 0, aj ≤ e0j for j = 1, . . . , N. (3.14)
No source completely eliminates its pollution, because the slope of the marginal cost
curve approaches infinity as abatement approaches e0, but zero abatement is possible
for some sources if the costs of abatement are high. The first-order conditions, then,
are different depending on whether this corner comes into play:
MBj(a) =
MCj(aj) if aj > 0MCj(0)− µj if aj = 0,
where the µj are the Lagrange multipliers on the zero abatement constraints. The N
marginal benefit functions are interdependent, as abatement at each source impacts the
marginal benefits at all other sources. As the number of sources becomes large, these
problems pose computational challenges because of the number of equations that must
be solved simultaneously.9
In the second policy, the uniform standard selects a concentration limit, C¯, that
cannot be exceeded in any location. The optimal concentration limit is computed by
setting a concentration limit, imposing emission reductions at sources to satisfy the
limit, and calculating the benefits and costs of abatement. This approach is repeated
for a series of limits at progressively stricter levels (lower concentrations). The uniform
standard adopted (one standard for the whole region) is the concentration limit that
9With the log-log C-R function there is the possibility of a non-convexity because the marginal
benefit and marginal cost curves are both increasing in abatement. In this model the potential for a
non-convexity is very small because the absolute value of the slope of the marginal cost curve is likely
greater than the absolute value of the slope of the marginal benefit curve in own-source abatement.
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achieves the greatest net increase in welfare for society. This concentration is referred
to as the “best” uniform standard for the region.
Under this command-and-control policy, in order to achieve any given concentration
limit, emission reductions are determined based on that receptor, among all those to
which the source contributes measurably, that has the highest concentration. To avoid
constraining distant sources that have a minimal impact on an out-of-compliance re-
ceptor, here we defined a source as contributing pollution to a receptor if the relevant
entry in the S-R matrix is above a lower threshold, ε.10 We define θji as an indicator
variable that equals 1 if piji ≥ ε and zero if piji < ε. We employ the following ap-
proach for determining emission reductions: for each source j the emissions required
to comply with the concentration limit are equal to the ratio of the proposed limit,
C¯, and the maximum concentration in a receptor to which source j contributes pollu-
tion, denoted Cj . If Cj is less than the proposed limit, emissions remain at the status
quo, e0j . This maximum concentration that a source contributes pollution is defined
as Cj = max{C1 · θj1, . . . ,CN · θjN}. The approach does not optimize abatement by
minimizing the costs of emission reductions. Rather, each source reduces emissions by
the proportion of its contribution to any downwind receptor that is out of compliance
with the concentration limit.
For the log-linear functional form the problem is formally stated as
max
C¯
{
Blin(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj = e
0
j ·max
{
0, 1− C¯Cj
}
for j = 1, . . . , N (3.15)
and for the log-log functional form as
max
C¯
{
Blog(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj = e
0
j ·max
{
0, 1− C¯Cj
}
for j = 1, . . . , N. (3.16)
The regional concentration standards (the NAAQS values calculated here) will depend
10ε = 1.0 × 10−6. For entries in the S-R matrix greater than this value of ε suggests that for each
additional ton of emissions from a source, the annual concentration in the receptor is increased by more
than 1 millionth of a µg m−3.
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on the C-R function because the benefits of abatement are determined by the functional
form of the HR.
The third policy is a uniform tax where the regulator must choose a single tax rate
on emissions to maximize the difference between total benefits of abatement and total
costs of abatement. For each source the resulting quantity of abatement from any chosen
tax policy is the greater of zero and the intersection of the tax and the source’s marginal
cost curve. For the log-linear C-R function the problem is stated as
max
t
{
Blin(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj = max
{
0,MC−1j (t)
}
for j = 1, . . . , N (3.17)
and for the log-log functional form as
max
t
{
Blog(a)− Cost(a)}
Subject to: aj = max
{
0,MC−1j (t)
}
for j = 1, . . . , N. (3.18)
3.3 Model solution and results
The model analyzes a hypothetical geographical region that is 750 km (East/West) and
500 km North/South (an area approximately 5% the size of the contiguous U.S.). The
region is separated into 25 km × 25 km grid squares, with a total of N = 600 grid
squares that are each a source and receptor of air pollution. The populations of the
grid squares in the region are modeled after a section of the U.S. Midwest that spans
from Northwest West Virginia to Southeast Wisconsin.11 The emissions from each grid
square prior to regulation are artificially determined but are correlated with that grid
square’s population, with a correlation coefficient ρ = 0.44.12 The model and this
example are meant to be representative of a generic situation of air pollution and how
abatement policies will affect the welfare of the region. Mapping the actual population
11The parameters of the dispersion model and the emissions from sources are artificial and not cal-
ibrated to the modeled geographic region. Modeled concentrations are not meant to mirror observed
concentrations in this region.
12The correlation coefficient is derived from the correlation between criteria pollutant emissions and
population from counties in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
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of a region of the Midwest, and correlating the emissions with population is done to
provide a reasonable reflection of a real-world situation.13
3.3.1 Model solution
The model assumes an initial situation without pollution regulation. The model then
solves for three abatement policies: efficient abatement, a uniform pollution concentra-
tion standard across the region, and a uniform emissions tax. Each policy is analyzed
with both of the Krewski et al. (2009) C-R functions: log-linear and log-log.
The model is run 1,000 times with different abatement cost parameter values and
distributions of initial emissions at the sources, randomly selected, to provide a wide
array of possible outcomes. The total quantity of emissions, prior to regulation, across
the region is fixed in each iteration, but the allocation of initial emissions to each grid
square is randomly assigned, with the approximate correlation between emissions and
population maintained. The marginal cost parameters for each grid square source are
randomly drawn from distributions in each model run.14
In the efficient abatement policy, which solves the maximization problems in (3.13)
and (3.14), emissions are selected to maximize the difference between the benefits to
society of reduced mortality and the costs of abatement for polluters. Solving this prob-
lem presents significant computational challenges, requiring as it does the simultaneous
solution of N = 600 equations and 600 unknowns. We adopted an iterative numerical
approach that yields the optimum in a computationally efficient manner.15 The iterative
13Our input parameters for the Gaussian-Plume dispersion model include a constant ground level
wind speed of 5.24 m/sec, based on the average annual wind speed in Minnesota at a height of 10 m.,
with a West to East prevailing direction. The emissions from each grid square are assumed to be emitted
from a point source with an effective height of 250 m. The background concentration level of PM2.5 is
C˜ = 4µg m−3. Following U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommendations (EPA 2010)
regarding the value of a statistical life (VSL), the parameter V is equal to $8.43 million (2012 U.S.
dollars). The baseline risk of mortality, λ0i , is assumed to be the same in each receptor, and is set to
the 2011 national mortality rate of 806.6 deaths per 100,000 population (Hoyert and Xu 2012).
14The parameters φ1 and φ2 for each source are both independently drawn from normal distributions:
φ1 ∼ N (20,000, 8,000); φ2 ∼ N (100,000, 50,000). Draws from the φ1 distribution that are negative
values are assigned a value of zero, and draws from the φ2 distribution that are non-positive are assigned
a value of 10. Fixed costs are assumed to be zero for all sources, F = 0.
15We confirmed this claim by solving an otherwise identical model, but with 150 grid squares instead
of 600. At N = 150 it is just possible to compute the solution directly using a personal computer. We
compared the efficient iterative solution to the fully simultaneous solution for a sample of 20 randomly
selected runs. The numerical error between the two methods was very small: 0.002% with the log-linear
C-R function and 0.001% with log-log.
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method is based upon the algorithm suggested by Antweiler (2012), who envisions an
environmental regulator who selects a set of source-specific discriminating taxes in each
period, adjusting the taxes in response to the observed emissions decisions by sources.
In each period (which is best interpreted as an iteration in our algorithm), the taxes
are set equal to each source’s marginal benefits of abatement, computed at the previous
period’s abatement level. Then the abatement level for the next iteration is determined
by equating marginal benefits and marginal costs for each source (taking into account
possible corner solutions). Because marginal benefits are based on abatement levels in
the previous iteration, the simultaneous equation problem is avoided. In the first step,
the abatement levels are not optimal, but after several iterations the solution converges
to the optimum found by solving the equations simultaneously. With the large number
of sources in the model, and the 1,000 model runs with different parameter values, the
iterative solution method is computationally efficient and very accurate.
3.3.2 Model results
Across the 1,000 runs of the model, substantial differences appear between the outcomes
from the log-linear and log-log C-R functions. With an efficient abatement policy, if
the true C-R function is log-log society should prefer fewer emissions, lower average
concentrations of fine particulates, and therefore, lower risks of mortality, than if the
true C-R function is log-linear. This finding is attributable to the comparatively large
reductions in risk of mortality that are possible from obtaining low concentrations of
fine particulates with a log-log C-R function. This result highlights the importance
of discovering the true shape of the C-R function between adult mortality and fine
particulate exposure as the preferred abatement policies and outcomes are substantially
different.
Efficient policy and uniform pollution standard
The results show that when abatement costs are sufficiently large an efficient abatement
policy is usually preferred to a uniform pollution standard for fine particulate concentra-
tions. This preference exists for both C-R functions, and suggests that policies directed
at obtaining the greatest risk reductions at the lowest cost may provide enough bene-
fits to outweigh the environmental justice concerns of not primarily focusing emission
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reductions at the dirtiest locations.
The following results report the outcomes from the median of the 1,000 model runs.
We analyze and compare the outcomes of the model from two of the policies exam-
ined: efficient abatement policy with log-linear and log-log C-R functions; and, the
“best” uniform pollution standard with log-linear and log-log C-R functions. Prior to
regulation, there are 3.22 × 106 tons of emissions across the region. With the efficient
abatement policy, across the 1,000 runs, the median emission reduction is 22% and 38%
with log-linear and log-log C-R functions, respectively. With the uniform standards,
emissions are reduced by 18% (log-linear C-R) and 30% (log-log). For both policies,
total emissions and population-weighted average concentrations are lower for the log-log
than for the log-linear C-R function. The largest population-weighted average concen-
tration reduction is achieved by the efficient abatement policy with the log-log C-R
function. From an initial population-weighted average concentration of 12.2 µg m−3,
the efficient abatement policy leads to a population-weighted average concentration of
10.0 µg m−3, for log-linear, and 8.6 µg m−3 for log-log. The “best” uniform standards
yield population-weighted average concentrations of 10.8 µg m−3 (log-linear) and 9.7
µg m−3 (log-log).
With the efficient abatement policy, concentration reductions (2.2 µg m−3 (log-
linear) and 3.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) would reduce annual expected deaths across the region
by 4,000 with log-linear versus 8,950 for log-log. The lower expected mortality with
log-log is attributable to both the lower average concentrations and the comparatively
smaller risks at low concentrations with this C-R function. The amount of abatement
(and therefore in our model the total costs of abatement) is higher for log-log than for
log-linear, because greater abatement is justified by the greater reductions in risk of
mortality. Under the “best” uniform standards the reduction in expected mortality is
2,700 with log-linear and 5,900 with log-log.
With a log-log C-R function the total emissions from the efficient abatement policy
are only 11% less than with the “best” uniform standard; however, the efficient policy is
able to achieve a 52% greater reduction in expected mortality across the region compared
with the uniform standard. An efficient abatement policy is able to more precisely target
abatement to reduce risks of mortality.
The effectiveness of the efficient abatement policies is demonstrated by a comparison
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Figure 3.3: Efficient abatement policy versus uniform standard: net benefits of abatement and
population-weighted average pollution concentration for each model run, (A) log-linear C-R
function, (B) log-log C-R function. The four clusters each contain 1,000 points, of which 69% to
71% are encircled by the respective ellipse. Each ellipse radius represents one standard deviation
from the mean. The points inside each ellipse are the outcomes nearest the center of the joint
distribution of PM2.5 concentration and net benefits.
of the net benefits of abatement between the two policies and the two C-R functions,
which combines the benefits from risk reductions with the costs of abatement for the
polluting sources. Figure 3.3, which displays both the net benefits of abatement and the
population-weighted average concentration across the region for all model runs, shows
that the efficient abatement policies are able to achieve far greater welfare for society
than a uniform standard while also reducing the average concentration to lower levels.
The ellipse inside each cluster of points in Figure 3.3 encircles the outcomes within one
standard deviation from the mean, in each dimension, of the 1,000 model runs. In the
median model run, net benefits with a log-linear C-R function are $13 billion for the
efficient abatement policy and $5.8 billion for the “best” uniform standard. For the log-
log C-R function, net benefits are $26 billion (efficient policy) and $13 billion (uniform
standard). Under either policy, the net benefits of abatement are much larger if the
C-R function is log-log compared to log-linear. If the true C-R function is identified as
log-log, regulators could justify imposing a more restrictive pollution control policy.
Across the 1,000 model runs the distribution of the outcomes is tightly centered
61
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
A
to
ta
l
em
is
si
o
n
s
(m
il
li
o
n
to
n
s)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
8
9
10
11
12
13B
P
M
2
.
5
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
(µ
g
m
−
3
)
Figure 3.4: Distribution of outcomes across 1,000 model runs, (A) total emissions across region,
(B) population-weighted average PM2.5 concentration across region: (i) initial situation without
regulation, (ii) log-linear efficient abatement policy, (iii) log-linear “best” uniform standard, (iv)
log-log efficient abatement policy, (v) log-log “best” uniform standard. Boxplot: center line
represents median, top and bottom of box represents 25th and 75th percentiles, and end of
whiskers represent 5th and 95th percentiles. The total emissions boxplot appears as a single line
under the initial situation without regulation because it is a constant value in all model runs.
around the median, indicating that the median results presented above provide a good
representation of the array of outcomes that are possible in the model. This outcome
suggests that across many profiles of initial emissions and abatement costs from sources,
the general pattern holds that society prefers lower emissions with a log-log than with
a log-linear C-R function. This conclusion is demonstrated in Figure 3.4 for total emis-
sions of pollution and population-weighted average concentrations of PM2.5 across the
region. The distributions of the outcomes across the model runs from the four policies
show clearly that emissions and concentrations are lower with the log-log C-R function
compared with the log-linear function. There is also a less obvious, but clear distinc-
tion between the efficient policies and the uniform standards, with lower emissions and
concentrations under the efficient policies.
Differences also exist between the maximum allowable concentrations from the “best”
uniform standard under the two C-R functional forms. In Figure 3.5, the median stan-
dard with the log-linear C-R function is set at 13.25 µg m−3, while the median stan-
dard with log-log is more stringent, at 11.75 µg m−3. The primary cause of the lower
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of maximum allowable PM2.5 concentration of “best” uniform standard
with log-linear and log-log C-R functions across 1,000 model runs. Boxplot: center line repre-
sents median, top and bottom of box represents 25th and 75th percentiles, and end of whiskers
represent 5th and 95th percentiles.
standard with the log-log C-R function is the greater ancillary benefits that accrue to
low-concentration receptors when limiting emissions to meet the standard at the dirtiest
receptors. While the standard is designed to limit the pollution in the dirtiest locations,
the resulting emission reductions also cleans the air in surrounding (i.e., comparatively
cleaner) areas, leading to risk reductions at those cleaner areas. Because of the steep
slope of the log-log C-R function at low concentrations, large risk reductions are also
achieved in nearby clean receptors. The larger benefits (with log-log compared to log-
linear) at the comparatively cleaner receptors offset the greater costs of setting a lower,
stricter uniform concentration standard across the region.
In the U.S., uniform pollution standards under the NAAQS are used to limit the
risks associated with criteria air pollutants. One apparent virtue of these policies is the
perceived equity of protecting everyone from the greatest risks from pollution (i.e., the
standard is the same everywhere). Under an efficient abatement policy, environmental
justice concerns may arise. The focus is on making the greatest risk reductions at
the lowest cost, regardless of equity among receptors. Of course, even with uniform
standards inequality still exists (Brulle and Pellow 2006; Mohai, Pellow and Roberts
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2009; Marshall 2008; Su et al. 2009; Clark, Millet and Marshall 2014). In previous
studies (Marshall, Zwor and Nguyen 2014), it was found that more than 90% of articles
on environmental justice in the United States reported that air pollution exposures are
greater for lower- than for higher- socioeconomic status groups (e.g., based on income,
race, education level, or other attributes). Dockery et al. (1993) reported that there
is no threshold of fine particulate concentration below which risks of mortality are
nonexistent (see also Pope and Dockery 2006). Receptors with concentrations below
the uniform standard face less risk than those receptors that just meet the standard.
The question becomes how much inequality is acceptable?
An efficient policy abates sources that would lead to the greatest risk reductions,
but surrounding receptors also experience concentration reductions because of pollutant
dispersion. Disregarding equity or justice under an efficient abatement policy may
initially appear objectionable, but the policy should be evaluated based on a comparison
of the realized level of inequality or injustice against the overall welfare gains. Figure
3.3 demonstrates the substantial advantage of the efficient abatement policies over the
uniform standards both with greater net benefits to society and lower average fine
particulate concentrations. Surprisingly, the level of inequality, as measured by the
Gini coefficient of the differences in fine particulate concentrations across the region, is
slightly lower with the efficient policy. With a log-linear C-R relationship the median
Gini coefficient across the model runs is 0.077 under the efficient policy and 0.090 under
the uniform standard. With log-log the Gini coefficient is 0.060 under the efficient policy
and 0.066 under the uniform standard. These differences are small and show significant
improvement when compared to the situation prior to regulation with a median Gini
coefficient of 0.139. The distributions across the model runs of the Gini coefficient,
in Figure 3.6, show considerable overlap, suggesting that the environmental inequality
issues with the efficient policies, in cases considered here, are of no greater concern than
with the uniform standards. Using the Atkinson coefficient, an alternative measure of
inequality, the same pattern is found with inequality slightly lower under the efficient
abatement policies than under the uniform standards.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Gini coefficient of inequality based on PM2.5 concentration across
1,000 model runs: (i) initial situation without regulation, (ii) log-linear efficient abatement
policy, (iii) log-linear “best” uniform standard, (iv) log-log efficient abatement policy, (v) log-
log “best” uniform standard. Boxplot: center line represents median, top and bottom of box
represents 25th and 75th percentiles, and end of whiskers represent 5th and 95th percentiles.
Efficient policy and uniform tax on emissions
The above results indicate a strong social preference for an efficient abatement policy
over a command-and-control style uniform pollution standard. Next we compare the
importance of source-specific emission controls in the efficient policy to a cost-effective
policy that does not differentiate the impact of emissions by source. Henry, Muller and
Mendelsohn (2011) find that SO2 allowance trading in the U.S. actually increases dam-
ages relative to the no-trade baseline because it directs greater emissions to the dirtiest
cities. The dirtiest cities tend to have the highest marginal costs of abatement as well
as the highest marginal damages from emissions. By not differentiating between emis-
sions at different sources, more emissions result in the areas with the highest marginal
damages than is optimal.
Here we compare a uniform emissions tax to an efficient abatement policy that
equates the marginal damages to the marginal costs of abatement for each source.
The uniform emissions tax achieves a cost-effective outcome because sources choose
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a quantity of emissions to equate their marginal costs of abatement with the tax on
emissions; however, because there is a single tax rate for the region, most or possibly all
sources will be charged a tax that is not equal to the marginal damages from emissions.
The uniform tax is a much simplier policy to administer than an efficient policy. We
ask whether the distribution of marginal damages across sources is sufficiently spread
out to favor an efficient policy over a uniform tax. Are the distributions of marginal
damages sufficiently different between a log-linear and log-log C-R function to warrant
different policies depending on the identified functional form?
The simulation results show that marginal damages vary greatly by source. Under
the efficient abatement policy with both the log-linear and log-log C-R functional forms,
marginal damages at the 95th percentile are nearly 3.5 times larger than at the 5th
percentile. With a log-log C-R function the marginal damages are approximately 59%
greater than with log-linear ($34,700 (log-linear), $55,100 (log-log), median marginal
damages per ton). While the magnitude of the marginal benefits of abatement vary
between the log-linear and log-log C-R functions, the distributions are quite similar.
There is nearly perfect correlation between the marginal benefits of abatement by source
with a log-linear and log-log C-R function. The form of the C-R function does not affect
which sources are inflicting the greatest and least harm from pollution. Rather if the
true C-R function is log-log all sources are contributing to greater damages than we
previously believed.
How does the distribution of marginal benefits of abatement affect the outcomes
from the efficient and uniform tax policies? Across the 1,000 model runs, the “best”
uniform tax policy requires slightly greater emission reductions (23% for log-linear and
39% for log-log) than the efficient policy (22% for log-linear and 38% for log-log), yet the
efficient policy has a greater impact on the population weighted average concentration
(10.0 µg m−3 (log-linear), 8.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) compared to the uniform tax (10.3
µg m−3 (log-linear), 9.0 µg m−3 (log-log); see Figure 3.7). The efficient policy generates
33% greater net benefits than the uniform tax with a log-linear C-R function, and 27%
greater net benefits with log-log. The level of inequality in concentration between grid
squares, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is very similar between the efficient policy
and the uniform tax.
The advantage of the efficient policy is that it directs more abatement to the sources
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Figure 3.7: Efficient abatement policy versus uniform tax: net benefits of abatement and
population-weighted average pollution concentration for each model run, (A) log-linear C-R
function, (B) log-log C-R function. The four clusters each contain 1,000 points, of which 69% to
71% are encircled by the respective ellipse. Each ellipse radius represents one standard deviation
from the mean. The points inside each ellipse are the outcomes nearest the center of the joint
distribution of PM2.5 concentration and net benefits.
in the most populated grid squares, where the damages from emissions are greatest.
With a log-linear C-R function, the efficient policy abates 32% of emissions from sources
in grid squares in the top decile of population, and only abates 9% of emissions from
grid squares in the bottom decile. Under the uniform tax, with log-linear, all deciles
abate 23% of emissions. With log-log, the efficient policy results in emission reductions
of 51% from the top decile, and 22% from the bottom decile. Under the uniform tax,
with log-log, all deciles abate 39% of emissions. The uniform tax policy, which does
not differentiate between emissions by source, leads to excessive emissions in the most
populated areas.
Given the wide distribution of marginal benefits of abatement, and the resulting
welfare advantage from efficient abatement, a policy that differentiates between the
emissions by source appears warranted. In addition, the inefficient aspects of the uniform
tax policy would be magnified if the tax were applied to a larger region with a wider
distribution of marginal benefits.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of abatement policies to initial situation without regulation.
∆ Emissions ∆ Concentration Net Benefits
(tons) (µg m−3) ($billions)
Log-linear:
Efficient policy -700,000 -2.2 12.8
Uniform standard -560,000 -1.5 5.8
Uniform tax -740,000 -1.9 9.6
Log-log:
Efficient policy -1,230,000 -3.6 26.5
Uniform standard -980,000 -2.5 13.4
Uniform tax -1,260,000 -3.2 20.8
Note.– the change in concentration is the population weighted
average across grid squares
Table 3.1 summarizes the median outcomes resulting from the three pollution control
policies considered in the model. The efficient policy leads to the lowest concentration of
fine particulates and greatest net benefits. The uniform concentration standard results
in the worst outcomes utilizing a command-and-control abatement policy. A uniform tax
on emissions outperforms the uniform standard by achieving a cost-effective outcome,
and results in the lowest total emissions of the three policies, but it provides insufficient
incentives to the sources inflicting the greatest harm to limit emissions. Across the three
policies, a log-log C-R function calls for lower emissions, lower concentrations of fine
particulates, and greater net benefits of abatement compared to a log-linear functional
form.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contains a discussion of the effect of different shapes of a C-R function on
environmental policy. An important distinction between the two functional forms con-
sidered is the impact on people facing the lowest concentration levels. If the log-log
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form reported in Krewski et al. (2009) is correct for fine particulates, then society may
prefer substantially lower emissions. With the log-log functional form the benefits from
a marginal unit of abatement are greater in clean locations than in dirty locations,
all else equal. The log-log functional form leads to recommendations for significantly
stricter pollution abatement policies, and correspondingly lower risks of mortality. Un-
derstanding the true shape of the C-R function between fine particulate concentrations
and adult mortality is a worthy endeavor. Socially optimal policies are substantially
different between the two functions.
The difference in policy outcomes between log-linear and log-log depend on the emis-
sions within the area under the regulator’s control. With greater unregulated emissions
impacting concentrations within the area of interest, from emissions either outside the
modeling domain or not subject to regulation within the region, the effectiveness of a
policy achieving low concentrations is constrained, and the large potential risk reduc-
tions with log-log may not be atainable. Policies regulating all relevant emissions is
crucial to realize the best possible outcomes.
Uniform pollution standards with command-and-control mechanisms to achieve the
standards do not appear to be the economically preferred method of pollution control.
We find that an efficient abatement policy leads to lower average concentrations while
also achieving a better outcome for society. Environmental justice is a potential concern
with an efficient abatement policy, because the focus is not on reducing risks for the most
vulnerable populations. Contrary to our expectations, our results indicate that the level
of inequality is similar or slightly less under an efficient abatement policy than under
a uniform pollution standard, and both policies yield greater equality than conditions
before abatement.
The application of Antweiler’s (2012) idea for the iterative emissions tax to our
computational problem appears to be interesting in its own right. He envisions an
environmental regulator who actually adjusts the vector of source-specific taxes each
period. That idea turns out to be powerful in an unexpected way: as the basis for
a computationally efficient solution algorithm. The key to Antweiler’s deep insight is
that the regulator does not need to know abatement costs in order to guide the iterative
policy to the optimum. Where his policy involves explicitly the passage of time, we
use the same idea to solve an otherwise infeasible numerical problem that does not
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involve the passage of time. In both uses, Antweiler’s and ours, regulated firms are
assumed not to behave strategically in their response to each period’s emission tax.
If this assumption is not met, as in Moledina et al. (2003) and Kwerel (1977), and
regulated sources anticipate the way their behavior in one periods feeds into the policy
next period, one may expect the problem to become more difficult both computationally
and in policy practice.
Our simulations identify the potential differences in outcomes and economically pre-
ferred policies between the two estimated Krewski et al. (2009) C-R functions. Applica-
tion of this model to actual data, taken up in future work, will help to understand further
the advantages and disadvantages of uniform environmental standards, such as the U.S.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. This model also highlights the importance
of source-specific policies, suggesting that greater scrutiny is needed on cost-effective
policies that do not account for spatial differences in damages by source.
Our analysis focused on the policy implications of a supralinear C-R function at low
concentrations. Supralinearity may be important for places that face much higher con-
centrations. At the highest concentrations globally, a supralinear C-R function indicates
that risk reductions would be comparatively small until substantially lower concentra-
tions are achieved (Evans et al. 2013).
Chapter 4
Marginal Damages of Criteria
Pollutant Air Emissions
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4.1 Introduction
Analysis of criteria air pollution is complicated by many factors: the wide-spread dis-
persion of the pollutants, the hundreds of thousands of sources of emissions in the U.S.,
and the association between impacts to human health from exposure to pollution. This
complexity makes it difficult to isolate the impact on affected areas from a single source
of emissions, yet isolating this impact is at the heart of sound air pollution policy. An
efficient approach to air pollution regulation requires that emissions from each source
are set so that the marginal damages of emissions are equated to the marginal costs of
emission abatement. Achieving an efficient outcome is not possible without isolating the
impact of emissions from individual sources. Unlike emissions of carbon dioxide, where
the location of the emission source does not affect the environmental impact, isolating
the impact of emissions of criteria pollutants by source is especially important because
marginal damages can have orders of magnitude difference depending on the source’s
location.
In this paper, the impact of emissions from the most heavily polluting sources in the
U.S., measured by marginal damages, is estimated using a recently developed air pollu-
tion model. Previous estimates of marginal damages (or damages per ton) have generally
been based on one of two types of models. One type is reduced form air dispersion mod-
els that lack a strong scientific foundation and have coarse geographic precision (Muller
and Mendelsohn 2009; NRC 2010; Levy, Baxter and Schwartz 2009; EPA 2014a). The
second type is complex chemical transport models (CTM) that cannot feasibly, given
computational resources, isolate the impacts of each individual source, when examining
emissions from many locations (EPA 2014b; EPA 2011; EPA 2008). The advantages
of reduced form models are ease of use and replication, allowing for model runs that
estimates the impacts from specific sources. Complex CTMs are precise and much more
accurate than reduced form models, but require substantial computational resources,
making it infeasible to preform the required model runs to analyze many sources indi-
vidually. In an attempt to merge complex CTMs and reduced form models, the response
surface model (RSM) was developed based on statistical estimation using model runs
from complex CTMs (Fann, Fulcher and Hubbell 2009). The RSM was constrainted to
estimating air pollution impacts to a limited number of sources in a few urban areas.
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The Intervention Model for Air Pollution (InMAP), used for this analysis, is derived
from a CTM but can be run much more quickly, using a simplified approach to chemical
reactions and transport, allowing for a high volume of runs and fine geographic precision
(Tessum 2014).1 The estimates of marginal damages of emissions from many sources,
provided in this paper, are thus based on a stronger foundation than those in the past.
This paper also examines the impact on marginal damage estimates of alternative
shapes of the concentration-response (C-R) relationship between fine particulate (par-
ticles with diameter less than 2.5 microns, PM2.5) air pollution and mortality. The C-R
analyzed here come from the two most prominent studies in the U.S.: the Harvard-
Six-City (H6C) study and the American Cancer Society (ACS) study. Estimates of the
C-R from the ACS study (Pope et al. 1995; Pope et al. 2002; Krewski et al. 2009) has
consistently found less severe, but still large and alarming, impacts of air pollution on
mortality than the H6C study (Dockery et al. 1993; Laden et al. 2006; Lepeule et al.
2012).
The most recent estimates from the ACS study, by Krewski et al. (2009), utilized two
functional forms of the C-R relationship: log-linear, a frequently used relationship, and
log-log, and alternative relationship. The biggest difference between the log-linear and
log-log C-R is the impact of PM2.5 concentration reductions in areas with already low
concentrations. The estimated log-log C-R in Krewski et al. indicates that the change in
the mortality rate from a concentration reduction is largest in the lowest concentration
areas. The log-log C-R implies that the marginal benefits of reducing emissions are
increasing in abatement, an unusual phenomenon. If the true C-R relationship is log-
log then more lives can be saved by reducing PM2.5 concentrations to very low levels.
Marginal damages of emissions of criteria air pollutants are greatly influenced both by
the functional form of the C-R, and the magnitude of the effect of PM2.5 concentrations
on mortality from the ACS and H6C studies. These differences are analyzed analytically,
and empirically using InMAP.
Section 4.2 analyzes the key factors that can influence marginal damage estimates.
The marginal damage equation is derived and the implications of the different C-R
functions are highlighted. Section 4.3 presents the results of marginal damage estimates
1The computational resources of a complex CTM are approximately 25,000 times greater than In-
MAP: complex CTMs require approximately a week of computing time on a super-computer, whereas
InMAP can be run in a few hours on a personal computer.
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for many sources of pollution using InMAP and compares them to previous estimates
based on other methodology.
4.2 Methods
This paper examines the impact on human health from emissions of criteria pollutants.
The damages from criteria pollutant emissions is associated primarily with their contri-
bution to fine particulate concentrations. The focus is on fine particulates (as opposed
to coarse particulates which have a wider diameter) because they go deep into the lungs
when enhaled and possibly into the blood stream (EPA 2004). Fine particulates can
also travel much greater distances and time in the atmosphere than coarse particulates,
which settle more quickly and near the source of emission. Exposure to fine particulates,
especially long term exposure, is associated with an increased risk of mortality. Fine
particulates can be emitted directly from sources (primary PM2.5) or can be formed
in the atmosphere from chemical reactions (secondary PM2.5). The total fine particu-
late concentration combines primary and secondary PM2.5. Health impacts are linked
with total fine particulate concentrations, and for this analysis we are agnostic to the
chemical composition of the particle.2
Certain criteria pollutants can contribute to secondary PM2.5 after emission. For
instance, gas-to-liquid chemical reactions can convert SOX into sulfate compounds that
add to the total fine particulate concentration. The health impacts linked to the in-
creased fine particulate concentration caused by emissions of a criteria pollutant is
attributed to the source of emissions. By far the largest damages associated with the
emission of the criteria pollutants examined here are due to their contribution to fine
particulate concentrations.
In this analysis, the impacts of emissions are measured by the marginal damages
from the emission of an additional ton of a pollutant from a source. Marginal damages
from criteria pollutants are an important measure for policy makers, both to identify the
most harmful emission sources, and to be compared with the marginal costs of pollution
abatement strategies. Emission reductions at different sources are not equally valuable
2Fine particulates are comprised of several chemical components either as solid particles or liquid
droplets. The major species are carbon, sulfate and nitrate compounds, and soil and ashe (EPA 2004).
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of link from emissions to damages.
to society and identifying the areas with the greatest opportunity to improve human
health, and understanding the cause of the difference is necessary for efficient pollution
control policies.
The link between emissions and marginal damages requires several steps as shown in
Figure 4.1. First, the pollutant is emitted and disperses. Depending on the pollutant,
certain chemical reactions can occur in the atmosphere, contributing to the ambient
concentration of fine particulates in many receptors. The increased concentration of
fine particulates raises the risk of mortality for the exposed population. Given the value
of human life, the increased risk of mortality is translated into monetary damages.
Several factors influence the estimates of marginal damages. This paper seeks to
highlight the differences in modeling that can influence estimates of the damages from
emissions. We focus on three factors corresponding to the arrows in Figure 4.1. First,
modeling the impact of criteria pollutant emissions on fine particulate concentrations in
section 4.2.1. Dispersion of emissions and resulting pollution concentrations are exceed-
ingly complex relationships to model, and the tradeoff between simplifying assumptions
and computational requirements is key. The second factor examined, in sections 4.2.2
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and 4.2.3, is the functional form and estimated magnitude of the effect of fine par-
ticulate concentrations on mortality. Exposure to fine particulates is believed to be a
significant cause of premature mortality, however, the magnitude of the impact and the
C-R relationship can greatly influence the estimated damages. The third factor is the
appropriate value assigned for reductions in the risk of mortality (i.e. the value of a
statistical life), and whether age should be considered, examined in section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Air dispersion modeling
Most important for the validity of marginal damage estimates is the choice of modeling
the change in concentrations of fine particulates resulting from a change in emissions
of criteria pollutants. Usually the choice is between computationally intensive CTMs
that produce state-of-the-science results, but are not specific to emissions at any single
source, and reduced form models that can be run many times, but suffer from less
accurate scientific representations of air dispersion and often lack desired geographic
precision. This choice often determines the type of air pollution analysis that can be
conducted.
Research with complex CTMs, which require substantial computational resources
and run time, often use a limited number of runs of the air dispersion model, each as
a comprehensive scenario of emission changes at many sources (Fann et al. 2012; EPA
2014b; EPA 2011). These model runs are valuable in assessing the impact and benefits
of proposed pollution control policies at precise geographic locations. For instance, the
CTM CAMx was used by the EPA when estimating the health co-benefits in the reg-
ulatory impact analysis of the proposed carbon pollution guidelines for existing power
plants (EPA 2014b). Because each scenario involves emission changes at many sources,
it is not possible to separate the benefits attributable to the emission reductions at
any specific source. Without this information we cannot identify the most damaging
sources of pollution, implement an economically efficient policy of pollution abatement,
or select emission reductions to meet a specific pollution concentration target in a re-
ceptor of concern. Essentially, pollution abatement becomes an exercise of applying
educated guesses as to the appropriate locations and quantities of emission reductions
that“should” be made without sufficient economic justification. With state, regional
or national policy initiatives based on this method, excessive and inefficient pollution
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reductions may result.
The reduced form Air Pollution Emission Experiments and Policy analysis (APEEP)
model (Muller and Mendelsohn 2007) is designed to run thousands of scenarios of emis-
sion changes. Each scenario involves a change of one ton of emissions from a single
source. The damages in all receptors in the U.S. are calculated after each scenario and
compared with the damages from the baseline scenario (no emission change). The dif-
ference between the scenario with the emission change and the baseline is the marginal
damages attributable to the source. This process is repeated thousands of times to
obtain marginal damages of emissions from each county in the U.S.
The form of the results is ideal for economic analysis. However, the modeling of
air pollution in APEEP is derived from the Climatological Regional Dispersion Model
(CRDM) source-receptor (S-R) matrix. The CRDM S-R matrix represents the change
in fine particulate concentration in any receptor in the U.S. from a change in emis-
sions from any source in the U.S. The S-R matrix from the CRDM is calculated using
a Gaussian plume model which requires many simplifying assumptions and may not
produce accurate results. For instance, Gaussian plume models assume that the wind-
speed is constant and the same at any elevation, and pollution travels in a straight line
from the source (Masters and Ela 2008, page 452). Even more sophisticated Gaussian
plume models are generally not recommended for predicting changes in pollution con-
centrations beyond 50 km from the emission source (EC/R 2014; Caputo, Gimenez and
Schlamp 2003). Modeling secondary fine particulate concentrations from SOX and NOX
emissions is complicated by the time required to travel to a receptor, and is difficult to
model with Gaussian plume models that are steady state (Holmes and Morawska 2006).
APEEP estimates the marginal damages of emissions of several pollutants from each
county in the Contiguous U.S. The geographic precision of APEEP is substantially less
than the complex CTMs that are often run at 12 km grid cells across the U.S.3
In a recent report, the National Resource Council (NRC) conducted a detailed anal-
ysis of the externality costs of energy in the U.S. (NRC 2010). In order to estimate the
damages per ton of emissions from each coal power plant in the U.S., the NRC used
3Compared to 144 km2 area of 12 km grid cells, the median (and 5th and 95th percentile) area of
counties in the Contiguous U.S. is 1687 km2 (638 km2, 7919 km2).
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APEEP. The authors chose APEEP rather than a complex CTM because the compu-
tational resources required to make these calculations would have been infeasible to
implement (NRC 2010, page 83). Despite the valuable research produced using APEEP
(Muller and Mendelsohn 2007, 2009; Henry et al. 2011; NRC 2010), there is room
for improvement. Estimates of marginal damages derived from more complex scientific
relationships, instead of Gaussian plume models, enhances confidence that atmospheric
dispersion of emissions and changes in PM2.5 concentrations are accurately represented.
In addition, models with geographic precision smaller than county level for sources of
emissions and receptors of air pollution increases the credibility and applicability of
marginal damage estimates.
The analysis presented here applies InMAP which is designed to bridge the divide be-
tween complex CTMs and simple reduced form models. The results in this paper, which
are based upon InMAP, provide estimates of marginal damages from many important
sources of pollution in the U.S. The results lay out a pathway to an alternative model
to APEEP based on more advanced air dispersion modeling and greater geographic
precision.
InMAP is derived from WRF-Chem, a complex CTM, but InMAP is designed specif-
ically for annual changes in PM2.5 concentrations from emissions of criteria pollutants
(Tessum 2014). The overwhelming majority of mortality related damages from criteria
pollutants are estimated based on annual average PM2.5 concentrations (EPA 2014b,
page 4-21). By focusing on annual averages and ignoring hourly, daily, weekly and
even monthly changes in concentrations, InMAP is able to calculate expected annual
impacts from criteria pollutants at a fraction of the time and computing resources of
WRF-Chem. It is therefore feasible to use InMAP to estimate the impacts from emis-
sions from a single source. Through repeated model runs of InMAP, marginal damages
of emissions from hundreds of sources are estimated in this paper. With substantially
more model runs an S-R matrix of impacts between all model grid cells could be created
for use in a reduced form model similar to APEEP. The creation of an S-R matrix is a
worthwhile exercise that is in the process of being produced. Testing the reliability of
InMAP’s predicted concentration changes to WRF-Chem’s is ongoing but incomplete;
however, InMAP provides the potential for a stronger scientific basis to the modeling
of the isolated impacts of emissions from many sources of pollution than has previously
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been produced from APEEP.
The geographic precision of InMAP also improves upon previous reduced form mod-
els. InMAP is designed with variable grid cell sizes based on population density. The
primary grid cell unit is 36 km × 36 km which is used in sparsley populated regions of
the U.S. For areas with progressively denser populations, the grid cells are squares with
12 km, 4 km and 1 km sides. This method allows for more precise estimates of impacts
in areas with the highest populations, which, on average, have the largest damages from
pollution. In addition, the geographic precision is based on population density rather
than the more arbitrary delination between counties, as in APEEP. This difference in
model precision is most important in large counties, such as Los Angeles County, CA,
which receives one estimate in APEEP and assumes a uniform PM2.5 concentration
across the county, but is broken into over 1,000 grid cells in InMAP. With InMAP it
is therefore possible to conduct environmental justice analyses for socioeconomic and
racial group disparities given the small grid cells in highly populated areas.
InMAP is run by inputting emission changes, from a baseline, at any number of grid
cells of eight primary pollutants: PM2.5, PM10, SOX , NOX , VOC, NH3, CH4 and CO.
The baseline emissions and pollution concentrations are from a WRF-Chem model run
representing 2005 conditions. InMAP then calculates the dispersion of the pollutants
and the chemical reactions that occur in the atmosphere. The output of the model is
the change in the fine particulate concentration at each receptor grid cell in the model
resulting from the scenario of emission changes.
For the present analysis, InMAP was run by inputting a one-ton emission change
from a single source grid cell. The results describe the isolated impact on total fine par-
ticulate concentrations at every receptor grid cell in the model from a one-ton emission
change at the source. This process was repeated for 223 source grid cells for elevated
emissions,4 and 675 source grid cells for ground level emissions. Figure 4.2 displays the
location of the elevated and ground source grid cells. For elevated sources InMAP was
run for primary polluant changes of PM2.5, SOX , and NOX . Ground level sources were
run with emission changes of PM2.5, SOX , NOX , and NH3.
5
4The effective stack height of elevated emissions sources is assumed to be 100 m.
5Almost all NH3 emissions originate from ground level sources, and are therefore excluded from
analysis of elevated sources. PM10, CO and CH4 emissions do not contribute to secondary PM2.5 and
thus excluded. VOC emissions contribute to secondary organic arosols that are included in the total fine
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Figure 4.2: Locations of 223 elevated sources and 675 ground sources coded by source grid cell
size.
particulate concentration. VOC emissions are modeled in InMAP, but the results are not presented here
because testing of InMAP has shown the impact of VOC emissions on fine particulate concentrations
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The goal of this analysis is to characterize the distribution of marginal damages
from the most heavily polluting locations in the U.S., and from areas with various levels
of population density. Source grid cells were chosen based on the quantity of criteria
pollutant emissions in the cell and the grid cell size. Emissions from the 2011 National
Emissions Inventory (EPA 2013a) from elevated and ground sources of the primary
pollutants were estimated at each InMAP grid cell.6 The proportion of total emissions,
rj , for a pollutant, p, were calculated for each grid cell j, and for elevated (l) and
ground-level (g) emissions:
rp,lj =
ep,lj∑N
j=1 e
p,l
j + e
p,g
j
and rp,gj =
ep,gj∑N
j=1 e
p,l
j + e
p,g
j
,
where p is an element of P = {PM2.5, SOX ,NOX ,NH3}, and N is the number of grid
cells in InMAP. The proportions were summed across all pollutants for a grid cell,
separately for elevated and ground level emissions, to create emission scores, Slj and S
g
j .
Slj =
∑
P
rp,lj and S
g
j =
∑
P
rp,gj .
The 223 elevated sources selected for analysis were the grid cells with the highest
score with a mix from each of the four grid cell sizes: 36 km, 12 km, 4 km, 1 km
squares. The fraction of sources from each grid cell size was based on the proportion of
total emissions from each grid cell size.7 Emissions from the selected elevated sources are
34% of U.S. total elevated PM2.5 emissions, 72% of total elevated SOX emissions, and
41% of total elevated NOX emissions. The 675 ground-level sources were chosen with
the same method as the elevated sources. Emissions from the ground-level sources are
8% of U.S. total ground-level PM2.5 emissions, 7% of total ground-level SOX emissions,
7% of total ground-level NOX emissions, and 18% of total ground-level NH3 emissions.
Despite chosing sources with the greatest emissions, Figure 4.3 shows that the selected
are underestimated.
6Point sources were placed in the corresponding InMAP grid cell. Ground, mobile and area emissions
were available at county level and were allocated to InMAP squares based on area and population of
grid cell.
7Of the 223 elevated source grid cells selected 22% are from 36 km cells, 31% from 12 km cells, 37%
from 4km cells, and 10% from 1km cells. Of the 675 ground level source grid cells selected 16% are from
36 km cells, 27% from 16 km cells, 38% from 4km cells, and 19% from 1 km cells.
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Figure 4.3: Distributions of 2005 PM2.5 concentrations: U.S. (top panel), InMAP grid cells of
223 elevated sources (middle panel), and InMAP grid cells of 675 ground-level sources (bottom
panel).
sources represent areas with a wide distribution of fine particulate concentrations. These
distributions are similar to the U.S. population weighted PM2.5 concentrations in 2005.
Different methods could be employed to select the source grid cells. Here, we are
attempting to demonstrate and explain the difference in marginal damages of emissions
from the locations that emit the greatest amount of criteria pollutants. The sources
selected are therefore not a representative sample of locations across the U.S. The 223
grid cells of the elevated sources represent 0.8% of the total grid cells in InMAP, 1% of
the total U.S. population, and 0.9% of the total area of the Contiguous U.S. The 675
grid cells of the ground-level sources represent 2.4% of the total grid cells in InMAP,
3.6% of the total U.S. population, and 2.0% of the total area of the Contiguous U.S.
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Regardless of the method chosen to select the source grid cells, the marginal damages
vary dramatically depending on the source of emission, as will be shown in the results.
The sources represent the grid cells with the greatest amount of emissions from the
2011 emissions inventory from the EPA, the most recently available version. However,
the baseline concentrations in InMAP represents 2005 conditions, when average PM2.5
concentrations were substantially higher (EPA 2012a). In terms of the sources selected,
this discrepancy is not necessarily problematic. Whether the largest emitting sources
changed from 2005 to 2011, the sources selected here still provide a wide range of sources
across the U.S. based on location, PM2.5 concentration and population, to examine the
differences in marginal damages.
The change in fine particulate concentrations between 2005 and 2011 has a large
effect on the estimates of marginal damages if calculated with a log-log C-R. The higher
fine particulate concentrations, on average, in 2005 will underestimate the marginal
damages with a log-log C-R for emissions in 2011. This is discussed in greater detail
in section 4.2.2. To account for the magnitude of the difference with a log-log C-R,
marginal damages are also calculated with estimated PM2.5 concentrations for 2013.
This marginal damage calculation with 2013 concentrations is only valid if the marginal
change in concentrations in 2005 from a change in emissions, predicted by InMAP, is
the same with the lower concentrations in 2013. From sensitivity testing of InMAP, the
impact per ton of emissions on concentrations is nearly identical regardless of whether
the change in emissions is marginal or large and discrete.8 This feature is explained
by the assumptions in InMAP, which as configured here, does not account for the
change in chemical reaction rates when underlying atmospheric conditions (e.g. baseline
pollution concentrations, chemical reaction rates) change. It is also possible that the
marginal change in concentrations from a change in emissions at a source in 2005 is
a reasonable estimate of the marginal change in concentration in 2013 at the same
source. Importantly, this is not suggesting that the marginal damage of emissions are
the same from 2005 to 2013, because the concentration level may alter the impact of
PM2.5 exposures on mortality. Future versions of InMAP will need to be created with
a new baseline scenario to determine whether the marginal impact on concentrations
8Several test runs of InMAP showed that fractional or large changes in emissions from a single
source or from many sources simultaneously resulted in the nearly identical impacts per ton of emission
changes.
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from a source of emissions is substantially different depending on baseline fine particulate
concentration and other ambient air and meteorological conditions. This is an important
question for the applicability of results from reduced-form air dispersion models to time
periods and atmospheric conditions that differ from the baseline conditions. For now
we use an estimate of 2013 baseline concentrations and InMAP emissions impacts for
2005 conditions to assess the marginal damages in 2013.9
4.2.2 Concentration-response relationship
We examine how the C-R relationships estimated from the H6C and ACS studies im-
pacts marginal damages of emissions. Both studies indicate a strong association between
mortality rates and ambient concentrations of fine particulates. Because everyone is ex-
posed to ambient air and human life is sacrosanct, damages from mortality caused by
fine particulate air pollution are enormous.10 The question is how large are the dam-
ages and what should be done about it. In the most recent analyses of the H6C study
(Lepuele et al. 2012) the magnitude of the estimated effect of PM2.5 concentrations on
mortality is approximately double the estimate in the ACS study (Krewski et al. 2009).
This difference in estimated risk of mortality leads to a corresponding approximate dou-
bling of the estimated marginal damages from emissions when using the H6C estimate
compared with the ACS estimate.
In addition to the large discrepancy in the magnitude of the health impact be-
tween the two studies, there is also a question regarding the correct functional form
of the relationship between fine particulate pollution and mortality, the concentration-
response. It is typically assumed (EPA 2014b; EPA 2011; Lepeule et al. 2012; Muller
and Mendelsohn 2009; NRC 2010) that the relative risk of mortality between any two
pollution concentration levels follows a log-linear C-R. With log-linear there is a con-
stant relative risk between any fixed concentration difference, regardless of the level of
the concentration. For instance, in the analysis by Krewski et al. (2009, table 11) it is
estimated that the risk of mortality at 15 µg m−3 is approximately 6% greater than at
5 µg m−3; and similarly, the risk at 20 is 6% greater than at 10 µg m−3. The Krewski et
9For comparision, the CRDM used by APEEP is based on 1990 meteorolgical data and 1996 emissions
(Abt Associates Inc. 2000), yet is currently in use to calculate marginal damages.
10The Office of Management and Budget estimates total benefits of fine particulate regulations be-
tween $19 and $169 billion per year (OMB 2013).
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al. (2009) analysis also estimated an alternative log-log C-R. The log-log C-R indicates
that the relative risks of mortality are substantially lower at very low concentrations of
fine particulates than at higher concentrations. Specifically, the risk is estimated to be
approximately 6% greater at 20 µg m−3 compared to 10µg m−3, but the risk is 9.5%
greater at 15 µg m−3 compared to 5 µg m−3. Krewski et al. (2009, page 27) state that
the log-log C-R was a slightly better predictor of the difference in mortality risk than
the log-linear function. The Krewski et al. (2009) analysis does not imply that the true
relationship between mortality and fine particulate air pollution is log-log, but it does
identify an uncertainty as to the true shape and a need for greater attention to this
question.
The choice of a log-linear or a log-log C-R may have substantial impacts on the
marginal damages from emissions and on the preferred policies to control pollution
(Goodkind et al. 2014). If the true C-R is log-log there exists an opportunity to reduce
air pollution related mortality at a greater rate per unit of air pollution reduction in
low- compared to high-concentration areas. If the log-log C-R is correct, there is a
possibility that in order to achieve the greatest mortality reductions, a larger share of
resources should be directed at reducing air pollution in the cleanest locations. Prioritiz-
ing concentration reductions in the cleanest locations is at odds with current pollution
abatement policies in the U.S., and contrary to objectives aimed at promoting environ-
mental justice as minority and socioeconimcally vunerable populations are more likely
to live in areas with greater environmental risks, including higher PM2.5 concentrations
(Marshall, Zwor and Nguyen 2014). With log-log, even though the risk reduction is
greatest in areas where the concentration of PM2.5 is low, the dirtiest locations often
have larger populations.11 Estimates of marginal damages of emissions are largely de-
termined by the size of the population impacted as a greater share of each ton of the
emitted pollutant is inhaled.12 With a log-log C-R, high concentration areas with larger
populations may have greater marginal damages per unit of concentration than low
concentration areas with smaller populations, even though the rate of mortality risk is
reduced more per unit of concentration reduction at low concentrations.
The present analysis estimates empirically and compares the marginal damages of
11The correlation between the log (base 10) population density and PM2.5 concentrations based on
the 2005 baseline model run in InMAP is 0.62.
12See Bennett et al. 2002 for discussion of intake fraction.
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emissions for both a log-linear and a log-log C-R function. Unlike with a log-linear
C-R, with log-log, baseline PM2.5 concentrations greatly influence the marginal damage
calculation. Because the InMAP baseline concentrations are modeled on 2005 conditions
when fine particulate concentrations were significantly higher, the analysis here may
underestimate the marginal damages with log-log based on the lower concentrations that
currently exist. Therefore, an additional estimate of marginal damages is evalutated
with estimated 2013 baseline PM2.5 concentrations. An estimate of the 2013 PM2.5
concentration at each InMAP grid cell (see Figure 4.4) is produced from the change in
observed PM2.5 concentrations at monitoring stations in 2005 and 2013.
13
4.2.3 Marginal damage equation
The equation for damages from criteria pollutant emissions depends on the functional
form of the chosen C-R. The derivation starts with the equation for mortality, Mi, in
receptor i as a function of the concentration of fine particulates, Ci, the population, Popi,
and the mortality rate, λi: Mi(Ci) = Popi · λi(Ci). We define the baseline mortality
rate given the baseline fine particulate concentration C0i as λ
0
i = λi(C
0
i ). When the
concentration level deviates from the baseline, the resulting change in mortality is
∆Mi(Ci) =Mi(Ci)−Mi(C0i )
= Popi · λ0i
[
λi(Ci)
λ0i
− 1
]
, (4.1)
where the ratio λi(Ci)/λ
0
i is the relative risk of mortality, RRi(Ci), in receptor i between
an alternative concentration and the baseline concentration. The equation for RRi(Ci)
132013 concentrations for InMAP grid cells were estimated using observed concentration changes be-
tween 2005 and 2013. PM2.5 concentrations from 1,074 monitoring locations in 2005 and 961 monitoring
locations in 2013 were obtained from the EPA AirData database (EPA 2014c). These concentrations
were applied to InMAP grid cells by averaging the nearest three monitors weighted by the inverse of
the distance between the grid cell and the monitor. Define the InMAP concentrations from the nearest
three monitoring station observations as CˆO,2005i and Cˆ
O,2013
i , for 2005 and 2013, respectively. The ratio
of the 2013 to 2005 observed concentrations at each grid cell was applied to the modeled 2005 InMAP
concentrations to obtain estimates of the 2013 InMAP concentrations:
C¯i =
CˆO,2013i
CˆO,2005i
Ci,
where Ci are the 2005 baseline concentrations derived from WRF-Chem, and C¯i are the estimated 2013
concentrations for the InMAP grid cells.
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Figure 4.4: PM2.5 concentrations (µg m
−3): top panel - InMAP 2005 modeled concentrations
(derived from WRF-Chem), bottom panel - estimated 2013 concentrations for InMAP grid cells
from observed PM2.5 concentrations (see footnote 13 for explanation of 2013 InMAP concentra-
tions calculations).
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depends on the assumed C-R between adult mortality and fine particulate concentra-
tions. Here we examine the log-linear (lin) and log-log (log) C-R forms. The log-linear
relationship assumes that the natural log of mortality risk has a linear relationship with
PM2.5 concentrations and other controlling variables, X:
ln
(
λlini (Ci)
)
= β0 + βXXi + γ
linCi or
λlini (Ci) = exp
{
β0 + βXXi
}
exp
{
γlinCi
}
. (4.2)
Taking the ratio of (4.2) evaluated at Ci and C
0
i , the relative risk of mortality with the
log-linear C-R is
RRlini (Ci) =
λlini (Ci)
λlin,0i
= exp
{
γlin(Ci − C0i )
}
. (4.3)
The log-log C-R assumes that the natural log of mortality risk has a linear relationship
with the natural log of fine particulate concentrations and other controlling variables,
X.
ln
(
λlogi (Ci)
)
= β0 + βXXi + γ
log ln(Ci) or
λlogi (Ci) = exp
{
β0 + βXXi
}
(Ci)
γlog . (4.4)
The log-log relative-risk equation is
RRlogi (Ci) =
λlogi (Ci)
λlog,0i
=
(
Ci
C0i
)γlog
. (4.5)
The γ parameters can be estimated from the relative-risk results from the ACS study
presented in Krewski et al. (2009) and from the H6C study in Lepeule et al. (2012).
Solving equation (4.3) for γlin and applying the relative-risk estimates for a 10 µg
m−3 change in PM2.5 concentration, the log-linear parameters for the ACS and H6C
studies are γlinACS = 0.00583 and γ
lin
H6C = 0.0131, respectively. Solving equation (4.5)
for γlog and applying the relative-risk estimates from Krewski et al. for a change in
PM2.5 concentration from 20 to 10 µg m
−3, the log-log parameter for the ACS study is
γlogACS = 0.0827.
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Applying the relative-risk equation to the change in mortality in (4.1) we can cal-
culate the damages, Di, in receptor i from a change in concentration.
Di(Ci) = V · Popi · λ0i [RRi(Ci)− 1] (4.6)
where V is the value of a statistical life (VSL), which we assume for the moment is a
uniform value applied for all individuals. Equation (4.6) is the general form of dam-
ages for any relative-risk function. Applying (4.3) and (4.5) to (4.6) produces different
estimates of the damages due to a change in concentration.
Next we examine the marginal change in damages in receptor i from a marginal
change in concentration, separately for the log-linear and log-log C-R:
MDlini (Ci) =
∂Dlini (Ci)
∂Ci
= V ·Mi(C0i ) · γlin · RRlini (Ci) (4.7)
MDlogi (Ci) =
∂Dlogi (Ci)
∂Ci
= V ·Mi(C0i ) ·
γlog
Ci
· RRlogi (Ci). (4.8)
The marginal-damage equation explains how damages in a receptor change for any
concentration reduction below the baseline. The log-linear marginal damage equation,
(4.7), changes with different concentrations, Ci, only through the impact on the mor-
tality rate in the relative-risk equation. This aspect causes the value of the marginal-
damage equation to decrease with concentration reductions, but only by the degree to
which PM2.5 concentrations impact mortality rates. Figure 4.5 illustrates the marginal-
damage equation of the log-linear C-R with the ACS and H6C parameter estimates for
a single hypothetical receptor with an initial PM2.5 concentration of 16 µg m
−3. The
steeper slope of the H6C marginal damage curve reflects the larger estimated effect
of PM2.5 concentrations on mortality rates in the H6C study compared with the ACS
study.
The log-log marginal damage equation, (4.8), is impacted by PM2.5 concentrations,
Ci, both directly in the denominator, and indirectly through the relative-risk equation.
However, while concentration reductions lower the value of the relative-risk equation,
the Ci term in the denominator causes marginal damages to increase with lower PM2.5
concentrations. The net effect is that marginal damages increase as PM2.5 concentra-
tions fall. Put another way, with the log-log C-R more lives are saved from a unit of
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of change in marginal damages across receptor concentration. The
hypothetical receptor has a population of 250,000, and initial mortality rate, λ0i , of 806.6 per
100,000 population.
PM2.5 reduction at a receptor if there is a low concentration compared with the same
reduction at the receptor if there is a high concentration.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the log-log C-R with the ACS parameter estimate. The figure
indicates that for receptors with a relatively high fine particulate concentration (e.g. 12-
16 µg m−3), the greatest difference in estimated marginal damages is between the use of
the ACS or the H6C log-linear parameter, whereas the functional form of the C-R is less
critical. For low-concentration receptors (e.g. 4-6 µg m−3), the distinction between log-
linear and log-log becomes more important to the estimation of PM2.5 health damages
than the difference between the ACS and H6C log-linear estimates. In the 2005 InMAP
baseline, low-concentrations receptors tended to contain lower populations, and there-
fore, less air pollution damages. In the future, if fine particulate concentrations continue
to decline, the large difference in estimated damages between the C-R functional forms
will apply to larger populations. If lower concentrations are achieved for a large portion
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of the population then the possibiliy exists that only limited pollution abatement would
be economically justified with a log-linear C-R, but substantially greater abatement
may be optimal if the C-R is log-log.
Equations (4.7) and (4.8) refer to changes in concentration in a single receptor, but
abatement of pollution originates from the sources of emissions. Air pollution policies
must focus on damages at all relevant sources of pollution even if the policy goal is
to reduce PM2.5 concentrations in a single receptor. Therefore, we seek to calculate
the marginal damages of emissions of the pollutants that contribute to total PM2.5
concentrations by differentiating the damages in receptor i (equation 4.6) with respect
to a change in emissions from source j. We start with the marginal damages to a single
receptor i of emission changes of pollutant p from source j at height h:14
MDp,hji (∆e) =
∂Di
(
Ci(∆e)
)
∂ep,hj
= MDi
(
Ci(∆e)
)∂Ci(∆e)
∂ep,hj
. (4.9)
This is the marginal change in damages in receptor i from a one-ton change in emissions
from source j, where MDi
(
Ci(∆e)
)
is the marginal damage of a concentration change in
receptor i, either equation (4.7) or (4.8) depending on the C-R. In equation (4.9), we see
that the marginal damages in i from emissions at j are given by the marginal damages
in receptor i from a concentration change (MDi(Ci)) weighted by the marginal impact of
emissions from source j on the concentration in i (∂Ci(∆e)/∂e
p,h
j ). The concentration
of PM2.5, Ci(∆e), is now a function of a three-dimensional matrix of emission changes,
∆e, from the baseline. The matrix ∆e has one dimension for each grid cell source in
InMAP, a second dimension for each pollutant, and a third dimension for the height
of emission, (N × P × H). The PM2.5 concentration in receptor i is affected by the
emissions at all source grid cells of several pollutants. We define the concentration in
receptor i based on its deviation from the baseline
Ci(∆e) = C
0
i +
∑
H
∑
P
N∑
j=1
∆ep,hj · pip,hji , (4.10)
where p is the primary emitted pollutant that is an element of P ={PM2.5, SOX , NOX ,
14The height of emission, h, refers to either ground-level emissions (g) or the effective stack height of
elevated emissions (l).
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NH3}; ∆ep,hj is the emission deviation from the baseline for source grid cell j, with posi-
tive values indicating an emission increase; and pip,hji is the marginal impact of emissions
of primary pollutant p at height h from source j on the total PM2.5 concentration in
receptor i. Each run of InMAP used in this analysis, with a one-ton change in emis-
sions of a single pollutant, from one source produces a vector, pip,hj , of impacts to all N
receptors. The ith element of this vector is pip,hji . The final term in (4.9) is evaluated as
∂Ci(∆e)/∂e
p,h
j = pi
p,h
ji .
For this analysis we are most interested in the marginal damages of a change in emis-
sions from the baseline conditions. Evaluating (4.9) at the baseline (Ci = C
0
i or ∆e = 0)
we can compare the marginal damages from source j to receptor i with the log-linear
and log-log C-R15
MDlin,p,hji (∆e = 0) = pi
p,h
ji ·MDlini (C0i ) = pip,hji · V ·Mi(C0i )γlin and (4.11)
MDlog,p,hji (∆e = 0) = pi
p,h
ji ·MDlogi (C0i ) = pip,hji · V ·Mi(C0i )
γlog
C0i
. (4.12)
Comparing equations (4.11) and (4.12) and applying the parameter estimates from
Krewski et al. (2009) for γlin and γlog, the marginal damages with a log-linear C-
R are larger than with log-log if the baseline concentration is greater than 14.2 µg
m−3, and less otherwise. Marginal damages with log-log are more than double the
marginal damages with log-linear for receptors with concentrations below 7.1 µg m−3.
In the 2005 InMAP baseline scenario, 39% of the U.S. population lived in receptors
with a PM2.5 concentration greater than 14.2 µg m
−3, and only 9% lived in receptors
where the concentration was below 7.1 µg m−3. However, applying the estimate of
PM2.5 concentrations in 2013 to InMAP, only 3% of the population is in an area with a
concentration above 14.2 µg m−3, and 20% below 7.1 µg m−3. Therefore, the difference
in marginal damages between log-linear and log-log is much larger in 2013 than in 2005.
For source j the combined marginal damages across all receptors, of its emissions of
pollutant p from height h for any matrix of emission changes, ∆e is
MDp,hj (∆e) =
N∑
i=1
pip,hji ·MDi
(
Ci(∆e)
)
, (4.13)
15At the baseline concentrations, C0i , the relative-risk is unity, RRi(C
0
i ) ≡ 1.
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which is the sum of the marginal damages of increased concentrations in all downwind
receptors weighted by the marginal impact from source j. It is important to distin-
guish between the marginal damages of increased PM2.5 concentrations in a receptor,
MDi(Ci(∆e)), and the marginal damages of increased emissions of a primary pollutant
from a source, MDp,hj (∆e). The expression MDi(Ci(∆e)) is useful in identifying loca-
tions where fine particulate concentrations are likely causing the greatest harm, but it
does not provide guidance as to where emission reductions should be made to achieve
desired concentration reductions. The marginal damage of emissions of pollutant p
from source j, equation (4.13), is the externality value of emissions at the source, and
is the primary focus of estimation in this analysis. This quantity provides more useful
information for policy makers in determining the most effective locations to reduce (or
increase) emissions to satisfy policy objectives. For instance, a Pigovian tax set equal
to the value of equation (4.13) for each source and for each pollutant could potentially
produce a socially optimal quantity of emissions of criteria pollutants (Goodkind et al.
2014).
4.2.4 Value of a statistical life
Perhaps the most consequential parameter contributing to the large marginal dam-
ages associated with criteria pollutant emissions is the value of a statistical life (VSL).
Economic analyses of the wage-risk trade-off of working-age adults have consistently
estimated large premiums to accept jobs that increase the risk of mortality (Viscusi
and Aldy 2003). The VSL is derived using a hedonic-wage approach, estimating a wage
equation that includes the risk of mortality for the worker’s job, along with worker and
job specific characteristics. The estimated value of the mortality risk parameter in the
wage equation is the marginal wage premium required for a marginally riskier job. The
average annual VSL for a sample of workers is derived from the value of this parameter
after multiplying by the average wage and the annual hours worked (typically assumed
to be 2000 hours).
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) compiled estimates of the VSL for workers in the U.S.
and other countries. The median VSL was approximately $7 million, with half of the
studies ranging from $5 to $12 million. The studies with estimates below this range
typically used data that could have suffered from self-selection bias, and the studies
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with estimates above this range typically used methods that did not directly measure
the wage-risk tradeoff. The role of income, gender and age are all potentially important
considerations in the estimation and application of the VSL.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommends the use of a VSL of $7.4
million in 2006 U.S. Dollars (USD) for all benefit analysis involving risk of mortality
for all age groups (EPA 2010). According to the estimated C-R in the ACS and H6C
studies, mortality related to exposure to PM2.5 pollution impacts older populations to a
much larger degree than younger adults because baseline mortality rates are larger with
older populations. This age dispariety raises the question of whether it is appropriate
to assign the same VSL to people of all ages. If older people have lower VSLs than
younger people then damages from criteria pollutant emissions may be overestimated
through the use of a uniform VSL.
An alternative approach is the VSL-year method that assumes individuals have the
same value of each additional year of life expectancy. The VSL-year method implies
a VSL that is substantially different for younger and older populations. While there
may be some intuitive appeal to the VSL-year methodology, it was rejected in empirical
analysis (Aldy and Viscusi 2008). The findings in Aldy and Viscusi (2008) do not
necessarily suggest a uniform VSL is the appropriate method, rather the VSL varies
by age, but is not always declining with age, as is implied by the constant VSL-year
approach. Estimates show that the VSL increases gradually until around age 46 and
then slowly declines for older individuals. We apply an age-adjusted VSL along with a
uniform VSL to understand the implications to the estimate of damages from criteria
pollutant emissions under the two approaches.
The age-specific VSL used here is derived from the cohort-adjusted fitted VSL es-
timate from Aldy and Viscusi (2008) (see solid black line in Figure 4.6). The cohort-
adjusted VSL is derived from the working age adult population and is therefore silent
on the VSL for children and adults 63 years and older. For the construction of the
age-specific VSL used in the present paper it is assumed that the VSL for all children
is the same as for 18 year-olds. This assumption is inconsequential for the marginal
damage calculation as the baseline mortality rate for young populations is much lower
than for adults.
The age-specific VSL for the population above 62, however, greatly influences the
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Figure 4.6: Age-specific estimates of VSL (million 2006 USD) used in marginal damage calcu-
lations: uniform across all ages (solid blue line) recommended by EPA (2010); cohort-adjusted
VSL (solid black curve) from Aldy and Viscusi (2008) for ages 18 to 62; high and low VSL
scenarios for older (>62) and younger (<18) populations (dashed black curves); implied VSL
with constant VSL-year (dotted red curve).
overall marginal damage estimates, even though people 63 years and older constitute
only 15% of the U.S. population. Without guidance from the VSL literature we apply
two age-specific VSL scenarios for older individuals (see Figure 4.6). The first assumes
a large drop in the VSL past age 62 and levels off around $1 million for the oldest
populations. This estimate is referred to as “VSL low”. The second age-specific VSL
scenario assumes a less dramatic drop-off of the VSL for older populations and levels of
around $4.6 million. This estimate is referred to as “VSL high”. These VSL scenarios
have no empirical backing, but are used to evaluate the impact of two distinct versions
of the VSL for populations over 62 years old.
Finally, an additional estimate of marginal damages is conducted using a constant
VSL-year approach to understand the implications to the impact of criteria pollutant
emissions of this method. The constant VSL-year is calculated as $312,000 of each addi-
tional year of life-expectancy. The VSL-year value is calculated so that the population
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weighted average of working age adults (age 18 to 62) of the implied VSL equals the
uniform $7.4 million VSL.16 The VSL derived from the VSL-year method is shown in
Figure 4.6 as the dotted red curve.
The age-specific VSLs (“high”, “low”, and constant VSL-year) are applied to the
marginal damage equation by separating the population by age and using age-specific
mortality rates. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) become
MDlini (Ci) =
∑
age
Vage · Magei (C0i ) · γlin · RRlini (Ci) (4.14)
MDlogi (Ci) =
∑
age
Vage · Magei (C0i ) ·
γlog
Ci
· RRlogi (Ci). (4.15)
where the age-specific mortality is Magei (C0i ) = Popagei · λ0,agei .
4.3 Results
We first describe and present the results of a recent benefit per ton estimate of emission
reductions using a complex CTM without source-specificity, and a damage per ton
estimate from a reduced form model with unique estimates from hundreds of sources.
We follow with the marginal damage estimates from InMAP for the selected sources,
and compare the results with past estimates.
4.3.1 Results from the literature
In the regulatory impact analysis for the proposed carbon pollution guidelines for exist-
ing power plants (EPA 2014b), benefits per ton of criteria pollutant emission reductions
as a result of the regulation were estimated. The estimates were produced using the
Comprehensive Air Quality Model with Extensions (CAMx), a complex CTM with 12
km × 12 km grid cells. Due to the computational requirements of running CAMx, the
model was run once for electric-generating-unit (EGU) emissions of primary PM2.5, SOX
and NOX from three regions of the Contiguous U.S.: East (all states east of Montana),
West and California. Each run simulated a scenario of emission changes across the
16VSL calculation with constant VSL-year assumes a 3% discount rate. The curvature of the implied
VSL across ages, in Figure 4.6, is the result of discounting and differences in expected mortality.
96
region and calculated the impacts to human health in each receptor across the country.
Total benefits of improved health were divided by total emission changes of a pollutant
for the region to calculate benefits per ton. We focus on the benefits per ton from the
eastern U.S. as the East comprises 78% to 93% of the national EGU emissions of these
pollutants. Estimated benefits per ton of emissions reductions in the East for year 2020
(in 2011 USD) are $140,000 for PM2.5, $40,000 for SOX and $6,700 for NOX (see light
gray bars in Figure 4.7).17
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of estimates of median marginal damages with InMAP from elevated
and ground level sources, benefits per ton of emission reductions in East region of U.S. (EPA
2014b), and median damages per ton from coal power plants (NRC). Values from EPA and the
NRC are adjusted to have an equivalent VSL with InMAP.
The benefits per ton estimated in the EPA regulatory impact analysis (2014b) are
much larger than the damages per ton estimated in a report from the National Resource
Council (2010) on the externality costs of energy. The NRC report used the reduced
form APEEP model to calculate the damages per ton from coal power plants in the U.S.
Because APEEP can be run easily many times, damages per ton were estimated for each
individual coal power plant. The median (and 5th and 95th percentile) damage per ton
estimates of coal power plant emissions were $7,100 ($2,600, $26,000) for primary PM2.5,
17Estimates were calculated with a $9.9 million (2011 USD) VSL for year 2020 income, and the
Krewski et al. (2009) log-linear C-R function for mortality reductions. The benefits include impacts to
mortality and morbidity, but mortality constitute 95% of the benefits.
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$5,800 ($1,800, $11,000) for SOX , and $1,300 ($700, $2,800) for NOX (see white bars
in Figure 4.7).18
The regulatory impact analysis (EPA 2014b) benefit per ton estimates are not di-
rectly comparable to the NRC report (2010) damage per ton estimates because the
sources and emission changes are not exactly the same, but they are examining emis-
sions from similar types of sources and locations and are seeking to answer a similar
question: how damaging are emissions of criteria pollutants? Figure 4.7 shows that even
after adjusting the two estimates for differences in VSL and dollar-year equivalency, the
EPA regulatory impact analysis estimates are 3 to 11 times larger than the median es-
timates from the NRC. Without comparing identical locations and emission reductions
it is not possible to know with certainty the reason for the divergence in estimates, but
the choice of the air dispersion modeling is likely a key factor. Estimates in section 4.3.2
from InMAP are more similar in value with the EPA regulatory impact analysis (2014b)
than with the estimates in the NRC report (2010). Because InMAP and the EPA RIA
estimates are based on a stronger scientific representation of air dispersion modeling,
and yield similar estimates of the magnitude of damages from emissions, the marginal
damage (or damages per ton) estimates derived from APEEP may underestimate the
true values.
4.3.2 Marginal damage estimates for selected sources using InMAP
For the 223 source grid cells for elevated emissions of primary PM2.5 the median and
mean marginal damage, across sources, is $92,500 and $201,300 per ton, respectively.19
Emissions of SOX and NOX from elevated sources cause substantial damages, but are
not as large per ton as primary PM2.5. The median (and mean) marginal damages are
$31,400 ($38,700) for SOX emissions, and $4,200 ($5,400) for NOX emissions from the
selected elevated sources. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.8 displays the distribution of marginal
damage estimates across sources for each pollutant (A - elevated sources, B - ground
level sources). For emissions from ground-level sources, median (and mean) marginal
18Damages per ton were calculated with a $6 million (2000 USD) VSL, and for mortality impacts
used the Pope et al. (2002) log-linear C-R function from the ACS study (the Krewski et al. (2009)
estimates are a subsequent estimate from the ACS study, and show approximately the same impact of
fine particulate concentrations on mortality).
19If not otherwise stated marginal damages are calculated using equation (4.13) with a log-linear C-R
and a uniform VSL of $7.4 million (2006 USD).
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damages per ton are $87,500 ($477,600) for PM2.5, $22,500 ($34,400) for SOX , $4,800
($8,400) for NOX , and $48,200 ($347,600) for NH3. Mean marginal damages are much
larger than median marginal damages for PM2.5 and NH3 emissions because of very
large impacts that are experienced very near the emission source in the most densly
populated areas.
Figure 4.8 suggests that the difference in marginal damages across pollutants and
across source locations is larger than the difference between elevated and ground-level
emissions. For a given pollutant, emissions cause dramatically different damages de-
pending on the location of the source. For elevated emission sources the 95th percentile
marginal damage source is 38 times more damaging than the 5th percentile source for
PM2.5. For both SOX and NOX emissions, marginal damages from the 95
th percentile
elevated source are approximately 11 times greater than the 5th percentile elevated
source. Even larger ratios exist between the most and least damaging ground-level
sources.
Elevated sources Ground-level sources
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of estimated marginal damages of emissions from elevated sources (A)
and ground level sources (B). Center line is median, top and bottom of box is the 25th and 75th
percentile, and the vertical lines extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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Table 4.1: InMAP marginal damages from selected sources (thousand $ per ton)
Percentile
Pollutant mean 1st 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 99th
Elevated sources:
PM2.5 201.3 11.3 21.6 58.9 92.5 172.1 823.0 2418.1
SOX 38.7 6.5 9.9 23.0 31.4 41.4 107.5 181.4
NOX 5.4 0.6 1.3 2.9 4.2 6.5 13.4 23.8
Ground sources:
PM2.5 477.6 8.6 17.9 42.9 87.5 253.5 3795.5 4407.6
SOX 34.4 3.4 5.8 12.7 22.5 35.2 142.6 153.8
NOX 8.4 0.7 1.2 2.6 4.8 8.7 37.2 43.8
NH3 347.6 5.3 9.2 22.8 48.2 161.3 2928.1 3390.3
Table 4.2: Marginal damages (thousand $ per ton) and population (millions) by distance of
receptors from source (km)
0 - 100 100 - 250 250 - 500 500 - 1000 >1000
mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med
Elevated sources:
PM2.5 164.5 50.1 12.7 9.9 11.9 8.6 8.2 6.1 4.0 1.4
SOX 16.1 5.3 6.5 4.7 7.6 5.5 5.6 3.9 2.8 0.9
NOX 3.4 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1
Pop 3.8 1.8 8.4 7.9 25.7 26.9 64.4 67.5 177.2 168.4
Ground sources:
PM2.5 452.4 55.6 9.5 5.7 6.3 4.4 5.0 3.2 4.4 3.5
SOX 19.4 3.5 4.7 2.4 3.8 2.5 3.3 2.0 3.1 2.6
NOX 6.9 2.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4
NH3 330.4 23.4 6.0 2.5 4.0 2.3 3.6 1.8 3.5 2.6
Pop 3.7 1.5 6.9 4.5 17.3 16.7 47.7 41.5 204.0 209.9
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The results in Table 4.2 show that criteria pollutants cause substantial damages
far from the source of emission. For the elevated sources selected in this analysis the
mean marginal damages per ton to receptors more than 100 km from the respective
source are $32,800 for PM2.5 emissions, $19,800 for SOX emissions, and $1,700 for NOX
emissions. Table 4.2 shows that at greater distances from the source, marginal damages
remain large because there is a substantially larger population exposed. For ground-
level sources the mean marginal damages per ton to receptors more than 100 km from
the source are $20,800 for PM2.5 emissions, $11,800 for SOX emissions, $1,200 for NOX
emissions, and $13,600 for NH3 emisisons.
Table 4.3: Percent of marginal damages attributed to impacts in receptors less than 100 km
from emission source and more than 100 km from emission source, averaged across sources of
each grid cell size.
distance from source: 0 - 100 km >100 km
grid cell size: 1 km 4 km 12 km 36 km 1 km 4 km 12 km 36 km
Elevated sources:
PM2.5 97.0 71.9 49.4 24.4 3.0 28.1 50.6 75.6
SOX 81.8 30.2 26.0 12.2 18.2 70.0 74.0 87.9
NOX 93.5 63.3 45.5 25.0 6.5 36.7 54.5 75.0
Ground sources:
PM2.5 97.9 77.5 48.0 16.7 2.1 22.5 52.0 83.3
SOX 79.2 26.0 22.1 7.4 20.8 74.0 77.9 92.6
NOX 93.3 69.2 51.2 22.8 6.7 30.8 48.8 77.3
NH3 97.7 71.3 40.2 12.2 2.3 28.7 59.8 87.8
The marginal damages of emissions from a source are strongly associated with the
population density of the source grid cell. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of the marginal
damages for a source that are experienced in receptors less than 100 km from the source.
For sources in the smallest grid cells, generally in areas with higher population density,
nearly all of the damages of emissions are suffered by people living near the source. In
sparcely populated areas, a larger share of the marginal damages impact those living far
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of marginal damages based on distance of receptors from the source of
emission: elevated sources (top panel), ground-level sources (bottom panel). Values are $ per
ton per 100,000 population. Dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th percentiles. The gray area
represents the range from the 25th to 75th percentiles. The black line is the median.
from the source. Table 4.3 does not imply that marginal damages to far away receptors
are larger from 36 km grid cells than from 1 km grid cells, rather the total marginal
damages are much larger from 1 km grid cells and the share of the total impacting
distant receptors is smaller.
The relationship between marginal damages and distance of receptors from the
source, adjusted for the size of the population exposed, is demonstrated in Figure 4.9.
In this figure the distribution of marginal damages per 100,000 population in recep-
tors at various distances from the sources are displayed for the selected sources. The
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of the ratio of marginal damages between each pollutant and PM2.5,
based on distance of receptors from the source of emission: elevated sources (top panel), ground-
level sources (bottom panel). Dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th percentiles. The gray area
represents the range from the 25th to 75th percentiles. The black line is the median.
marginal damages per person decrease dramatically with distance, however, there are
much larger populations exposed at greater distances.
For a given location, the rate at which primary PM2.5 and SOX emissions contribute
to total fine particulate concentrations near the source helps explain the large difference
in estimated marginal damages between these two pollutants. SOX emissions require
chemical reactions to form sulfate which can then form into fine particulate chemical
compounds. These reactions take time, and so limit the impact of SOX emissions on
total PM2.5 concentrations near the source. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.10
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where the ratio of marginal damages between each pollutant and PM2.5 is plotted for
receptors various distances from the source of emission. For receptors less than 50 km
from the elevated sources of emissions, marginal damages from SOX are, on average, 10%
of the marginal damages from PM2.5. This ratio increases sharply at greater distances
from the source. The ratio of marginal damages between SOX and PM2.5 is 0.42 for
receptors 50 to 250 km from the elevated sources, and 0.65 for receptors 250 to 1000 km
from the elevated sources. Figure 4.10 shows that a similar relationship between SOX
and PM2.5 marginal damages is found for ground-level sources. Compared to sources
that emit primary PM2.5, it is less important to locate sources of SOX emissions far
from population centers.
Figure 4.10 also shows that the ratio of marginal damages between NOX and PM2.5
remains approximately the same for any distance between receptors and sources. For
NH3 emissions, the marginal damages are more similar in magnitude to PM2.5, and the
ratio does not change much based on distance from the source.
The damages resulting from long range transport of the emissions is based largely
on the size of the population east of the source. Figure 4.11 shows that at greater
distances from the source, receptors east of the source are impacted to a much larger
degree than populations north, south or west of the source. In Figure 4.11 the area of
each circle repsents the per capita marginal damages of people living various distances
and directions from a source. The values are the average across all elevated sources.
Between 250 and 500 km from the source of emission, marginal damages per person are
large for populations east of the source, and less, but still substantial, for populations
north, south and west of the source. For populations 500 to 1000 km from the emission
source, marginal damages per person remain relatively large east of the source, but
much smaller in the other directions. Note that while the marginal damages per person
are less in the outer ring, there are, on average, larger populations in the outer ring
than in the inner ring.
4.3.3 C-R functional form
The form of the C-R function can have large impacts on the marginal damages of
emissions, but the high baseline PM2.5 concentrations in 2005 limits large differences to
mostly low population/low marginal damage areas. Figure 4.12 displays the distribution
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Figure 4.11: Marginal damages from elevated sources based on distance and direction of receptors
from the source of emission. Area of circles represents the average, across elevated sources, of
marginal damages per person living in the respective region. Black dot in center represents the
source of emissions, but the data is not specific to this location. Gray state boundaries are
included to provide scale for the distances from a source. Inner white ring represents people
living 250 to 500 km from a source, and the direction (north, east, south or west) of the source.
Outer white ring represents people living 500 to 1000 km from the source.
of the ratio of marginal damages with a log-log and a log-linear C-R for primary PM2.5
emissions. For sources with a ratio above one, marginal damages are greater if calculated
with a log-log C-R compared with the calculation made with a log-linear C-R. For the
elevated emissions sources (panel A) in 2005 the median ratio is 0.96, suggesting that
at the median, marginal damages are higher with log-linear. For ground level sources
(panel B) in 2005 the median ratio is 1.10. For both types of sources the median
differences between log-linear and log-log are unremarkable. The sources at the top of
the distribution (where log-log marginal damages are substantially higher) tend to be the
least damaging emissions because they are in the low population areas, suggesting that
in 2005 the largest differences between log-linear and log-log occurred in locations whose
emissions have the least impacts to human health. As Figure 4.5 showed, the dispariety
between log-log and log-linear grows larger as PM2.5 concentrations get smaller. Because
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of ratio of marginal damages calculated with the log-log C-R and
the log-linear C-R (with either the 2005 or the 2013 baseline PM2.5 concentrations). Elevated
sources (A) and ground level sources (B). Center line is median, top and bottom of box is the
25th and 75th percentile, and the vertical lines extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles.
the lowest concentrations tend to be found in the least populated areas the sources that
contribute greatest to the low concentration receptors also tend to have lower marginal
damages of emissions.
With 2013 baseline concentrations the difference between log-log and log-linear is
greater and is relevant to higher population receptors. We assume that the marginal im-
pacts on concentrations from emissions at the 2005 baseline concentrations are the same
with 2013 PM2.5 concentrations.
20 The median ratio of log-log to log-linear marginal
damages is 1.46 for elevated sources of primary PM2.5 emissions, and 1.56 for ground
level sources (see Figure 4.12). With the lower fine particulate concentrations in 2013
only 1 (0.5%) of the elevated sources and 8 (1.1%) of the ground level sources have larger
marginal damages with log-linear compared with log-log, while the marginal damages
are 50% greater with log-log than with log-linear for 95 (42.6%) of the elevated sources
and 414 (61.3%) of the ground level sources. Marginal damages with log-log are larger
than log-linear for the other primary pollutants as well. The median ratio of marginal
20In the 2013 marginal damage equation the baseline mortality rates are derived from the 2005
mortality rates, the PM2.5 concentration change between 2005 and 2013, and the log-linear or log-log
C-R equation from Krewski et al. (2009).
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damages between log-log and log-linear for 2013 baseline concentrations are 1.48 for
SOX and 1.51 for NOX for elevated sources, and 1.58 for SOX , 1.61 for NOX , and 1.56
for NH3 for ground-level sources.
The marginal damages with log-log are much greater for most sources at 2013 con-
centrations than at 2005 concentrations because lower concentrations cause the marginal
damage curve to shift up for each source. This is illustrated from examining the largest
emitting source of SOX emissions from the 2011 NEI. The coal fired Duke Energy Beck-
jord power plant in New Richmond, OH emitted over 90,000 tons of SOX in 2011. Figure
4.13A shows the marginal damage curve calculated with the log-linear C-R, for any level
of emissions for the Beckjord plant from zero emissions to its current emissions, both
with 2005 and 2013 baseline concentrations. The curves are nearly identical, therefore,
the total damages of SOX emissions from this plant (if it maintained the same quantity
of emissions in both 2005 and 2011) are approximately the same. In 2005 total damages
from SOX emissions with a log-linear C-R are $3.17 billion, and in 2013 total damages
are $3.06 billion. Figure 4.13B displays the marginal damage curves calculated with
the log-log C-R from the same plant. The solid curve is with the higher 2005 baseline
concentrations, and the dashed curve is with the lower 2013 baseline concentrations.
The 2013 marginal damages have shifted up dramatically with the log-log C-R because
the value of risk reductions is greater given the lower concentrations of PM2.5 in 2013.
If this plant maintained the same level of emissions between 2005 and 2013, and the
C-R is log-log, the damages are much greater in 2013. In 2005 the estimated damages
due to SOX emissions for this plant are $2.74 billion (less than with a log-linear C-R),
but in 2013 the damages from this plant emitting the same quantity of SOX are $4.28
billion, much greater than with log-linear. For comparison, the total estimated revenue
from electricity sales by the Beckjord plant in 2011 is $0.45 billion (EIA 2014). The
Beckjord plant is slated for retirement in 2015.
Figure 4.13 also shows that with log-log the marginal damage curve is decreasing
in emissions, or increasing in abatement, but the slope is very flat. The flat slope is
explained by the relatively small amount that any one plant can contribute to the total
PM2.5 concentration in a receptor, even when abating all emissions from the largest
source of SOX in the U.S. This is especially true with SOX emissions that do not have
as disproportionate an impact on local PM2.5 conditions due to the time required to form
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Figure 4.13: Marginal damage function for SOX emissions from Duke Energy Beckjord power
plant in New Richmond, OH, with 2005 and 2013 baseline PM2.5 concentrations. A - log-linear
C-R. B - log-log C-R.
sulfate particles. The large shift in the marginal damages in Figure 4.13B shows that
with log-log, lower PM2.5 concentrations provide the opportunity to make greater risk
reductions from additional abatement from any source. In other words, concentration
reductions, or emission abatement, from one location or source, are complements with
emission reductions at other sources (Goodkind et al. 2014). Emission reductions at one
source increase the marginal damages (or marginal benefits) of emissions (abatement)
at nearby sources.
With a log-log C-R, emission reductions that impact low concentration receptors
are associated with a relatively large reduction in the mortality rate compared to high
concentration receptors. As PM2.5 concentrations continue to decline, the importance
of identifying the true shape of the C-R function gains prominence because of the large
difference in the estimated mortality resulting from emissions between the use of a
log-linear and log-log C-R.
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4.3.4 Value of a statistical life
All estimates of the marginal damages of emissions thusfar have assumed a uniform VSL
across all ages of $7.4 million. For the analysis of damages from critieria pollutants a
disproportional share of impacts are experienced by older people. Applying an age-
specific VSL to the marginal damage calculation can substantially reduce the estimated
burden of these air pollutants. Figure 4.14 shows the distribution of the ratio between
marginal damages calculated with an age-specific VSL and marginal damages calculated
with a uniform VSL. Using the “low” age-specific VSL scenario described in section 4.2.4
that assumes a substantially lower VSL for older populations, the marginal damages are
41 to 54% of the marginal damages with a uniform VSL. A similar relationship is true
for all of the primary pollutants, at ground-level and elevated sources. The marginal
damages with the “high” age-specific VSL scenario, which assumes the VSL for older
populations decreases only slightly after age 62, are 73 to 80% of the marginal damages
with a uniform VSL. The difference in the estimates between the “low” VSL and “high”
VSL is attributed exclusively to the value assigned for mortality of individuals over age
62, as the two age-specific VSL scenarios are the same for everyone 62 and younger. The
average value of the age-specific VSLs are slightly lower than the uniform VSL. For ages
18 and above the population-weighted average VSLs are $6.6 million and $7.1 million
for the “low” and “high” age-specific VSL, respectively. The difference in average VSL
explains only a small part of the large differences in marginal damages when calculated
with a uniform VSL and an age-specific VSL. Using a constant value of an additional
year of life expectancy, the marginal damages with the VSL-year method are 47 to 58%
of the marginal damages with a uniform VSL.
With only 15% of the population over age 62, the differences between the marginal
damages with the uniform VSL, the “high” age-specific VSL, the “low” age-specific
VSL, and the constant VSL-year, highlights the relative weight that the mortality of
older individuals has on the overall marginal damage calculation. These differences
demonstrate the importance of identifying the appropriate VSL to apply to the non-
working age population if age varying methods are to be used.
The current policy of the EPA is to apply a uniform VSL for individuals of any age
when evaluating the benefits associated with mortality risk reductions (EPA 2010). This
policy is not necessarily justified and may be driven by politics as much as science. In
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Figure 4.14: Distribution of ratio of marginal damages using an alternative age-specific VSL
method and marginal damages using a uniform VSL. Center line is median, top and bottom of
box is the 25th and 75th percentile, and the vertical lines extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles.
2003 the EPA set a lower VSL for older populations, but reversed the policy after public
and Congressional outcry over the “senior death discount” (Banzhaf 2014). Given the
large impacts of criteria air pollution on mortality and the disproportionate burden on
older individuals, it is important to question if age should be a consideration in society’s
valuation of human life. An efficient air pollution policy, matching marginal damages
of emissions and marginal costs of abatement at each source, would likely recommend
substantially different emission reductions if derived from a uniform or age-specific VSL.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper attempts to identify and explain the key factors that affect the calculation
of damages associated with emission of criteria pollutants. The choice of modeling of
the impact of emissions on mortality in receptors is key in providing valid estimates
of damages of air pollution. Estimates of damages using complex CTMs are unable
to separate the impact from individual sources if many sources are of emissions are
modeled. Reduced form models, such as APEEP, are not based on the state-of-the-
science understanding of air dispersion, and may underestimate the damages from air
pollution. InMAP, derived from a complex CTM, can be run to identify the impacts
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from individual sources, an important factor given the wide distribution of marginal
damages depending on the location of the source.
The estimates from InMAP from the selected elevated and ground level sources
presented here are a first step in developing a complete S-R matrix that can identify
the impact of emissions from any source to any receptor in the U.S. With a complete
S-R matrix source-specific pollution abatement policies can be evaluated and designed
with prinicles of economic efficiency.
The form of the C-R function between mortality and PM2.5 concentrations is an area
that deserves more attention especially because the lower fine particulate concentrations
in the U.S. in recent years amplifies the difference in outcomes between the log-log and
log-linear C-R.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
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The study of fine particulate air pollution is important for several reasons: the impacts
are severe, everyone is exposed, and there are no safe levels. Understanding the effects
of fine particulates and how to manage emissions is difficult because of the complicated
relationships involved. Connecting emissions from a particular source with damages
to any individual involves modeling the dispersion of emissions, chemical reactions in
the atmosphere, human exposure to pollution and the resulting health impacts, and
finally the valuation of a change in risks of human mortality. This dissertation sought
to identify the key aspects of these steps that influence how we measure air pollution
impacts and regulate emissions.
Within the U.S., damages from criteria pollutant emissions vary dramatically de-
pending on the location of the source. The reliance on concentration standards for
fine particulates limits the efficacy of air pollution regulations to be protective of hu-
man health, a key directive of the Clean Air Act. Our results suggest that better
outcomes are possible by regulating emissions, rather than concentrations. In addition,
policy instruments that apply source-specific prices equal to their marginal damages
are preferred. Source-specific policies help incentivize eliminating the most damaging
emissions, and prices encourage cost-effective abatement controls and the development
of new abatement technologies that can decrease the burden of emission reductions for
polluters.
Creating source-specific policies, such as emissions taxes set equal to the marginal
damage of emissions, are only possible if the isolated impact of emissions on concen-
trations at each receptor can be identified. A source-receptor (S-R) matrix, identifying
the impact of emissions at each location to every possible receptor, makes it possible
to create a set of source-specific emission taxes. Currently available S-R matrices, such
as the one utilized in APEEP (Muller and Mendelsohn 2007), are valuable but may
underestimate the impact of emissions and lack the preferred geographic precision for
sources of emissions and receptors of pollution.
The recently developed Intervention Model for Air Pollution (InMAP) provides an
important advance in isolating the impact of emissions from specific sources. Even
the most advanced air pollution models cannot perfectly represent the dispersion of air
pollution and the chemical reactions governing the development of fine particulates. A
trade-off exists between accuracy in representing the physical world and the time and
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computational resources required to run an air dispersion model. It becomes impractical
to run models to isolate the impact of emissions from many individual sources with
too much complexity. Using overly simplified models introduces doubt regarding the
accuracy of the results. InMAP bridges the divide between complex chemical transport
models, that require substantial computational resources, and reduced form models,
that can be run very quickly. A goal for future research is the creation of an S-R
matrix derived from InMAP. This would mark a substantial improvement over existing
matrices. Not only would the S-R matrix make the analysis and development of source-
specific regulations possible, it could be used identify the optimal location to build new
emission producing plants, given various other cost and location constraints.
The economic theory and practical implementation of cost-effective source-specific
regulations requires further analysis. The practical difficulties of source-specific policies
include eliciting private information on abatement costs from emitters of pollution. One
possible solution is to shift focus exclusively to describing the external damages from
air pollution and setting source-specific taxes. Polluters, given appropriate incentives
to internalize the external damages, could achieve a substantially improved outcome
compared to the outcomes of command-and-control policies. This policy would allow
regulators to ignore abatement costs, something they may not be adept at describing,
and induce the creativity of industry to find innovative abatement solutions. One of
the difficulties with a command-and-control policy is designing abatement strategies
for technologies that do not yet exist, and have no financial incentive to be developed.
Analysis of the potential advantages, drawbacks, and obstacles of implementing source-
specific taxes to a real-world problem of air pollution is necessary.
Economists also need to understand the strategic incentives that would be provided
to polluters from source-specific taxes. If taxes are designed to equal the marginal
damages of emissions, a source could under- or over-abate emissions to influence the
size of the tax. Analysis should focus on the potential inefficiencies that could result
from strategic behavior compared with the advantages of providing polluters with better
incentives to make cost-effective abatement decisions. For several air pollutants, it is
possible that strategic behavior by emitters would not be problematic. Any individual
source of pollution may have limited impact on the tax they face. If the marginal
damage function for a source is relatively flat, then abatement decisions will have little
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influence on the tax. A flat marginal damage function is likely when the C-R is log-
linear or when there are many sources of emissions and substantial dispersion of the
pollutant.
This dissertation has also identified the shape of the concentration-response (C-R)
as consequential for the type of regulation that should be pursued, the magnitude of
the damages from fine particulate exposure, and which populations can benefit most
from concentration reductions. If the C-R between fine particulates and mortality is
log-log, then the benefits of reducing pollution to very low levels is much greater than
has generally been believed. Pursuing regulation of air pollution across the entire range
of exposure becomes essential with a log-log C-R.
Here we demonstrated the differences in policy outcomes and marginal damages
between the log-linear and log-log C-R estimated from the American Cancer Society
study by Krewski et al. (2009). This does not, however, provide guidance as to the true
shape of the C-R. Future epidemiological studies should be designed to better evaluate
how the C-R differs across concentration levels.
Our focus has been devoted to ambient concentrations of fine particulates in the
U.S. A large share of the world’s population is exposed to much higher concentrations.
The question of the shape of the C-R is relevant here as well. A log-log C-R at high
fine particulate concentrations suggests that large reductions in pollution may lead to
only limited mortality risk reductions (Evans et al. 2013).
The most comprehensive longitudinal studies of the link between fine particulate
exposure and mortality have been conducted in the U.S. and at relatively low concen-
trations. The shape of the C-R for high concentrations does not necessarily correspond
to the shape at low concentrations, and extrapolating the results from these studies to
concentrations outside the range observed introduces large uncertainty for the C-R in
areas with high concentrations. Studies designed to identify the C-R for densely pop-
ulated developing nations are difficult to create, but will provide valuable information
for our understanding of the C-R response of fine particulates, and the risk reductions
that are possible from cleaning the air in the dirtiest locations in the world.
There are positive and negative implications if the C-R is log-log over the range of
high ambient concentrations. The good news is that, compared to low concentration
areas, the mortality attributable to fine particulate air pollution in high concentration
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areas is not dramatically higher. The bad news is that even large reductions in concen-
trations would have relatively small reductions in risk of mortality. Therefore, it may be
difficult to justify, economically, the emission reductions required to achieve low enough
concentrations where substanial gains in public health are realized.
The magnitude of the damages from PM2.5, both globally and in the U.S., are
suggestive that the fine particulate concentrations are far too high. Achieving an optimal
level of fine particulates could potentially involve dramatic shifts in the global economy.
Estimation of sectoral and industry level damages from fine particulates along with
input-output analysis could provide guidance to the likely changes in the economy. A
full accounting of the external costs of air pollution across the economy would give
government officials helpful information regarding policy priorities and for making long-
term investments. Emission taxes, if used to implement pollution control policies, would
reap substantial revenues. The distributional impacts of taxes, and the appropriate
redistribution of tax revenues are important questions for further study.
A central component of any analysis of fine particulate air pollution is the valuation
of changes in mortality risk. It is insufficient to only model the change in mortality
from a change in emissions, because we need to compare this with the value of products
and activities that created the emissions. Identifying an appropriate value is difficult
and controversial. The EPA currently uses a value of a statistical life (VSL) of $7.4
million, derived by combining estimates from 26 studies that individually ranged from
$0.85 million to $19.8 million (EPA 2010). While the range of studies used by the EPA
demonstrates the uncertainty in the appropriate value of the VSL, it is a necessary
parameter to conduct cost-benefit analyses. Applying a uniform value of the VSL to
people of all ages, as is the policy of the EPA, may also be unsatisfactory. It is important
to ask difficult questions about how mortality risks should be valued and if age should
be a consideration.
The valuation of air pollution reductions could alternatively be framed in terms of
improved health for the entire population and an increase in life expectancy. Studies
could potentially be designed to evaluate the value that people assign to additional
years of life expectancy, years that would be realized at different points in the future
depending on the age of the person. In addition, less air pollution could result in
healthier lives for all remaining years; healthier lives that could increase the value of
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each year lived. Ideally, from either perspective (reduced mortality versus extended life
and improved heath) one would hope to arrive at similar conclusions. A re-framing of
the issue could help evaluate our current valuation methods.
Concentrations of fine particulates have decreased dramatically in the U.S. in the
last several decades, yet significant risks remain. In parts of the developing world, fine
particulate pollution is an alarming problem. Additional research is required in the
science, epidemiology and economics to further our understanding so that appropriate
controls can be implemented.
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Proof of Proposition 1. For a given realization u, social welfare at the optimal
quantity policy q∗ = (α− η)/(δ − β)
SW(q∗, u) =
(α− η)2
2(δ − β) −
α− η
δ − β u.
Also for a given u, the social welfare achieved at the optimal abatement response a∗(t, u)
to any tax t is found in equation (2.9). Let t˜ be the price at which marginal benefits equal
expected marginal costs. This is the optimal price policy for small ν, but not necessarily
for large ν. We establish the proposition for t = t˜, noting that the advantage to the
price policy grows larger still when the optimal tax in (2.23) is used. Let ∆(u) denote
the advantage SW(t˜, u)− SW(q∗, u) of this (possibly nonoptimal) price policy over the
optimal quantity policy.
The support of u can be partitioned into three intervals as follows:
U1 =
{
u : u >
δ(α− η)
δ − β
}
U2 =
{
u :
δ(α− η − e0(δ − β))
δ − β ≤ u ≤
δ(α− η)
δ − β
}
U3 =
{
u : u <
δ(α− η − e0(δ − β))
δ − β
}
.
The welfare advantage of the price policy for u in these three intervals is
∆1(u) =
α− η
2(δ − β)(η − α+ 2u) > 0 for u ∈ U1 (A.1a)
∆2(u) =
u2(β + δ)
2δ2
> 0 for u ∈ U2 and u 6= 0
(A.1b)
∆3(u) =
α− η − e0(δ − β)
2(δ − β)
(
η − α+ e0(δ − β) + 2u) > 0 for u ∈ U3. (A.1c)
At the endpoints of the Uj , the corresponding ∆j(u) values are equal. If ν = 0, clearly
E[SW(t˜, u)] = E[SW(q∗, u)]. If, on the other hand, ν > 0, equations (A.1a)–(A.1c)
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ensure that
E[SW(t˜, u)]− E[SW(q∗, u)] =
∫
U1
∆1(u) du+
∫
U2
∆2(u) du+
∫
U3
∆3(u) du > 0.
To see that the difference is increasing in ν, note that for u > 0 the ∆j(u) that is relevant
at ν is increasing in u, and for u < 0 the ∆j(u) that is relevant at −ν is increasing in
−u. In either case we have that the advantage to the price policy increases in ν. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that, from (2.6),
t˜ = η + δa˜ = η + δ
(
η − α
β − δ
)
.
To see that (i.) is true, consider (2.23) for the case with η > η∗. Either ν ∈ (ν4A, ν1A)
or ν ≥ ν1A. In the former case, tˆ2b is optimal and we must show that
tˆ2b =
β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ > η + δ
(
η − α
β − δ
)
.
The inequality can be rearranged to yield
ν >
δ(η − α)
β − δ = ν4A,
which is true by assumption. In the latter case, tˆ1 is optimal and we must show that
tˆ1 = α+
βe0
2
> η + δ
(
η − α
β − δ
)
.
The inequality can be rearranged to yield η > η∗, which is again true by assumption.
To see that (ii.) is true, consider (2.23) for the case with η < η∗. Either ν ∈
(ν4B, ν1B) or ν ≥ ν1B. In the former case, tˆ3b is optimal and we must show that
tˆ3b =
β(η + ν)− βδe0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ < η + δ
(
η − α
β − δ
)
.
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The inequality can be rearranged to yield
ν >
δ(e0(β − δ) + α− η)
β − 2δ = ν4B,
which is true by assumption. In the latter case, tˆ1 is optimal and we must show that
tˆ1 = α+
βe0
2
< η + δ
(
η − α
β − δ
)
.
The inequality can be rearranged to yield η < η∗, which is true by assumption. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that η > η∗, which means that q∗ = 0 and that
E[SW(q∗, u)] = 0. This outcome can be acheived by the price-settting regulator who
sets any t ≤ tmin, which yields E[SW(tmin, u)] = 0. If, instead, η < η∗, we know that
q∗ = e0 and the welfare outcome is E[SW(q∗, u)]. This outcome can be achieved by the
price-setting regulator who sets t ≥ tmax, which ensures complete abatement. In both
cases, a price policy is available at which E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] ≥ E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)]. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of (i.) follows from the definition in (2.24) and
the associated derivation.
To see (ii.), suppose that ν > E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0). Define
ν1A = η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ)
which appears as equation (2.19). Note that t∗(ν, θ) = tˆ2b > tmin when ν ∈
(
E[MC(o, u)]−
MB(0), ν1A
)
and that t∗(ν; θ) = tˆ1 > tmin when ν ≥ ν1A. From (2.15) and (2.16)
we know that tˆ1 and tˆ2b are single-valued and continuous in ν on their feasible inter-
vals. The only possible points of discontinuity are at ν = E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0) and at
ν1A. But limν↗(η−α) tmin = α and limν↘(η−α) tˆ2b = α, and so t∗(ν, θ) is continuous at
ν = E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0). Also,
lim
ν↗ν1A
tˆ2b = α+
βe0
2
= tˆ1.
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We conclude that t∗(ν; θ) is continuous and that t∗(ν, θ) > tmin whenever ν > E[MC(0, u)]−
MB(0). What is more, we have shown that for ν ≥ ν1A, t∗ = tˆ1.
To see (iii.), note that η > η∗ implies that q∗(ν; θ) = 0 and so E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)] = 0.
Either ν ∈ (E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0), ν1A), in which case t∗ = tˆ2b, or else ν ≥ ν1A, in which
case t∗ = tˆ1. In the former case, the difference E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] − E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)]
can be simplified to
E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)]− 0 = δ
(
ν − (E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0)))3
3ν(β − 2δ)2 , (A.2)
which is strictly positive whenever ν > E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0). Moreover, the derivative
of (A.2) with respect to ν is
∂
∂ν
[
δ
(
ν − (E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0)))3
3ν(β − 2δ)2
]
=
δ
(
ν − (E[MC(0, u)]−MB(0)))2
3ν2(β − 2δ)2 (2ν − α+ η),
which is strictly positive because, under Assumption 2, we have η > α.
In the latter case with ν ≥ ν1A,
E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)]− 0 = e
0
4ν
[
(ν − ν∗min)
(
ν − ν∗min +
e0
3
√
3δ(2β − δ)
)]
. (A.3)
We know that the right side of (A.3) is strictly positive whenever ν > ν∗min. To see that
it is strictly positive whenever ν > ν1A, note that ν1A > ν
∗
min so long as β < 2δ, which
is assumed to be true. The derivative of (A.3) with respect to ν is
∂
∂ν
(
e0
4ν
[
(ν − ν∗min)
(
ν − ν∗min +
e0
3
√
3δ(2β − δ)
)])
=
∂
∂ν
[
e0
4ν
(
(ν − η − η∗)2 − δ(e
0)2
12
(2β − δ)
)]
= − e
0
4ν2
(
(ν − η + η∗)2 − δ(e
0)2
12
(2β − δ)
)
+
e0
2ν
(ν − η + η∗).
The last expression is strictly positive whenever
(ν − η + η∗)(ν + η − η∗) > −δ(e
0)2
12
(2β − δ),
which is true for ν > ν∗min. This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of (i.) follows from the definition in (2.24) and
the associated derivation.
To see (ii.), suppose that ν > MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]. Define
ν1B =
βe0
2
+ α− η
which appears as equation (2.20). Note that t∗(ν, θ) = tˆ3b < tmax when ν ∈
(
MB(e0)−
E[MC(e0, u)], ν1B
)
and that t∗(ν; θ) = tˆ1 < tmax when ν ≥ ν1B. From (2.15) and (2.17)
we know that tˆ1 and tˆ3b are single-valued and continuous in ν on their feasible intervals.
The only possible points of discontinuity are at ν = MB(e0)−E[MC(e0, u)] and at ν1B.
But limν↗(MB(e0)−E[MC(e0,u)]) tmax = α+βe0 and limν↘(MB(e0)−E[MC(e0,u)]) tˆ3b = α+βe0,
and so t∗(ν, θ) is continuous at ν = MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]. Also,
lim
ν↗ν1B
tˆ3b = α+
βe0
2
= tˆ1.
We conclude that t∗(ν; θ) is continuous and that t∗(ν, θ) < tmax whenever ν > MB(e0)−
E[MC(e0, u)]. What is more, we have shown that for ν ≥ ν1B, t∗ = tˆ1.
To see (iii.), consider two cases: either ν ∈ (MB(e0)−E[MC(e0, u)], ν1B), in which
case t∗ = tˆ3b, or else ν ≥ ν1B, in which case t∗ = tˆ1. In the former case, we can write
E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)]− E[SW(q∗(ν, θ), u)] = δ
(
ν − (MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]))3
3ν(β − 2δ)2 , (A.4)
which is positive whenever ν > MB(e0) − E[MC(e0, u)]. The derivative of (A.4) with
respect to ν is
∂
∂ν
[
δ
(
ν − (MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]))3
3ν(β − 2δ)2
]
=
δ
(
ν − (MB(e0)− E[MC(e0, u)]))2
3ν2(β − 2δ)2 (2ν+e
0(β−δ)+α−η),
which is strictly positive under Assumption 2.
In the latter case with ν ≥ ν1B, the argument follows that found in the proof of
Proposition 4. Replace ν∗min with ν
∗
max in (A.3) and the same argument establishes the
claim made here. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof of (i.) follows from the definition in (2.27) and
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the associated derivation.
To see (ii.), note that the derivation of ν∗min in (B.9) was achieved by setting
E[SW(t∗(ν; θ), u)] = E[SW(q∗(ν; θ), u)] and solving for ν. From (2.15) we know that
tˆ1 = α+ (βe
0/2) and from (2.16) we know that tmin = MC(0,−ν). Insert ν∗min into the
latter and rearrange to find the difference
tˆ1 − tmin = e
0δ
2
+
e0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) > 0.
We show that t∗(ν; θ) is not lower hemicontinuous. Define the sequence (νm) with
element ν∗min + (1/m) and specify tmin ∈ t∗(ν∗min; θ). No sequence (tm) ∈ R+ exists with
tm → tmin and tm ∈ t∗(ν; θ) for each m.
To see (iii.), note that Eu[a
∗ | ν < ν∗min] = 0. For ν > ν∗min, we have
Eu[a
∗] =
∫ tˆ1−E[MC(e0,u)]
−ν
e0f(u) du+
∫ tˆ1−E[MC(o,u)]
tˆ1−E[MC(e0,u)]
(
tˆ1 − η − u
δ
)
f(u) du
=
e0
2ν
(
tˆ1 − δe
0
2
− η + ν
)
.
Insert the expression for tˆ1 to get Eu[a
∗] = e0(η∗ − η + ν)/2ν, which is strictly positive
whenever ν > η − η∗. But this inequality must be satisfied for ν > ν∗min.
The proof of (iv.) follows closely that of Proposition 4(iii.) and so is omitted. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof of (i.) follows from the definition in (2.27) and
the associated derivation.
To see (ii.), note that the derivation of ν∗max in (B.10) was achieved by setting
E[SW(t∗, u)] = E[SW(q∗, u)] and solving for ν. From (2.15) we know that tˆ1 = α +
(βe0/2) and from (2.17) we know that tmax = MC(e
0, ν). Insert ν∗max into the latter and
rearrange to find the difference
tmax − tˆ1 = e
0δ
2
+
e0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) > 0.
We show that t∗(ν; θ) is not lower hemicontinuous. Define the sequence (νm) with
element ν∗max + (1/m) and specify tmax ∈ t∗(ν∗max; θ). No sequence (tm) ∈ R+ exists
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with tm → tmax and tm ∈ t∗(ν; θ) for each m.
To see (iii.), note that Eu[a
∗ | ν < ν∗max] = e0. For ν > ν∗max, we have
Eu[a
∗] =
∫ tˆ1−E[MC(e0,u)]
−ν
e0f(u) du+
∫ tˆ1−E[MC(0,u)]
tˆ1−E[MC(e0,u)]
(
tˆ1 − η − u
δ
)
f(u) du
=
e0
2ν
(
tˆ1 − δe
0
2
− η + ν
)
.
Insert the expression for tˆ1 to get Eu[a
∗] = e0(η∗− η+ ν)/2ν, which is strictly less than
e0 whenever ν < η − η∗. But this last inequality must be satisfied for ν > ν∗max.
The proof of (iv.) follows closely that of Proposition 5(iii.) and so is omitted. This
completes the proof. 
Appendix B
Chapter 2 Optimal Tax Rule
Derivations
135
136
Appendix B: Chapter 2 Optimal Tax Rule Derivations
We start with the equations (2.11)–(2.14), with the interval of relevant taxes given by
T = [tmin, tmax] and with tmin = η − ν and tmax = η + ν + δe0. Equations (2.11)–(2.14)
can be differentiated using Liebniz’s rule, and the resulting first derivatives set equal to
zero. (The derivatives themselves are quite lengthy and so are omitted.) Solving the
first-order necessary conditions for the tˆj yields equations (2.15)–(2.18).
The second-order sufficient conditions associated with the tˆj are as follows. (Their
derivation is somewhat tedious and is available upon request.)
tˆ1: The second-order sufficient condition for tˆ1 to be a local maximum is
∂2Γ1(tˆ1)
∂t2
= − e
0
2ν
< 0. (B.1)
When T1 6= ∅, we can be sure that tˆ1 is a local maximum.
tˆ4: The second-order sufficient condition for tˆ4 to be a local maximum is
∂2Γ4(tˆ4)
∂t2
=
(β − δ)
δ2
< 0. (B.2)
This condition is satisfied, and thus tˆ4 is a local maximum, if and only if β < δ.
Whenever Assumption 1 is satisfied, if T4 6= ∅ we know that tˆ4 is a local maximum.
Otherwise (under Assumption 2), tˆ4 is a local minimum.
tˆ2a: Because tˆ2a = tmin, we know that tˆ2a is an endpoint tax level that must be checked
against all possible local maxima. The second-order sufficient condition for tˆ2a to
be a local maximum is
∂2Γ2(tˆ2a)
∂t2
=
−η + α+ ν
2δν
< 0. (B.3)
This condition is satisfied, and thus tˆ2a is a local maximum, if and only if ν < η−α.
tˆ2b: The second-order sufficient condition for a local maximum at tˆ2b is
∂2Γ2(tˆ2b)
∂t2
=
η − α− ν
2δν
< 0. (B.4)
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This condition is satisfied, and thus tˆ2b is a local maximum, if and only if ν > η−α.
tˆ3a: Note that tˆ3a = tmax, so that tˆ3a is another endpoint tax level that must be checked
against all possible local maxima. The second-order sufficient condition for tˆ3a to
be a local maximum is
∂2Γ3(tˆ3a)
∂t2
=
−α− e0(β − δ) + (η + ν)
2δ2ν
< 0. (B.5)
This condition is satisfied, and thus tˆ3a is a local maximum, if and only if ν <
e0(β − δ) + α− η.
tˆ3b: The second-order sufficient condition for tˆ3b to be a a local maximum is
∂2Γ3(tˆ3b)
∂t2
=
α+ e0(β − δ)− (η + ν)
2δ2ν
< 0. (B.6)
This condition is satisfied, and thus tˆ3b is a local maximum, if and only if ν >
e0(β − δ) + α− η.
Our purpose in the remainder of the appendix is to demonstrate that the optimal tax
rules found in (reftstar1), (2.24), and (2.27) are correct. This requires checking all six
possible maxima, ruling out those that are minima or infeasible in each circumstance,
and then comparing the rest to each other to show which is the global maximum of
the expected social welfare function. Remember that E[SW(t)] combines the four Γj
functions, and these four functions are defined only over the domain of values that are
part of the combined function. Therefore, it is possible for a potential local optimum
to be outside the domain of its corresponding Γj function. This is referred to in the
remainder of the Appendix as the local optimum being infeasible and therefore it cannot
be the global maximum. It is also possible for the domain of a Γj function to be empty.
In this case the local optimum is infeasible. Thus, for a local optimum to be feasible
the corresponding Γj function must be non-empty and the local optimum must be an
element of the Γj domain defined in (2.7a) - (2.7d).
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B.1 Optimal tax rule for β < δ
This is the situation in which Assumption 1 is satisfied. Under Assumption 1 we have
η < α and η > e0(β − δ) + α.
The six possible local optima are considered in turn. We show that one and only one
of the first-order necessary conditions can simultaneously yield both (i.) a feasible
outcome, and (ii.) a local maximum. The corresponding tax level must be the global
maximum.
The first step for each is to determine whether it is a local maximum or not. If it is,
we then derive the conditions for its feasibility. These are restrictions on the parameter
vector that must be satisfied in order for the corresponding tˆj to be the globally optimal
tax. It might be helpful to refer to Figure 2.3 while reading this section.
tˆ1: By equation (B.1) the second derivative of Γ1(t) with respect to t is strictly nega-
tive. Therefore, tˆ1 is a local maximum. For it to be feasible tˆ1 must be an element
of T1. From (2.7a) this implies that tˆ1 ∈ [t1, t1] which is equivalent to
η + δe0 − ν ≤ α+ βe
0
2
≤ η + ν.
Notice that if tˆ1 satisfies these conditions then it must also be true that T1 is
non-empty. The left inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ η − α − (e0/2)(β − 2δ) and
the right inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ α − η + βe0/2. Combining these two
expressions yields the sufficient condition for tˆ1 feasibility:
ν ≥ max
{
η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ), α− η + βe
0
2
}
.
Define
ν1A = η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ) and ν1B = α− η + βe
0
2
,
which appear as equations (2.19) and (2.20). We have that
[ν1A > ν1B] if and only if [η > η
∗] .
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We conclude that tˆ1 is the optimum in each of the following cases:
1. [η > η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1A] or
2. [η < η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1B] ,
where η∗ is given in (1).
tˆ4: Under Assumption 1, where β < δ, the inequality in (B.2) is always satisfied.
Thus, tˆ4 is a local maximum. For it to be feasible tˆ4 must be an element of T4.
From (7d) this implies that tˆ4 ∈ (t4, t4) which is equivalent to
η + ν <
βη − αδ
β − δ < η + δe
0 − ν.
The left inequality is equivalent to ν < δ(η − α)/(β − δ) and the right inequality
is equivalent to ν < δ[e0(β− δ) +α− η]/(β− δ). Combining these two expressions
yields the sufficient condition for tˆ4 feasibility:
ν < min
{
δ(η − α)
β − δ ,
δ[e0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ
}
.
Define
ν4A =
δ(η − α)
β − δ and ν4B =
δ[e0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ .
which appear as equations (2.21) and (2.22). We have that
[ν4A < ν4B] if and only if [η > η
∗] .
We conclude that tˆ4 is the optimum in each of the following cases:
1. [η > η∗] and [ν < ν4A] or
2. [η < η∗] and [ν < ν4B] .
tˆ2a: By definition, tˆ2a ≡ tmin. From equation (B.3) the condition for tˆ2a to be a
maximum is
ν + α− η
2νδ
< 0,
which implies that ν < η − α. But this cannot hold because by Assumption 1
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η < α, and ν ≥ 0. We conclude that tˆ2a is a local minimum and cannot be the
optimal tax level.
tˆ2b: Because η < α and v is non-negative, by (B.4) the second-order condition is always
satisfied at tˆ2b, which is therefore a local maximum. For feasibility tˆ2b must be
an element of T2, but due to the min {·} function in the expression for t2 we
must consider separately the cases when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅. Suppose first that
T1 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν < δe0/2. Then tˆ2b ∈ T2 implies from (2.7b) that
tˆ2b ∈ [t2, t2] which is equivalent to
η − ν ≤ β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν.
The left inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ η−α, which is always true because η ≤ α
and ν ≥ 0. The right inequality is equivalent to
ν ≥ δ(η − α)
β − δ .
Combining this expression with the condition for T1 = ∅ shows the sufficient
condition required to hold for tˆ2b to be feasible when T1 = ∅:
δ(η − α)
β − δ ≤ ν <
δe0
2
.
This requires δ(η − α)/(β − δ) < δe0/2 which is true if and only if η > η∗.
Now suppose that T4 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν ≥ δe0/2. In this case tˆ2b ∈ T2
implies from (2.7b) that tˆ2b ∈ [t2, t2) which is equivalent to
η − ν ≤ β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ < η + δe
0 − ν.
As before the left inequality will always be satisfied. The right inequality is equiv-
alent to
ν < η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ) .
Combining this inequality with the condition for T4 = ∅ shows the sufficient
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conditions required to hold for tˆ2b to be feasible when T4 = ∅:
δe0
2
≤ ν < η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ).
This requires that δe0/2 < η − α− e02 (β − 2δ), which is true if and only if η > η∗
Combining the sufficient conditions for tˆ2b feasibility when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅ we
conclude that tˆ2b is the optimal tax if and only if:
[η > η∗] and [ν4A ≤ ν < ν1A] ,
where ν1A and ν4A are defined in equations (2.19) and (2.20).
tˆ3a: By (2.17), tˆ3a ≡ tmax. From equation (B.5) we know that tˆ3a is a local maximum
if and only if
ν − α− e0(β − δ) + η
2νδ
< 0,
which implies that ν < e0(β − δ) + α − η. But this cannot hold because by
Assumption 1, η > e0(β − δ) + α, and ν ≥ 0. We conclude that tˆ3a is a local
minimum and cannot be the optimal tax.
tˆ3b: Because η > e
0(β − δ) + α and v is non-negative, the second-order condition in
(B.6) is always satisfied at tˆ3b. It is therefore a local maximum when feasible. For
feasibility of tˆ3b it must be an element of T3, but due to the max {·} function in the
expression for t3 we must consider separately the cases when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅.
Suppose first that T1 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν < δe0/2. Then tˆ3b ∈ T3 implies
from (2.7c) that tˆ3b ∈ [t3, t3] which is equivalent to
η + δe0 − ν ≤ β(η + ν)− βδe
0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + νδe
0.
The right inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ e0(β − δ) + α − η, which is always true
because η > e0(β − δ) + α and ν ≥ 0. The left inequality is equivalent to
ν ≥ δ
[
e0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ .
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Combining this expression with the condition for T1 = ∅ shows the sufficient
condition required to hold for tˆ3b to be feasible when T1 = ∅:
δ
[
e0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ ≤ ν <
δe0
2
.
This requires that δ
[
e0(β − δ) + α− η] /(β− δ) < δe0/2 which is true if and only
if η < η∗.
Now suppose that T4 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν ≥ δe0/2. In this case tˆ3b ∈ T3
implies from (2.7c) that tˆ3b ∈ (t3, t3] which is equivalent to
η + ν <
β(η + ν)− βδe0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν + δe
0.
As before the right inequality will always be satisfied. The left inequality is equiv-
alent to
ν < α− η + βe
0
2
.
Combining this inequality with the condition for T4 = ∅ shows the sufficient
condition required to hold for tˆ3b to be feasible when T4 = ∅:
δe0
2
≤ ν < α− η + βe
0
2
.
This requires that δe0/2 < α− η + βe0/2 which is true if and only if η < η∗
Combining the sufficient conditions for tˆ3b feasibility when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅ we
conclude that tˆ3b is the optimal tax if and only if:
[η < η∗] and [ν4B ≤ ν < ν1B] ,
where ν1B and ν4B are defined in equations (2.20) and (2.22)
Note that the ranges in which these four taxes are optimal do not overlap. They
also form a partition over the entire interval [0,∞) of possible values of ν. Therefore,
the optimal tax policy is simply the one local maximum that, for any set of parameters,
satisfies the corresponding conditions.
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One final consideration is when η = η∗. In this instance ν1A = ν1B = ν4A = ν4B.
Thus, when η = η∗, tˆ2b and tˆ3b are never feasible and the optimal tax is at tˆ1 = tˆ4.
The optimal tax is given in equation (2.23).
B.2 Optimal tax rule for β ∈ (δ, 2δ)
This is the first situation in which Assumption 2 is satisfied. Under Assumption 2 we
have
η > α and η < e0(β − δ) + α
As in the previous section the six possible local optima are considered in turn to find
the local maxima and regions of feasibility. Unlike in section B.1 it is possible for the
feasible regions of the local maxima to overlap. Thus, the global maximum is found by
comparing the value of the relevant Γj functions at the local optima for the overlapping
regions.
tˆ1: The analysis of tˆ1 is identical to that in section B.1. Thus, tˆ1 is a local maximum
and tˆ1 ∈ T1 in each of the following cases:
1. [η > η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1A] or
2. [η < η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1B],
where ν1A and ν1B are defined in equations (2.19) and (2.20).
tˆ4: Under Assumption 2, where β > δ, the inequality in (B.2) is never satisfied. Thus,
tˆ4 is a local minimum and we conclude that it cannot be the optimal tax level.
tˆ2a: By (2.16), tˆ2a ≡ tmin and from (2.7b), tmin ∈ T2, therefore, tˆ2a is always feasible.
Equation (B.3) implies that tˆ2a is a local maximum when ν < η − α. Under
Assumption 2, η > α so there exists a region of the non-negative ν-space such
that tˆ2a is a feasible local maximum.
tˆ2b: By (B.4) the second-order condition is satisfied at tˆ2b when ν > η − α and is
therefore a local maximum over this region of ν-space. For feasibility of tˆ2b it
must be an element of T2, but due to the min {·} function in the expression for
t2 we must consider separately the cases when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅. Suppose first
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that T1 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν < δe0/2. In this case tˆ2b ∈ T2 implies from
(7b) that tˆ2b ∈ [t2, t2] which is equivalent to
η − ν ≤ β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν.
The left inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ η − α, which is always true when tˆ2b is a
local maximum. The right inequality is equivalent to
ν ≤ δ(η − α)
β − δ .
Combining this expression with the condition for T1 = ∅ along with the feasibility
condition that ν ≥ η − α shows the sufficient conditions required to hold for tˆ2b
to be feasible when T1 = ∅:
η − α ≤ ν < min
{
δ(η − α)
β − δ ,
δe0
2
}
.
The first term in the min{·} function is relavent (δ(η−α)/(β− δ) < δe0/2) if and
only if η < η∗. Thus, when T1 = ∅ and η < η∗, tˆ2b is feasible and a local maximum
when η − α < ν ≤ δ(η − α)/(β − δ). When T1 = ∅ but η > η∗, the second term
in the min{·} function is relavent, and tˆ2b is feasible and a local maximum when
η − α < ν < δe0/2.
Now suppose that T4 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν ≥ δe0/2. In this case tˆ2b ∈ T2
implies from (7b) that tˆ2b ∈ [t2, t2) which is equivalent to
η − ν ≤ β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ < η + δe
0 − ν.
As before, the left inequality will always be satisfied. The right inequality is
equivalent to
ν < η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ).
Combining this inequality with the condition for T4 = ∅ shows the sufficient
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conditions that must hold in order for tˆ2b to be feasible when T4 = ∅:
δe0
2
≤ ν < η − α− e
0
2
(β − 2δ).
This requires δe0/2 < η − α− (e0/2)(β − 2δ) which is true if and only if η > η∗.
Combining the sufficient conditions for tˆ2b feasibility when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅ we
conclude that tˆ2b is a local maximum and feasible in each of the following cases:
1. [η > η∗] and [η − α < ν < ν1A] or
2. [η < η∗] and [η − α < ν ≤ ν4A],
where ν1A and ν4A are defined in equations (2.19) and (2.20).
tˆ3a: By (2.17), tˆ3a ≡ tmax and from (2.7c), tmax ∈ T3, therefore, tˆ3a is always feasible.
Equation (B.5) implies that tˆ3a is a local maximum when ν < e
0(β − δ) + α− η.
Under Assumption 2, η < e0(β−δ)+α so there exists a region of the non-negative
ν-space such that tˆ3a is a feasible local maximum.
tˆ3b: By (B.6) the second-order condition is satisfied at tˆ3b when ν > e
0(β − δ) + α− η
and is therefore a local maximum over this region of ν-space. For feasibility of tˆ3b
it must be an element of T3, but due to the max {·} function in the expression for
t3 we must consider separately the cases when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅. Suppose first
that T1 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν < δe0/2. Then tˆ3b ∈ T3 implies from (2.7c)
that tˆ3b ∈ [t3, t3] which is equivalent to
η + δe0 − ν ≤ β(η + ν)− βδe
0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν + δe
0.
The right inequality is equivalent to ν ≥ e0(β − δ) + α − η, which is always true
when tˆ3b is a local maximum. The left inequality is equivalent to
ν ≤ δ[e
0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ .
Combining this expression with the condition for T1 = ∅ along with the feasibility
condition that ν ≥ e0(β−δ)+α−η shows the sufficient conditions that must hold
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in order for tˆ3b to be feasible when T1 = ∅:
e0(β − δ) + α− η ≤ ν < min
{
δ[e0(β − δ) + α− η]
β − δ ,
δe0
2
}
.
The first term in the min {·} function is relavent (δ[e0(β − δ) + α − η]/(β − δ) <
δe0/2) if and only if η > η∗. Thus, when T1 = ∅ and η > η∗, tˆ3b is feasible and a
local maximum when e0(β − δ) +α− η < ν ≤ δ[e0(β − δ) +α− η]/(β − δ). When
T1 = ∅ but η < η∗, the second term in the min{·} function is relavent, and tˆ3b is
feasible and a local maximum when e0(β − δ) + α− η < ν < δe0/2.
Now suppose that T4 = ∅, which is equivalent to ν ≥ δe0/2. In this case tˆ3b ∈ T3
implies from (2.7c) that tˆ3b ∈ (t3, t3] which is equivalent to
η + ν <
β(η + ν)− βδe0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν + δe
0.
As before the right inequality will always be satisfied. The left inequality is equiv-
alent to
ν < α− η + βe
0
2
.
Combining this inequality with the condition for T4 = ∅ shows the sufficient
conditions that must hold in order for tˆ3b to be feasible when T4 = ∅:
δe0
2
≤ ν < α− η + βe
0
2
.
This requires δe0/2 < α− η + βe0/2 which is true if and only if η < η∗.
Combining the sufficient conditions for tˆ3b feasibility when T1 = ∅ and T4 = ∅ we
conclude that tˆ3b is a local maximum and feasible in each of the following cases:
1. [η < η∗] and
[
e0(β − δ) + α− η < ν < ν1B
]
or
2. [η < η∗] and
[
e0(β − δ) + α− η < ν ≤ ν4B
]
,
where ν1B and ν4B are defined in equations (2.20) and (2.22).
To find the global maximum we must combine the feasibility conditions and compare
Γj values for each of the local maxima: tˆ1, tˆ2a, tˆ3a, tˆ2b, tˆ3b.
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For low values of ν the global maximum will either be at tˆ2a or tˆ3a. The Γj values
for these two local maxima are
E[SW (tmin)] = Γ2(tˆ2a) = 0 and (B.7)
E[SW (tmax)] = Γ3(tˆ3a) =
∫ ν
−ν
(
β − δ
2
(e0)2 + e0(α− η − u)
)
du
= e0(η∗ − η). (B.8)
Thus, tˆ3a is strictly preferred to tˆ2a if and only if Γ3(tˆ3a) > Γ2(tˆ2a) = 0. This is true
precisely when η < η∗. Conversely, tˆ2a is strictly preferred to tˆ3a if and only if η > η∗.
Consider first the case where η > η∗. The sufficient conditions for each of the local
maxima to be feasible are summarized below1:
tˆ2a : ν ∈ [0, η − α]
tˆ3a : ν ∈ [0, e0(β − δ) + α− η]
tˆ2b : ν ∈ (η − α, ν1A)
tˆ3b : ν ∈ (e0(β − δ) + α− η, ν4B]
tˆ1 : ν ∈ [ν1A,∞)
The inequality η > η∗ implies both that η−α > e0(β−δ)+α−η and that ν1A > ν4B.
This first condition demonstrates that tˆ3a cannot be the global maximum because its
feasible range is contained in the feasible range of tˆ2a, and when η > η
∗, tˆ2a strictly
dominates tˆ3a. We state without proof that on the interval (e
0(β − δ) + α − η, η − α],
Γ2(tˆ2a) > Γ3(tˆ3b); and on the interval (η − α, ν4B], Γ2(tˆ2b) > Γ3(tˆ3b). These conditions
show that the feasible local maximum tˆ3b cannot be the global maximum when η > η
∗.
With tˆ3a and tˆ3b eliminated from consideration as the global maximum, the optimal tax
policy is simply the single remaining feasible local maximum in each region of ν-space.
Notice that the feasible ranges for tˆ2a, tˆ2b and tˆ1 form a partition over the entire interval
[0,∞) of possible values of ν.
1When ν = η − α, tˆ2a = tˆ2b and neither are local maxima, rather this is an inflection point of Γ2.
Similarly, when ν = e0(β− δ) +α−η, tˆ3a = tˆ3b and it is an inflection point on Γ3. ν = η−α is included
in the feasible range for tˆ2a but not tˆ2b; and ν = e
0(β − δ) + α− η is included in the feasible range for
tˆ3a but not for tˆ3b.
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Now consider the case where η < η∗. The sufficient conditions for each of the local
maxima to be feasible are summarized below:
tˆ2a : ν ∈ [0, η − α]
tˆ3a : ν ∈ [0, e0(β − δ) + α− η]
tˆ2b : ν ∈ (η − α, ν4A]
tˆ3b : ν ∈ (e0(β − δ) + α− η, ν1B)
tˆ1 : ν ∈ [ν1B,∞)
The inequality η < η∗ implies both that e0(β−δ)+α−η > η−α and that ν1B > ν4A.
The first of these conditions demonstrates that tˆ2a cannot be the global maximum
because its feasible range is contained in the feasible range of tˆ3a, and when η < η
∗, tˆ3a
strictly dominates tˆ2a. We state without proof that on the interval (η−α, e0(β−δ)+α−
η], its true that Γ3(tˆ3a) > Γ2(tˆ2b); and on the interval (e
0(β−δ)+α−η, ν4A], its true that
Γ3(tˆ3b) > Γ2(tˆ2b). These conditions show that the feasible local maximum tˆ2b cannot
be the global maximum when η < η∗. With tˆ2a and tˆ2b eliminated from consideration
as the global maximum, the optimal tax policy is simply the single remaining feasible
local maximum in each region of ν-space. Notice that the feasible ranges for tˆ3a, tˆ3b and
tˆ1 form a partition over the interval [0,∞) of possible values of ν.
One final consideration is the case in which η = η∗. In this instance η − α =
e0(β − δ) + α − η, ν1A = ν1B, Γ2(tˆ2a) = Γ3(tˆ3a) and Γ2(tˆ2b) = Γ3(tˆ3b). Thus, when
η = η∗, tˆ2a and tˆ3a are both optimal tax levels for ν ≤ η − α = e0(β − δ) + α − η; tˆ2b
and tˆ3b are both optimal tax levels for ν ∈ (η − α = e0(β − δ) + α− η, ν1A = ν1B); and
tˆ1 is the optimal tax for ν ≥ ν1A = ν1B.
The optimal tax is given in equation (2.24)
B.3 Optimal tax rule for β ≥ 2δ
In this situation Assumption 2 is again satisfied which implies that
η > α and η < e0(β − δ) + α.
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The six possible local optima are considered again to find the local maxima and regions
of feasbility. The global maximum is found by comparing the value of the relevant Γj
functions at the local optimas for the entire region of possible values of ν.
tˆ1: The analysis of tˆ1 is identical to that in section B.1. Thus, tˆ1 is always a local
maximum when feasible and tˆ1 ∈ T1 in each of the following cases:
1. [η > η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1A] or
2. [η < η∗] and [ν ≥ ν1B],
where ν1A and ν1B are defined in equations (2.19) and (2.20).
tˆ4: Under Assumption 2, where β > δ, the inequality in (B.2) is never satisfied. Thus,
tˆ4 is a local minimum and we conclude that it cannot be the optimal tax.
tˆ2a: By (2.16), tˆ2a ≡ tmin and from (7b), tmin ∈ T2, therefore, tˆ2a is always feasible.
Equation (B.3) implies that tˆ2a is a local maximum when ν < η − α. Under
Assumption 2, η > α so there exists a region of the non-negative ν-space such
that tˆ2a is a feasible local maximum.
tˆ2b: Equation (B.4) implies that tˆ2b is a local maximum when ν > η − α. A necessary
condition for feasibility of tˆ2b is that tˆ2b ≥ t2 which implies
η − ν ≤ β(η − ν)− 2αδ
β − 2δ .
This inequality is equivalent to ν ≤ η − α, but this violates the second-order
condition for tˆ2b to be a local maximum. Therefore, if tˆ2b is feasible it cannot be
a local maximum, so we conclude it cannot be the optimal tax.
tˆ3a: By (2.17), tˆ3a ≡ tmax and from (7c), tmax ∈ T3, therefore, tˆ3a is always feasible.
Equation (B.5) implies that tˆ3a is a local maximum when ν < e
0(β − δ) + α− η.
Under Assumption 2, η < e0(β−δ)+α so there exists a region of the non-negative
ν-space such that tˆ3a is a feasible local maximum.
tˆ3b: Equation (B.6) implies that tˆ3b is a local maximum when ν > e
0(β − δ) + α − η.
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A necessary condition for feasibility of tˆ3b is that tˆ3b ≤ t3 which implies
β(η + ν)− βδe0 − 2αδ
β − 2δ ≤ η + ν + δe
0.
This inequality is equivalent to ν ≤ e0(β− δ)+α−η, but this violates the second-
order condition for tˆ3b to be a local maximum. Therefore, if tˆ3b is feasible it cannot
be a local maximum, so we conclude it cannot be the optimal tax.
To find the global maximum we must compare the feasibility conditions and Γj
values for each of the local maxima: tˆ1, tˆ2a, and tˆ3a. As was demonstrated in section
B.2 a tax at tˆ2a is strictly preferred to tˆ3a if η > η
∗ and vice versa when η < η∗.
Consider first the situation where η > η∗. The tax tˆ2a is always feasible and is a
maximum if ν < η − α. The only other possible optimal tax is tˆ1 which is always a
local maximum and is feasible if ν ≥ ν1A. First, notice that η − α ≥ ν1A is equivalent
to β ≥ 2δ, which is given by assumption. Next, we want to find the critical value of ν
at which Γ1(tˆ1) ≥ Γ2(tˆ2a). Because Γ2(tˆ2a) = 0 we need to find the threshold value of
ν at which Γ1(tˆ1) ≥ 0. Solving this expression for ν:
ν ≥ η − η∗ + e
0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ).
Define
ν∗min = η − η∗ +
e0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) (B.9)
as the value of ν that equates Γ2(tˆ2a) and Γ1(tˆ1). Further,
Γ1(tˆ1)− Γ2(tˆ2a) = e
0
4ν
(
ν − ν∗min
)(
ν − ν∗min +
e0
3
√
3δ(2β − δ)
)
,
which is strictly positive for ν > ν∗min. Two more conditions must be considered. First,
ν∗min ≥ ν1A is equivalent to β ≥ 2δ, which is given by assumption. Second, ν∗min ≤ η−α
holds whenever β ≥ 2δ. Therefore, when ν < ν∗min, tˆ2a is always a maximum and is
strictly preferred to tˆ1; when ν > ν
∗
min, tˆ1 is feasible and is strictly preferred to tˆ2a; and
when ν = ν∗min, Γ2(tˆ2a) = Γ1(tˆ1). Thus, tˆ2a is the optimal tax level for ν ∈ [0, ν∗min] and
tˆ1 is the optimal tax level for ν ∈ [ν∗min,∞).
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Next consider the case with η < η∗. The value tˆ3a is always feasible and is a local
maximum if ν < e0(β − δ) + α − η. The only other possible optimal tax is tˆ1 which is
always a maximum and is feasible if ν ≥ ν1B. First, notice that e0(β− δ) +α− η ≥ ν1B
is equivalent to β ≥ 2δ, which is given by assumption. Next, we want to find the critical
value of ν at which Γ1(tˆ1) ≥ Γ3(tˆ3a). Solving this expression for ν:
ν ≥ η∗ − η + e
0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ).
Define
ν∗max = η
∗ − η + e
0
6
√
3δ(2β − δ) (B.10)
as the value of ν that equates Γ3(tˆ3a) and Γ1(tˆ1). Further,
Γ1(tˆ1)− Γ3(tˆ3a) = e
0
4ν
(
ν − ν∗max
)(
ν − ν∗max +
e0
3
√
3δ(2β − δ)
)
.
which is strictly positive for ν > ν∗max. Two more conditions must be considered.
First, ν∗max ≥ ν1B is equivalent to β ≥ 2δ, which is given by assumption. Second,
ν∗max ≤ e0(β − δ) + α − η holds whenever β ≥ 2δ. Therefore, when ν < ν∗max, tˆ3a is
always a maximum and is strictly preferred to tˆ1; when ν > ν
∗
max, tˆ1 is feasible and is
strictly preferred to tˆ3a; and when ν = ν
∗
max, Γ3(tˆ3a) = Γ1(tˆ1). Thus, tˆ3a is the optimal
tax level for ν ∈ [0, ν∗max], and tˆ1 is the optimal tax level for ν ∈ [ν∗max,∞).
One final consideration is the case in which η = η∗. In this instance Γ2(tˆ2a) = Γ3(tˆ3a)
and ν∗min = ν
∗
max. Thus, when η = η
∗, tˆ2a and tˆ3a are both optimal tax levels for
ν ≤ ν∗min = ν∗max; and tˆ1 is the optimal tax for ν ≥ ν∗min = ν∗max.
The optimal tax is given in equation (2.27).
B.4 Restricting marginal costs to be nonnegative
We have been silent on the possibility that, for large ν, the marginal cost of abatement
might be negative for small a. Negative marginal costs might not be considered un-
reasonable, if one is persuaded by the argument of Porter and van der Linde (1995).
Requiring nonnegative marginal costs complicates our analysis, but not irretrievably so.
Here we sketch the changes one would need to make, under Assumption 2, in order to
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account for a restriction that ν ≤ η.
For β < 2δ
In order for tˆ1 to be the optimal tax, either (2.20) or (2.22) must be violated. Because
we are restricting the lower bound on ν and not the upper bound, and because (2.22) is
relevant when η < η∗, we need only determine conditions guaranteeing that η is greater
than or equal to the right side of (2.20). That is:
η ≥ βe
0
4
+
α
2
. (B.11)
Therefore, if negative marginal costs are ruled out tˆ1 can be the optimal tax level if
(B.11) is satisfied. Because tˆ2b can be optimal only if η > η
∗, requiring marginal costs
to be non-negative does not further restrict the feasibility of tˆ2b being the optimal tax
level.
In order for tˆ3b to be the optimal tax level, we must have ν > e
0 (β − δ) + α − η,
which is true only if
η > η∗ − α
2
. (B.12)
If negative marginal costs are ruled out, an interior tax level that strictly dominates
a quantity policy can exist if (B.12) holds. Without restrictions on marginal cost an
interior tax level that dominates the quantity policy can always exist with a sufficiently
high ν.
For β ≥ 2δ
In order for tˆ1 to be the optimal tax, either ν ≥ ν∗min or ν ≥ ν∗max must hold. Because
we must restrict the lower bound on ν and not the upper bound, and because ν∗max is
relevant when η < η∗, we need only determine conditions under which ν∗max ≤ η. This
is true whenever
η ≥ η
∗
2
+
e0
12
√
3δ (2β − δ). (B.13)
Therefore, if negative marginal costs are ruled out the interior tax level that strictly
dominates a quantity policy can exist if (B.13) is satisfied. Without restrictions on
marginal cost, an interior tax level that dominates the quantity policy can always exist
with a sufficiently large ν.
